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ABSTRACT
A limited amount of research was found regarding teacher perceptions of their ability to
respond to an active shooter incident. This study was intended to provide relevant information
for school leaders to use in their efforts to improve school safety measures. Data was collected in
a mixed-methods, explanatory model research study using a survey, the Active Assailant
Prevention and Response Survey (AAPRS), and semi-structured interviews. Teachers enrolled in
graduate-level education courses at a large university in the southeastern United States made up
the study’s population. A majority of the sample population agreed that they were confident in
the planning protocol (M = 3.22), confident regarding their school’s drills and procedures (M =
3.12), and confident in their ability to respond to an active school shooter (M = 3.01).
Participants reported less confidence in the following areas: access to crisis management plans,
involvement in developing crisis management plans, effectiveness of drills, training for faculty,
training for students, and ability to protect students during an attack.
Demographic factors such as gender (p > .10), years of teaching experience (p > .10), and
presence of security (p > .10) during the school day did not significantly impact teacher
perceptions of their ability to respond to an active school shooter. Teachers working in secondary
schools with students in grades 6 through 12 had slightly less confidence in their ability to
respond than teachers working in elementary school settings, but this difference was not
statistically significant (p > .10). Teachers working in schools that conducted fewer than three
active shooter drills per year had less confidence in their ability to respond to an active shooter
crisis than those whose schools conducted drills more frequently. A Pearson r correlation
revealed r (109) = .520, p < .001, demonstrating a strong correlation between perceptions of
iii

planning protocol and teacher’s perceived ability to respond to an active shooter. There was also
a significant correlation, r (109) = .637, p < .001, between participant perceptions of drills and
procedures and perceptions of ability to respond.
The results from the interviews were consistent with the AAPRS findings and helped
illuminate teacher perceptions. Many of those interviewed suggested that a more personalized
approach to training that explored specific dynamics of individual classrooms would improve
confidence in their ability to respond to an active shooter. The interviews also revealed a need
for drills or practice during less structured times of the day, such as lunch or during an assembly,
so that teachers and students can feel more prepared. Interview participants revealed a need for
first-aid training as well as training for what to do if an attacker infiltrated their classroom.
Policymakers and school leaders will be informed through these findings of factors that can help
teachers feel more confident in their ability to respond to an active shooter crisis.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
In May 2018, Cable News Network (CNN) compiled a list of some of the deadliest
single-day mass shootings in the United States since 1949. There were 35 incidents on the list
and the number of lives taken in any single incident ranged from 58 to 8 (CNN, 2018). Eight of
the incidents took place at a school. In the 1990’s, American schools found themselves
embroiled in overwhelming media coverage of school shooting attacks that left parents fearing
for the safety of their children (Langman, 2009; Newman, Fox, Harding, Mehta, & Roth, 2004).
The shootings and the killings continue in American schools. These acts of devastating violence
have a dramatic impact on school administrators, teachers, staff, parents, and students in the
school community. In response to the fear these attacks cause and the number of students losing
their lives in active shooter attacks in schools, this study sought to analyze teacher perceptions of
their ability to protect students during an active shooter attack. Crises such as these can wreak
havoc on the community, the students, and the public view of school as an institution (Newman
et al., 2004; Rider, 2016). Though teachers are not the only individuals affected by these attacks,
they are regarded as the first line of defense and the actions of teachers can drastically impact the
damage caused during an active assailant crisis (Jonson, 2017).

Background of the Study
A crisis at a school can take many forms. Crises in any form can make students, school
faculty, staff, and parents feel unsafe. The feeling of safety in school is an important condition
for academic success (Skiba & Sprague, 2008). In a 2019 nationwide poll conducted by the
Associated Press, 67% of parents reported feeling that schools were less safe than they were 20
1

years prior, and 27% of the parents polled said they were not confident in the ability of schools
to respond to active shooter incidents (Swanson, Thompson, & Fingerhut, 2019). However, In
the face of this fear, reports compiled by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES,
2019) indicated a slight decline in other types of violence such as gang violence, sexual assault,
and fighting on school campuses. Reports have also noted that schools around the country
implemented more safety measures from 2015 to 2017 than the entire decade prior (Musu,
Zhang, Wang, Zhang, & Oudekerk, 2019). The fears of parents are compounded by heavily
publicized active shooter attacks on schools such as the 1999 attack at Columbine High School
in Colorado, the 2012 attack at Sandy Hook Elementary in Connecticut, and the 2018 attack at
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Florida. These fears have led to the implementation
of policies that have little to no research to substantiate their effectiveness (Borum, Cornell,
Modzeleski, & Jimerson, 2009; Cowan, Vaillancourt, Rossen, & Pollitt, 2013; Jonson, 2017).
The trend in active assailant attacks does not seem to be dissipating. The Center for
Homeland Defense and Security US Naval Postgraduate School (2019) compiled information
from the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
concerning active assailant attacks in K-12 school settings dating back to 1971. Table 1 outlines
the number of incidents as well as the number of injuries, including fatalities, by decade. With 12
incidents in the 1970s, 29 incidents in the 1980s, 31 in the 1990s, 45 in the early 2000s, and 49
between 2010 and 2019, there is clearly no reduction in the number of incidents (Riedman &
O’Neill, 2019). Injuries and fatalities from these attacks continue to increase across decades and
while these incidents continue to occur in American schools, a sense of safety will never be fully
achieved (Riedman & O’Neill, 2019). If crisis management plans in schools focus on preparing
2

teachers using research-based methods of prevention and response, then hopefully these jarring
statistics will begin to decrease, and ultimately disappear.
Table 1
K-12 Active Assailant Incidents and Injuries by Decade
Decade
1970-1979
1980-1989
1990-1999

Number of Active Assailant
Incidents
12
29
31

Number of Injuries Including
Deaths
54
206
171

2000-2009
45
2010-2019
49
Note. Adapted from Riedman & O’Neill, (2019).

92
224

Law and Policy Regarding School Safety
The continued occurrence of active shooter incidents warrants more research-based
planning and protocol in K-12 schools to improve teacher perceptions of their ability to respond
to attacks (Katsiyannis, Whitford, & Ennis, 2018; Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018). What
constitutes effective planning and protocol for active assailant attacks has been a contested topic
with solutions offered from divergent sources (Borum et al., 2009; DeVos, Azar, Nielsen, &
Whitaker, 2018; Trump, 2019). Special interest groups, parents of active shooter victims, school
leaders, and politicians have proposed laws and policies to help make school safer, but what is
the answer (Cowan et al., 2013)? What policies and training programs are most effective in
preventing and limiting the damage caused by these crisis attacks? To better understand factors
that affect how teachers perceive their ability to respond to an active shooter, this researcher
analyzed teacher responses to questions concerning crisis management planning and practices in
3

their schools. Participants were then asked to rate how confident they felt in their ability to
respond. Though many factors may impact how a teacher would react when faced with a crisis,
crisis management theory research supports the idea that proper planning and protocols in
preparation for a crisis can positively impact the reactions of those involved (Pearson & Clarie,
1998; Shrivastava, Mitroff , & Alpaslan, 2013). A continued effort to understand the impact
school protocols have on teacher perceptions will help direct funding away from ineffective
strategies and toward quality crisis management plans.
Billions of dollars were spent between 2001 and 2019 to add metal detectors, security
badge technology, safety training programs, and security cameras in America’s schools
(Jagodzinski, 2019, Jonson, 2017; Ruger, 2019). The United States Congress, in 2018, passed the
STOP School Violence Act to allocate over a billion dollars for increased security measures in
schools through 2021 (Kubena & Watts, 2019). The 2019 legislative session in Florida brought
forth Senate Bill 7030, which allocated millions of dollars of funding for the Marjory Stoneman
Douglas Act passed the previous year. In states around the country new laws resulted in over
$950 million dollars toward making schools safer, specifically directed at combating active
shooter attacks (Ruger, 2019). Researchers have stated that metal detectors, cameras, and
security badges, are not the most effective methods for reducing violence from active assailant
attacks (Bushman, Calvert, Dredze, Jablonski, Morrill, Romer, & Webster, 2016; Duplechain &
Morris, 2014). Some of the emerging policies emphasize mental health care, school climate,
teacher training, and student preparation as valuable components of active shooter crisis
prevention (Bushman et al., 2016; Katsiyannis et al., 2018). An active shooter roaming a school
campus, is a manifestation of a larger issue that should have been made secure long before the
4

breach of the school’s security systems (Jonson, 2017; Langman, 2009). Crisis management
theory points to effective prevention, protection, response, and recovery training for teachers and
school leaders as keys to making schools safer and helping parents, staff, and students feel safe
in schools (Brown, 2016; Bushman et al., 2016; Department of Education, 2002; Scherz, 2006).
Due to the importance of this safety issue, and as a result of increased safety initiatives,
researchers are starting to uncover programs that show promise for making schools safer (DeVos
et al., 2018; Frazzano, & Snyder, 2014; Kubena & Watts, 2019). Programs that demonstrate
more effective results include: implementing school climate factors that promote safety,
instituting anonymous reporting systems, increasing mental health access for students, improving
training methods for faculty and staff, and implementing the threat assessment model (Borum et
al., 2009; Bushman, Newman, Calvert, Downey, Dredze, Gottfredson, Webster, 2013; Bushman
et al., 2016; Chapman, 2018; Jones, 2017). Finding research to support training methods and
safety features has proven difficult due to the rarity of violent attacks on schools, the variability
among attackers, and variety regarding the demographics of schools where attacks took place.
Teacher perceptions provide a useful tool to help evaluate the effectiveness of safety protocols
and crisis management plans in schools (Graveline, 2003; Rider, 2016).

The Role of Teachers in Prevention and Response
On Valentine’s Day in 2018, former student Nikolas Cruz entered Marjory Stoneman
Douglas High School where he killed 14 students and 3 adults (Berman, 2018). On December
14, 2012, 20-year-old Adam Lanza entered Sandy Hook Elementary school where he killed 20
students and 6 adults (Vogel et al., 2012). On April 20, 1999, seniors Eric Harris and Dylan
5

Klebold entered Columbine High school where they killed 12 students and 1 teacher (Langman,
2009). These types of events are rare, but they instigate fear, and the repercussions create a
lasting impact on the communities affected (Bushman et al., 2013; Jagodzinski, 2019). To
combat this fear, politicians and communities began calling for more security; but what is the
solution to such a complex problem? Gates, security badges, armed resource officers, and visible
security cameras may increase the feelings of safety, but making schools safe is more about the
people, human-systems, prevention methods, and focused preparation for school personnel and
students (American Institute of Research, 2019; Newman et al., 2004; Page, 2017).
One possible avenue to help parents feel safer involves implementing crisis management
programs in schools that increase the self-efficacy of teachers in their ability to respond to these
threatening acts of violence (Borum et al. 2009). Creating a climate of safety, increasing mental
health screenings, lowering the ratio of mental health professionals to students, developing
consistent disciplinary plans, and providing training for teachers, school leaders, and students in
reporting and recognizing possible predictive elements of violence are all plausible methods to
improve safety in schools (Borum, 2017; Jonson, 2017; Langman, 2018; Newman et al., 2004;
Petrovich, 2016). In the aftermath of the attack at Columbine High School in 1999, the fear
created by these rare but devastating active shooter incidents increased the nation’s attention to
issues of school safety (Sprague, Smith, & Stieber, 2002). The expedient response by legislators
and the department of education has caused money to be spent on features that may, or may not,
make schools safer (Borum, 2009; Ruger, 2019; Trump, 2019). The effects of these devastating
incidents impact the entire school and surrounding community in immeasurable ways. Students,
parents, the community, and all involved in the school are devasted when a crisis occurs. The
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focus of this research is the role of teachers as the first line of defense against these attacks
(Embry-Martin, 2017; Graveline, 2003, Rider, 2016). Most school shootings only last a few
minutes, so increasing the self-efficacy of teachers in their ability to prevent and respond more
effectively to issues of violence and safety is paramount (Bandura, 1993; Blanchfield, 2013;
Borum, 2009, Jonson, Moon, & Hendry, 2018; Newman et al., 2004).

Statement of the Problem
There is a paucity of research regarding teacher perceptions concerning crisis
management protocol in relationship to their ability to respond competently during an active
shooter scenario (Brown, 2008; Bushman et al., 2016; Embry-Martin 2017). A deeper
understanding of how crisis management protocol, school demographics, personal demographics,
and the presence of security guards impact the perceptions of teachers in their ability to respond
to active assailant attacks is needed (Brown, 2008; Bushman et al., 2013; DeVos et al, 2018,
Embry-Martin, 2017). With the current status of fear stated by parents for their children due to
active shooter incidents; politicians, parents, teachers, and principals want to implement
measures now that can help make schools safer and diminish fears (PDK International, 2018;
Ruger, 2019). Money is being rerouted and funneled into programs and measures to make
schools safer, but what are teachers experiencing on the front lines? What programs and methods
are being implemented, which are effective, and what does effective look like in practice?
A detailed look at many types of schools in multiple settings is needed to help add to the
knowledge of programs and training practices that help teachers feel more confident in their
ability to respond to violence and crises in schools (Brown, 2008; Graveline, 2003; Rider 2016).
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The researcher’s intent is to add to the available knowledge of teacher perceptions regarding the
implementation of different prevention and safety measures in schools across grade levels and
school types. Analyzing teacher perceptions across a variety of school settings may offer new
insight into school safety initiatives for improving safety in all settings (Embry-Martin, 2017).
Though populations are divergent, policies that show the potential to increase teacher selfefficacy could be beneficial on a much larger scale.

Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to analyze teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to
active shooter attacks, and to better understand how crisis management protocols and
demographic factors might affect those perceptions. By analyzing responses from teachers across
different grade-levels and school types, this research sought to provide a more richly detailed
understanding of the effect training methods, demographics, and security measures have on
teacher perceptions concerning their ability to respond during an active shooter crisis. Due to the
limited research regarding teacher perceptions, the findings of this study may lead to
improvements in active shooter response planning in schools.

Definition of Terms
According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2014), violence is the third
leading cause of death among people aged ten to twenty-four, and twelve young people die each
day due to homicide (David-Ferdon, & Simon, 2014). In order to better understand violence (and
more specifically, school violence), it is imperative to use a common vocabulary. Several terms
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have been expanded and refined since the early 1990s as researchers attempted to better
understand, predict, and prevent acts of violence in schools (Bushman et al., 2016; Warnick,
Johnson, & Rocha, 2010). The focus of the study consisted of shootings and attacks in the
context of schools, but mass shootings in multiple settings have been utilized to provide a deeper
analysis of school shootings, particularly in relationship to creating response plans (Frazzano, &
Snyder, 2014). Below is a list of definitions and terms referred to in this study. Some definitions
are school specific, others were used in reference to attacks in multiple settings.
Active shooter/Assailant – “A law enforcement term from the FBI describing a shooting (or
attack) in progress with one or more individuals actively engaged in killing or attempting
to kill people in a populated area” (National Center for Education Statistics, 2018, p.6).
Climate – “The policies, practices, and procedures as well as the behaviors that get rewarded,
supported, and expected in a work setting and the meaning those imply for the setting's
members ” (Schneider, Erhart, & Macey, 2011, p. 3)
Collective Teacher-Efficacy – “The perceptions of teachers in a school that the efforts of the
faculty as a whole will have a positive effect” (Goddard, Hoy, & Hoy, 2000, p. 480).
Emergency Preparedness – “A school employee’s ability to respond appropriately in the event
of a school shooting, which includes the prevention, reaction, and follow-up actions
performed in the event of a school shooting” (Rider, 2016, p. 11).
Mass School Shooting – “A situation in which one or more people intentionally plan and
execute the killing or injury of four or more people, not including themselves, using one
or more guns, with the killings or injuries taking place on school grounds during the
school day or during a school-sponsored event on school grounds, excluding organized
9

gang shootings” (Katsiyannis, Whitford, and Ennis, 2018, p. 3).
Mass shootings – Shooting incidents with four or more casualties (Layden, 2010; Langman,
2009).
Organizational Crisis – “A low-probability, high-impact process that threatens the viability of
the organization and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of
resolutions, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made swiftly” (Pearson and
Clair, 1998, p. 60).
Organizational Crisis Management– “A systematic attempt by organizational members with
external stakeholders to avert crises or to effectively manage those that do occur.
Organizational crisis management is considered effective when key stakeholders believe
that the success outcomes of short and long-range impacts of crises outweigh the failure
outcomes” (Pearson and Clair, 1998, p. 61).
Prevention – “What schools and districts can do to reduce or eliminate risk to life and property”
(Department of Education, 2004, p. 12).
Rampage shootings - Attacks on multiple people who are seemingly selected at random by
students who attend, or attended, the school under attack (Langman, 2009).
Response – “The steps to take during a crisis” (Department of Education, 2004, p. 12).
School Violence – “Aggression with the goal of extreme physical harm, such as injury or death
directed at others or at one’s self in a school setting” (Bushman et al., 2016, p. 18).
Self-efficacy. - “Peoples’ judgments of their capabilities to organize and execute courses of
action required to attain designated types of performance” (Bandura, 1986, p. 391).
Severe Targeted School Violence – A term used in international research that describes
10

attempted multiple killings where the school, or school property, is specifically chosen as
the location of the attack and victims are either randomly selected or selected based on
symbolic purposes of position. This type of attack excludes attacks caused by social,
gang-related, or individual factors where the school location is a choice of convenience
(Böckler, Seeger, Sitzer, & Heitmeyer, 2013).
Targeted school shooting - When a school is specifically selected as the intended location of a
shooting attack with the intention of multiple killings where victims are selected either at
random or for symbolic purposes. This excludes shootings caused by social, gang-related,
or individual factors where the school location is a choice of convenience (Warnick,
Johnson, & Rocha, 2010).

Theoretical Framework
Crisis management theory served as the theoretical framework to analyze teacher
perceptions of their ability to respond during a crisis. This framework also helped identify how
teacher perceptions might be affected by personal demographics and school characteristics. The
principles of crisis management theory also provided a framework to better understand active
assailant attacks and the crisis management plans implemented in schools to prevent attacks and
diminish potential damage during and after an attack. Organizational crisis management theories
apply to active assailant attacks in schools and to school safety protocols because these theories
were developed to fit a wide range of organizational structures and crisis types (Boin, Stern, &
Sundelius, 2016; Graveline, 2003; Rider, 2016). This study used crisis management theory to
better understand active assailant attacks and the protocols implemented in schools to combat
11

these crises. Prior to explaining how crisis management theory applies to teacher perceptions of
their ability to respond to an active shooter attack, the usefulness of teacher perceptions for this
study is explained. Crisis management theory provided multiple definitions for the term crisis.
The study focused on one particular definition of crisis and this selected definition provides a
guide for the main tenets of this study. An explanation of this crisis definition and why it was
selected is provided for clarity as part of the theoretical framework.

Perceptions in Educational Research
Perceptions are a useful tool in educational research as evinced by the numerous
scholarly reports, dissertations, and peer reviewed articles analyzing teacher perceptions on a
vast array of educational phenomena. A general keyword search for “teacher perceptions”
through the University’s library catalogue and educational leadership databases produced 14,582
results on numerous topics. These results demonstrate the viability and expediency of teacher
perceptions in advancing knowledge concerning educational practices. School safety,
preparation, planning, implementation, and preparedness are factors involved in this study that
rely on the perceptions of teachers (Brown, 2016; Embry-Martin, 2017, Rider, 2008). How
teachers and school leaders perceive the level of threat regarding active assailant scenarios
directly affects the preparation and planning implemented (Pearson, & Clair, 1998). The
psychology of teacher perceptions in reaction to threatening situations also exposes how
preparation and planning can influence those reactions during a crisis (Goodman, Harnett, &
Knight, 2018).

12

Defining Crisis
An active shooter event is a crisis for any school and community. Peter Langman (2009)
pointed out in his book, Why Kids Kill, that “a student threatening mass murder is a student in
crisis” (p. 9). Crisis management theorists and researchers assert that, “crises have been and
always will be with us” (Boin, Stern, & Sundelius, 2016, p. 1). Defining crisis and crisis
management is a hotly debated topic among researchers in this broad field, but each definition
contains elements that apply directly to active assailant attacks in schools (Brown, 2008;
Graveline, 2003). The application of crisis management theories to active shooter preparedness
offers a theoretical lens to help understand how these events occur and how schools can limit the
extensive damage caused in attacks (Mitroff, Alpaslan, & Green, 2004; Pearson & Claire, 1998:
Shrivastava et al., 2013).
Boin, Stern, and Sundelius, (2016) define crisis as an undesirable and unexpected “phase
of disorder” in the normal development of a system that requires immediate and urgent decision
making (p. 2). Robert Irvine, president of the Institute for Crisis Management, maintains that
everyone in an organization is a crisis manager (1997). He goes on to define crisis as “a
significant disruption that stimulates extensive news media coverage and public scrutiny and
disrupts the organization’s normal business activities” (Irvine, 1997, p. 1). Shrivastava, Mitroff,
and Alpaslan (2013), while promoting more extensive education concerning crisis and crisis
management, rejected the notion that a universal definition exists for crisis or for crisis
management. Instead, they offer a distinction between natural crises, which are unavoidable and
caused by nature, and technological crises caused by agents or organizations (Shrivastava et al.,
2013). This technological definition depicts a crisis as a process, not an event, that expands and
13

spreads in five stages.

Figure 1: Crisis Stages
Note: Adapted from Shrivastava et al., 2013; p. 8.
Figure 1 provides a visual model to better understand a crisis as a process as opposed to a
singular event. These theories offer a vantage point to explain the complexities of active assailant
attacks in order to better analyze crisis management strategies as perceived by teachers. This will
also assist in the evaluation of crisis management protocol to begin the process of vetting
different programs and policies for effectiveness in predicting, preparing for, responding to, and
limiting damage caused by active assailant attacks.

Crisis Management Theory
Pearson and Clair (1998), in their attempt to reframe crisis management, state that, “those
interested in the psychological view might consider how individual’s perceptions before, during,
and after a crisis are mediated by organizational intervention” (p. 59). The major theoretical
14

focus of this study involved teacher perceptions of their school’s organizational interventions
concerning crisis management protocol for preventing, responding to, and recovering from active
assailant attacks. Pearson and Clair (1998) provide another useful definition of organizational
crisis that can be applied to active shooter incidents. “An organizational crisis is a lowprobability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and is characterized
by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolutions, as well as by a belief that decisions must
be made swiftly” (p. 60).
Crisis management theory, an expanding and complex theoretical framework, is used in
business, economics, world governments, history, political science, psychology, and public
administration (Mitroff et al., 2004). Crisis management theory provides a valuable lens to
comparatively analyze different schools of thought and methodologies for training and preparing
teachers and schools to respond to active assailant scenarios. According to Shrivistava (2013),
“Our language and concepts about crisis, as well as our explanations of their causes and
consequences, shape our crisis planning and ultimately the resilience of human communities” (p.
8). If the theories regarding crisis management are applied to incidents of active shooters in
schools, a theoretical basis for understanding the role of teachers can be better outlined and
defined in ways that may improve preparation and response practices.
This study focused on understanding perceptions among teachers concerning their ability
to respond to an active shooter incident. Another focus was to analyze teacher perceptions of the
planning and procedures for active shooter scenarios and to identify relationships that may exist
between demographic factors and teacher perceptions in terms of protecting students during an
active shooter crisis. A deeper understanding of these factors may help improve school policy
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regarding school safety and crisis intervention to help increase the confidence that teachers have
in their ability to keep students safe.

Research Questions
In order to better understand the impact that planning, safety protocol, and various
demographic factors have on the perceptions of teachers regarding their ability to respond to
active assailant situations, the following research questions were created. These questions guide
the data collection and research methods utilized in this study.
RQ 1. How do teachers perceive their ability to respond to active shooter scenarios?
RQ 2. What are the perceptions of teachers regarding their school’s planning and preparation for
active shooter scenarios?
RQ 3. What are the perceptions of teachers regarding their school’s drills and practice
procedures for active shooter scenarios?
RQ 4. What relationships exist, if any, between perceptions of planning and preparation for
active shooter scenarios, and preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident among
teachers?
RQ 5. What relationships exist, if any, between perceptions of procedures and drills, and
perceptions of preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident among teachers?
RQ 6. What effect, if any, do school factors such as presence of security, and gradeconfiguration have on the perceptions of teachers in responding to active shooter
scenarios?
RQ 7. What effect, if any, do individual demographic factors such as gender and years of
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educational experience have on the perceptions of teachers in responding to active
shooter scenarios?

Limitations
This study to analyze the perceptions of teachers concerning how prepared they feel to
respond to an active shooter crisis was limited by the following factors.
1. The sample size was limited to teachers enrolled in graduate-level education courses at a
large university in the southeastern United States.
2. None of the participants were involved in an actual active shooter scenario, so the results
focused primarily on teacher perceptions.
3. The use of multi-case study interviews provides for rich data, but still does not provide
findings that can be generalized to larger populations.
4. Using surveys in research is problematic due to low response rates, possible dishonesty
among participants, and inability to control for who elects to complete the survey.
5. There was approximately a 14% return rate for the AAPRS survey instrument, which
limits the generalizability of the findings in this study.

Delimitations
In any endeavor to analyze perceptions, concessions must be made in terms of selecting a
population and sample that fits the needs of the project. The design and methodology of this
study contained the following delimitations.
1. Participants included teachers enrolled in graduate-level education courses at a large
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university in the southeastern United States.
2. Participant school types, locations, and districts were limited by the pool of teachers
enrolled in graduate-level education courses at a large university in the southeastern
United States at the time of the study.
3. The only school personnel included in the study were teachers even though there are
countless other individuals responsible for safety in schools whose perceptions are
influential.

Assumptions
To collect a sample fitting the needs of this research project, assumptions were made regarding
elements beyond the control of the researcher. The researcher approached this study with the
following assumptions.
1. The participants filling out the surveys were certified teachers currently working in
Florida schools.
2. All answers to survey and interview items were honest and factual based on the personal
experiences and perceptions of participants.

Organization of the Study
This study contains five chapters of organization to better analyze and understand the
perceptions of teachers’ regarding their preparation and ability to respond to active assailant
crisis scenarios in schools. The first chapter provides background for the study, details the
problem and the purpose of the study, includes the seven research questions that guide the study,
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and identifies the methods and limitations of the study.
Chapter 2 includes a review of relevant literature covering the history of active shooter
scenarios in schools, the role of teachers in school safety, school law and policy related to active
shooter prevention, the importance of teacher perceptions, crisis management theory, selfefficacy, and the components of active assailant protection in schools. The second chapter also
supports the use of an explanatory mixed-methods model in providing more rich descriptions and
a deeper understanding of teacher perceptions (Bogdan, & Biklen, 2007).
Chapter 3 contains a detailed description of the concepts used to conduct the study as
well as the methodology of the study. This includes the selection of participants, data collection
methods and instrumentation, and a plan for analyzing the data. In the fourth chapter the data is
analyzed using descriptive, correlational, and qualitative statistical methods and calculations. In
the final chapter, Chapter 5, the findings are discussed and recommendations for future school
safety measures as well as future studies regarding this topic are outlined.

Summary
The current research regarding safety and protocol for active assailant scenarios is one of
vital importance. Keeping students safe and helping parents feel that their children are safe is the
goal of safety training protocol and practices in schools (DeVos et al., 2018). The purpose of this
study was to better understand how crisis management protocols and demographic factors may
affect the perceived ability of teachers to prevent and respond to active assailant incidents. These
perceptions, and the factors that affect them, will add to the limited literature on this topic in the
hopes that the findings will be used to improve school safety practices and protocol.
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
There is a paucity of research regarding teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to
an active assailant crisis (Brown, 2008; Bushman et al., 2016; Rider, 2016). A deeper
understanding of how school safety protocol, school demographics, and teacher demographics
impact a teacher’s perceived ability to respond to active shooter scenarios is needed (DeVos et
al., 2018; Dwyer, 2002). The perceptions of teachers in their ability to respond to active shooter
events, as identified through the lens of their own experiences with school protocol and crisis
planning methods, can provide valuable information for school leaders in the development of
school safety initiatives (Embry-Martin, 2008; Rider, 2016). The theoretical concept in this study
involved the application of crisis management theory to active shooter attacks and safety
protocols in schools.
A search of educational research databases including EBSCO, ERIC, SAGE, and EBSCO
PSYCH using key search terms: “teacher perceptions,” and “crisis management,” or “active
shooter” uncovered five research-based articles directly focused on teacher perceptions regarding
active assailant prevention, preparation, and response. One was from the country of Turkey, four
of the five works concerned high school teachers only, two out of the five were qualitative
studies with few participants, and two offered quantitative data from limited sample sizes
specified to certain geographic areas. The intent of this study was to add to the limited research
and help codify the perceptions of teachers regarding this far reaching and important issue of
school safety (Newman et al., 2004; Page, 2017). Designating plans, programs, and money to
improve crisis management plans without a clear vision of what is happening in schools will not
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help the nation feel safer at school (Jonson, 2017). The limited data about teacher perceptions
regarding school safety protocol could continue to exacerbate feelings of insecurity among
parents and students. Not knowing how programs and safety measures are being implemented or
how they impact teachers could lead to millions of dollars in funding spent on ineffective or
unnecessary programs and measures.
The intent of this study was to add to the limited research in this area by analyzing the
perceptions of teachers regarding this far reaching and important issue of school safety.
Identifying various factors that affect the perceptions of teachers in their ability to respond to
active shooter scenarios may lead to improvements in active shooter response planning, and
reduce fears regarding school safety (Newman et al., 2004; Page, 2017). The following sections
provide a detailed literature review of topics related to active shooter scenarios and the role of
teachers concerning prevention and response to these deadly attacks.
The literature review begins with a discussion of mass killings and a global analysis of
targeted school attacks. A history of active shooter attacks in schools is followed by a description
of national and state legislation regarding school safety policy enacted in response to mass
school shootings and gun violence. National and state policy effects on active shooter prevention
and crisis response protocol in schools provides a connection to the importance of teachers and
their perceptions in the analysis and implementation of school safety programs. After discussing
legislation and policy regarding active shooter attacks in schools, there is a section devoted to the
theoretical framework of crisis management theory. This theoretical frame provides an in-depth
understanding of active shooter scenarios along with valuable methodology to guide policy and
protocol for prevention and response to attacks. A description of the concept of teacher self21

efficacy promotes the value of effective training and crisis management planning in schools to
improve teacher response to attacks. The chapter ends with research to support the use of an
explanatory mixed-methods model to provide a deeper understanding of teacher perceptions by
combining results from qualitative and quantitative data.

Mass Killings and Targeted School Attacks
November 14, 2019 a 16-year-old boy shot five students, killing 2 and wounding 3,
before turning the gun on himself at his school in California (Winton, 2019). On August 4, 2019
Connor Betts shot 36 people, killing nine, just outside a bar in Ohio (Pearson, 2019). On October
17, 2018 Vladislav Roslyakov killed 20 students and wounded 70 with a shotgun in a school in
Crimea (Pearson, 2019). October 1, 2017 Stephen Paddock killed 58 people and injured more
than 800 from his Mandalay Bay Hotel window in Las Vegas, Nevada (Pearson 2019). Mass
Shootings, or mass homicide attacks, internationally gain wide attention in the media. Ambiguity
of definitions and limited access to data in certain global areas, impedes research on these attacks
making it difficult to create global comparisons (Böckler et al., 2013; Lankford, 2016; Lott,
2018). Nearly all definitions exclude terrorist attacks and attacks related to military combat.
Some definitions require a minimum of 4 deaths, some definitions require the perpetrators to
have connections to the site of attack, some definitions require the attacker(s) to only use guns,
and yet other definitions contain complex exclusions regarding assailant motives (Böckler et al.,
2013; Borum, 2017; Langman, 2004; Warnick et al., 2010). The lack of clearly defined terms
makes it nearly impossible to determine the depth and breadth of this phenomenon in a global
context (Harding, Fox, & Mehta, 2002). Some areas of the world are embroiled in
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political/ideological conflicts and attacks on every aspect of society either go unreported or are
too commonplace to garner significant global media attention (Bennouna, Boetzelaer, Rojas,
Richard, Karume, & Nshombo, 2017; Leushner, Bondu, Schroer-Hippel, Panno, Neumetzler,
Fisch, & Scheithauer, 2011). Most media portrayals and researchers point to the United States as
the leading nation in terms of mass murder attacks that align with many of the definitions
presented (Agnich, 2010; Agnich, 2015; Lankford, 2016; Pearson, 2019). In 2016, Lankford
published an article stating that the United States accounted for 31% of all reported mass
shooting attacks in his examination of mass shootings in 171 countries between 1966 and 2012.
With 90 total perpetrators of this type of violence, the United States recorded twice as many
attacks as the next four countries combined (Lankford, 2016).
Not only does the United States lead the world in public mass shootings, but this trend
carries over into schools. Böckler (2013) wrote a book analyzing international school shooting
incidents and found that between 1925 and 2011 the United States accounted for 76 school
shooting attacks, while the rest of the world had 44 reported incidents. In some nations where
access to guns is restricted, reports of shooting attacks in schools are much lower than in the
United States, but attacks with other weapons still appear in media headlines (Agnich, 2015;
Harding et al., 2002). Rampage and mass homicide attacks in schools have become a perpetual
problem that needs to be addressed globally by continually updating and adding to research in
areas that show promise for reducing or eliminating this safety issue.
In most other aspects, youth violence in the United States has steadily declined since the
1990s (Blanchfield & Ladd, 2013; Scherz, 2006; Page, 2017). The early 1990s saw a massive
increase in violence in the United States attributed to gang and drug related cultural issues
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(Scherz, 2006). Youth violence decreased throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s as a result
of national, state, and local policies aimed at reducing this deadly trend in drug use and gang
violence through a multipronged approach involving anti-drug media campaigns, increased
security measures, improved school climate initiatives, and more stringent punishment for rule
violations in schools (Blanchfield & Ladd, 2013; Kubena & Watts, 2019). It seemed the new
programs and policies were working, until February 2, 1996 when fourteen-year-old Barry
Loukaitis entered Frontier Middle School with a hunting rifle, two handguns, and 78 rounds of
ammunition. During this unprecedented style of attack, Loukaitis killed a teacher along with two
students and forever altered the dynamics of school violence (Scherz, 2006; Coleman, 2004).
There is no way to tell definitively exactly how many mass school shootings have taken
place (Lott, 2018). Although a multitude of different agencies attempt to collect data regarding
school shootings in all forms, no record is exhaustive and many use divergent definitions for
their data collection sets (Nicodemo & Petronio, 2018; Riedman & O’Neill, 2019). In 2016, the
New York Police Department compiled data regarding active shooter incidents from the
Department of Homeland Security and the FBI from 1966 through 2016. They reported 308 total
incidents and 83 of them took place at a school (O’Neill, Miller, Waters, 2016). The Center for
Homeland Security and the Naval Postgraduate School contends that there were 465 school
shootings between 2010 and 2019 (Riedman et al., 2019). This number includes any time a gun
was fired at a school or school owned property. The same data set reports that 49 of these
incidents fit the FBI definition of an active shooter attack (Riedman et al., 2019). The data for
2018 and 2019 are particularly alarming, showing that a gun was fired at a school location 204
times with 15 of these incidents fitting the active shooter definition (Riedman et al., 2019).
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School shootings are a problem. Even though these events are rare, they have shown an increase
in frequency since the FBI’s first recorded case in 1940 (O’Neill et al., 2016). No significant sign
of decrease in these attacks exists (Katsiyannis et al., 2018). The fears of parents that schools are
not prepared to handle active shooter attacks are noted (Agnich, 2015; CNN, 2018; Jonson,
2017), and with no end to these attacks in sight, schools must make significant efforts in
response to these crises in schools.

History of US K-12 School Mass Shootings
The FBI, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and
numerous researchers have worked to collect data from media outlets, news reports, police
records, and various sources in an effort to better understand and identify the history of mass
school shooting attacks in the United States. Often, researchers will turn to these sources in order
to compile data sets for their research (Borum, 2017; Bushman et al., 2013, Langman, 2018;
Newman et al., 2004; Katsiyannis et al., 2018). The earliest description of a targeted mass school
shooting occurred in 1940 when principal Verlin Spencer shot six school administrators after
being fired from South Pasadena Jr. High School (Williams, 2017). The extensive sources
utilized for this study do not contain any other similar attack descriptions until the 1970s. Most
other school shooting incidents prior to the 1970s related to desegregation in schools, were social
disputes, accidents, or grievances where only one or two people were killed (Katsiyannis et al.,
2018; Riedman et al., 2019). One major incident occurred in 1966, but it was an attack at the
University of Texas, where Charles Whitman climbed the observation deck and shot 46 people
during 96 minutes of terror (Wallenfeldt, 2016).
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This section is intended to outline the breadth and variety of school attacks. A better
understanding of attacks and attackers allows these events to be further classified as crisis
situations for the application of the crisis management theoretical frame. The different motives,
methods, weapons, and styles of attacks makes finding solutions much more problematic. People
should not be able to enter a school campus with weapons and begin taking lives. Combatting
this issue demands a multi-faceted approach.

1970s and 1980s
Data for the 70s and 80s contain 41 K-12 active assailant attacks resulting in 260 injuries
or deaths (Riedman et al., 2019). The increase in attacks at schools during this time is attributed
to desegregation violence as well as the counterculture movement and reactions to political
events such as the Vietnam War (Page, 2017). The late 1980s also instigated a rise in many other
forms of violence in schools that fed into the early 1990s, where an increase in gang activity and
drug use followed the expansion of crack cocaine and drug trafficking elements into the United
States (Warnick et al., 2010). The majority of K-12 active assailant cases compiled throughout
the 70s and 80s were perpetrated by adults at elementary schools (Katsiyannis et al., 2018;
Pearson, 2019). The large number of injuries during this decade is attributed to one major
hostage incident in 1986 at Cokeville Elementary School in Wyoming where 78 students were
injured when a makeshift bomb exploded (Mitchell, 1996). The perpetrators were adults who
committed suicide during the attack (Mitchell, 1996).
From 1970 to 1980 there were two notable incidents involving students as perpetrators of
mass school targeted attacks. In 1979 a 16-year-old girl with diagnosed mental health issues shot
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at Grover Cleveland Elementary School from her home across the street from the school, killing
two and wounding nine (Daly, 2014). In Goddard, Kansas in 1985, 14-year-old James Alan
Kearbey donned a long dark coat and dark shades, gathered ample ammunition, a rifle, and a
.357 Magnum pistol, then walked to Goddard Jr. High School and proceeded to shoot four
people (Adame, 2015). One applicable event was found in 1988 but excluded from lists of mass
shooting attacks since only two were killed. The student, 16-year-old Nicholas Elliot, attended
Atlantic Shores Middle School in Virginia. He used a semiautomatic pistol to shoot two teachers
before his gun jammed and a teacher wrestled him to the ground to subdue him (Glavin, 2019).
Reportedly, four homemade bombs were found in his locker after the incident and his intentions
to kill multiple victims were clarified in the proceeding court case where he was sentenced to life
(Somerville, 1989). The attack by Elliot would not be included in most data sets for mass
targeted school violence or mass shootings because there were fewer than 4 injuries.

The 1990s and Columbine
The early 1990s saw an increase in all levels of violence among young people, both in
and outside of school (Bushman et al., 2013; Bushman et al., 2016; Borum, 2017). There were
more than 272 documented cases of shootings that took place at a K-12 school or school-based
location (Riedman et al., 2019). About 31 of these shootings fit the description of an active
assailant attack resulting in 171 wounded or dead (Katsiyannis et al., 2018; Riedman et al.,
2019). Before 1996, most school active shooter attacks continued to be perpetrated by adults
entering school buildings or school events and taking lives as a result of grudges held, mental
health issues, disputes, or work-related conflicts (Glavin, 2019). The 1985 attack in Kansas, by
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Kearbey, stood out as an anomaly and nothing similar had taken place for over a decade. The
majority of mass targeted school violence shifted dramatically after Barry Loukaitis entered
Frontier Middle School in Washington wearing a long black coat to conceal his rifle and two
handguns (Geranios, 2017b). Loukaitis shot and killed three and wounded another before a
teacher, Jon Lane, wrestled the gun away (Geranios, 2017b). The majority of active shooter
incidents since 1996 have been perpetrated by students between the ages of 11 and 19
(Katsiyannis et al., 2018). The 1985 and 1996 incidents portended future school attacks. There
were several similarities to these events including the long cloaks, the massive arsenals, as well
as the motives and methods.
The three years following the incident in Moses Lake, Washington presented some of the
most widely studied and notable active shooting events to date. Bethel, Alaska; Pearl,
Mississippi; West Paducah, Kentucky; Jonesboro, Arkansas; Edinboro, Pennsylvania; and
Springfield, Oregon all witnessed the devastation from active shooter attacks in schools (Glavin,
2019; Katsiyannis et al., 2018). The decade ended with the attack in Littleton Colorado at
Columbine High School, which is arguably the most notorious of the mass school shootings in
America. During this attack, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, who were students at the school,
killed 13 and injured 21 while wearing long dark jackets in an attack they spent months planning
(Langman, 2009). The phrase ‘going Columbine’ is now synonymous with shooting attacks in
schools as a result of the media attention and expansive research dedicated to understanding and
explaining this terrible event (Langman, 2018).
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Twenty-First Century Attacks
In the 30 years from 1970 to 2000 there were about 72 active assailant attacks in
elementary, middle, and high schools in the United States (Riedman et al., 2019). Between 2000
and 2019, the same data set shows 94 attacks, a 31% increase (Riedman et al., 2019). School
shootings continue to increase each decade and 2018 through 2019 were the most dangerous two
years on record, with 109 injuries or fatalities resulting from active shooters (Glavin, 2019).
Table 2 contains data and details for targeted mass school shootings in the United States for K-12
schools dating back to 1940. The table shows the transition from the 80s to the 90s toward more
attacks perpetrated by teenage students in middle and high schools as opposed to adult
perpetrators attacking elementary schools. Much of the information from the table comes from
Katsiyannis in a 2018 article of intentional mass shootings with the addition of three school
shootings that took place after the article’s publication.
The common denominator throughout all this tragedy is that school leaders, politicians,
and communities are working toward solutions. Though these incidents are rare occurrences,
they require quick decisions, and the safety of students is paramount. Each of these shootings
brought changes to the communities that suffered them. Some of the attacks, such as the
Columbine attack and the Parkland, Florida attack in 2018 that claimed 17 lives, have led to
major changes in legislation and policy in an attempt to end these crises in schools (Kubena &
Watts, 2019; Jagodszinski, 2019). After Columbine, the Department of Education analyzed mass
school shooting incidents and found the following: (a) most of the attacks were not sudden or
impulsive; (b) other people knew about the attack before it happened in most cases; (c) there
usually was no direct threat made toward the targets by the attacker; (d) no useful profile exists
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to describe the attackers; (e) prior to the attack, most attackers behaved in a way that caused
others concern or suggested they needed help; (f) many attackers considered or attempted suicide
and had poor coping skills in the face of a loss or personal failure; (g) Many attackers claimed
they were bullied or marginalized by others; (h) most attackers had used weapons in the past and
they had access to guns; (i) others were involved in many of the attacks, either in planning stages
or other capacities; (j) most of the attacks were not ended by law enforcement (Vossekuil, Fein,
Reddy, Borum, & Modzeleski, 2004, p. 31). An extensive amount of data was consulted from a
multitude of sources to compile descriptions of the active assailant attacks on schools found in
Table 2. This extensive table does not account for each shooting incident at a school, but it
includes details about notable mass school attacks from 1940 through 2019.
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Table 2
K-12 20th and 21st century mass shootings
Date

Location

School
Level

Victims:
Killed

Victims:
Wounded

Firearm(s)

Description of Perpetrator(s)

5/6/1940

Pasadena, CA

Jr. High/
Middle

5 adults

1 adult

One pistol .22-caliber
semiautomatic

A 38-year-old White male, described as the
junior high school’s principal, thought he
was going to be ﬁred at the end of the school
year (Williams, 2017).

1/29/1979

San Diego, CA

Elementary

2 adults

8 students
1 adult

One rifle .22-caliber semiautomatic with scope

A 16-year-old white female, described as
having mental issues at the time of the
shooting (Daly, 2014)

2/24/1984

Los Angeles, CA

Elementary

1 student

11 students

One AR-15 rifle, one
shotgun 12-gauge double
barreled, one shotgun 12gauge pump action

A 47-year-old black male described as a
surviving child of the Jonestown massacre
(Lindsey 1984)

1 adult

1/21/1985

5/16/1986

Goddard, KS

Cokeville, WY

Jr. High /
Middle

1 adult

Elementary

0

1 student
2 adults

One Rifle .308 caliber semiautomatic, one pistol .357
caliber

78 students

Five rifles and explosives

A 43-year-old white mail and a 47-year-old
white female, husband and wife, took 136
children and 18 adults hostage because the
husband was fired from his position as the
town marshal. Both committed suicide after
the bomb they used was detonated. (Mitchell,
1996)

One pistol 44 magnum

A 14-year-old white male went to school
with the intention of killing his teacher for
giving him a failing grade (Associated Press,
1986)

1 adult

12/4/1986

Lewiston, MT

High

1 adult

2 students
1 adult
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A 14-year-old white male described as a
loner who was bullied (Adame, 2015)

Date

Location

School
Level

Victims:
Killed

Victims:
Wounded

Firearm(s)

5/20/1988

Winnetka, IL

Elementary

2 students

6 students
2 adults

1 pistol .22 caliber semiautomatic, 1 pistol .357
magnum, 1 pistol Smith &
Wesson

7 students

1 revolver .22 caliber

9/26/1988

Greenwood, SC

Elementary

2 students

2 adults
1/17/1989

Stockton, CA

Elementary

5 students

31 students

1 Ak-47

1 adult
5/1/1992

9/17/1993

Olivehurst, CA

Sheridan, WY

High

3 students

9 students

1 adult

1 adult

0

4 students

1 handgun 9mm

Jr. High/
Middle

1 adult

1 student

1 Shotgun

Jr. High/
Middle

2 students

High

1 student

Jr. High/

1 shotgun 12-gauge, 1 rifle
.22 caliber

Middle

11/7/1994

2/2/1996

2/19/1997

Wickliffe, OH

Moses Lake, WA

Bethel, AK

4 adults

Description of Perpetrator(s)

A 30-year-old white female describe as
having mental health issues. She committed
suicide. (McCoppin and Berger, 2013)
A 19-year-old white male described as
having mental issues (Knapp, 2012)
A 24-year-old white male described as a
drifter. Committed suicide after the attack.
(Emmons & Richman, 2016).
A 20-year-old white male described as a
former student with a grudge against a
teacher (Luery, 2017)
A 29-year-old white male described as a
former student with a recent discharge from
the Navy that was less than honorable. He
committed suicide after the attack. (Glavin,
2019)
A 37-year-old white male described as
having mental health issues (O’Donnell,
2014)

1 student

1 rifle .30/30 caliber, 1
revolver .357, 1 pistol .25
caliber semi-automatic

14-year-old white male who had mental
issues at the time of the shooting (Geranios,
2017a)

2 students

1 shotgun

A 16-year-old white and Alaska Native male
who was abused and lived in foster care
(Langman, 2009)

1 adult

1 adult
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Date

Location

School
Level

Victims:
Killed

Victims:
Wounded

Firearm(s)

10/1/1997

Pearl, MS

High

2 students

7 students

1 rifle .30/30 caliber

A 16-year-old white male who killed his
mother and claimed he was part of Satanic
cult (Mitchell, 2016)

12/1/1997

West Paducah, KY

High

3 students

5 students

5 rifles, 2 shotguns, 2 pistols

A 14-year-old white male on schizophrenia
medication (Associated Press, 2010)

3/24/1998

Jonesboro, AR

Jr. High/
Middle

4 students

10 students

4 revolvers, 3 rifles, 2
pistols

An 11-year-old white male and a 13-year old
white male, described as bullies by their
peers (Langman, 2009)

Jr. High/
Middle

1 adult

2 students

1 handgun .25 caliber

A 14-year-old white male described by peers
as a “loner who never smiled and dressed
sloppily.” (Associated Press, 1998)
A 15-year-old white male who took Prozac,
killed his parents, and then went to school
during lunch for the attack. (Bennett, 2012)

4/24/1998

Edinboro, PA

1 adult

1 adult

Description of Perpetrator(s)

5/21/1998

Springfield, OR

High

2 students

25 students

1 rifle semiautomatic

4/20/1999

Littleton, CO

High

12 students

21 students

2 shotguns, 1 assault rifle, 1
pistol semiautomatic

A 17-year-old white male and an 18-year-old
white male both described as mentally ill and
having been bullied, also described by some
as bullies themselves. Both committed
suicide (Langman, 2009)

1 adult

5/20/1999

Conyers, GA

High

0

6 students

1 Rifle .22 caliber

A 15-year-old white male who threatened to
kill himself but did not. (Queen, 2016)

12/6/1999

Fort Gibson, OK

Jr. High/
Middle

0

5 students

1 Handgun 9mm

A 13-year-old Native American male who
was an honor student seeing a psychiatrist
for mental health issues before the shooting
(Walton, 2005)
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Date

Location

School
Level

Victims:
Killed

Victims:
Wounded

Firearm(s)

3/5/2001

Santee, CA

High

2 students

11 students

1 revolver .22 caliber

2 adults

Description of Perpetrator(s)

A 15-year-old white male described as
having been bullied and sexually abused by
an adult (Dickey, 2013)

3/22/2001

El Cajon, CA

High

0

4 students

1 shotgun 12-gauge, 1 pistol
.22 caliber

3/21/2005

Red Lake, MN

High

5 students

5 students

1 pistol .22 caliber

5 students

5 students

1 handgun 9mm, 1 shotgun
12-guage pump-action, 1
rifle .30-06 bolt-action

A 32-year-old white male who committed
suicide (Folmer et al., 2013)

0

3 students

2 revolvers .22 caliber and
.38 caliber

A 14-year-old white male at an alternative
high school described as having mental
health issues and having been bullied and
suspended from school (Maag, 2007)
A 17-year-old white male (Caniglia, 2014)

2 adults

10/2/2006

Nickel Mines, PA

Elementary/
Middle

10/10/2007

Cleveland, OH

High

2 adults

2/27/2012

Chardon, OH

High

3 students

3 students

1 handgun .22 caliber
semiautomatic

12/14/2012

Newton, CT

Elementary

20 students

2 adults

1 rifle .22 caliber bolt
action, 1 rifle Bushmaster
XM15-E2S

6 adults
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An 18-year-old white male described as a
loner with a history of mental illness
(Texaira et al., 2001)
A 16-year-old Native American male killed
two family members and was described as
having been bullied was also taking Prozac
and anti-depressant medication (Langman,
2018)

A 20-year-old white male who killed his
mother, was describe as having mental health
issues who committed suicide (Vogel et al.,
2012)

Date

Location

School
Level

Victims:
Killed

Victims:
Wounded

Firearm(s)

10/24/2014

Marysville, WA

High

1 student

4 students

1 pistol .40 caliber

A 15-year-old Native American male
described as an outgoing and popular
football player. Committed suicide after the
attack. (Johnson and Dewan, 2014)

2/29/2016

Middletown, OH

High

0

4 students

1 pistol .38 caliber

A 14-year-old white male self-described as
having abused Adderall and not being
wanted by others, including his parents
(BieryGolick, 2018)

9/28/2016

Townville, SC

Elementary

1 student

2 students

1 pistol .40 caliber

A 14-year-old white male who killed his
father and was homeschooled after being
expelled for bringing a hatchet to his middle
school (Mayo, 2018)
A 15-year-old white male described as
having mental health issues and having been
bullied (Geranios 2017a)

1 adult

Description of Perpetrator(s)

9/13/2017

Rockford, WA

High

1 student

3 students

1 assault weapon and 1
pistol

1/23/2018

Benton, KY

High

2 students

14 students

1 pistol 9mm semiautomatic

A 16-year-old white male (Sayers and
Wolfson, 2018)

2/14/2018

Parkland, FL

High

14 students

17 students

1 AR-15 style semiautomatic rifle

A 19-year-old white male described as a
former student with mental health issues
(Berman, 2018)

13 students

1 shotgun, 1 revolver

A 17-year-old white male described as
having been bullied and having mental health
issues (Hanna et al., 2018)

3 adults
5/18/2018

Houston, TX

High

8 students
2 adults
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Date

5/7/2019

11/14/2019

Location

School
Level

Victims:
Killed

Victims:
Wounded

Firearm(s)

Description of Perpetrator(s)

Highlands Ranch, CO

K-12
charter

1 student

8 students

3 handguns, 1 rifle

An 18-year-old white male student and a 16year-old student in transition described as
having mental health issues and abused drugs
even on the day of the attack (Helsel, 2019)

Santa Clarita, CA

High

2 students

3 students

1 Pistol .45 caliber
semiautomatic

A 16-year-old white male who committed
suicide (Yan, 2019)

Note: Adapted from Katsiyannis, A., Whitford, D. K., & Ennis, R. P. (2018). Historical examination of United States
intentional mass school shootings in the 20th and 21st centuries: Implications for students, schools, and society. Journal of
Child and Family Studies, doi:10.1007/s10826-018-1096-2
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Laws Regarding School Attacks
The 1985 shooting in Goddard Kansas was the impetus for a 1990 change in state
legislation that would allow 14-year-olds to be tried as adults in similar cases (Adame, 2015).
Expansion of gun violence in the early 1990s led to zero-tolerance discipline policies in schools
(Graveline, 2003; Morton, 2013). There are national laws regarding school safety that date to the
1960s, but the majority of laws passed since the 1999 Columbine attack focus on grants to fund
new programs and safety initiatives referred to as ‘target-hardening’ measures that provide
money for gates, metal-detectors, and other safety features for schools (Warnick & Kapa, 2019).
Below is a brief description of laws relevant to school shootings nationally and in the state of
Florida.

National Laws and Policy for School Safety
In the 1960’s, President Linden B. Johnson waged a war on crime in an effort to create
the Great Society. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act emerged as a major part of
this program. One component of this legislation promoted grant funding for research-based
programs related to criminal justice and alternative punishment options for juvenile offenders.
Public Law 90-351 was introduced by Emanuel Celler, a Democrat from New York, as HR 5037
on July 17, 1967. It was signed into law by President Johnson the following June. Title I of the
law outlines three main goals.
1. Assist states in evaluating law enforcement needs to develop effective plans for
combatting crime.
2. Provide grants to state and local government agencies to improve their ability to deal with
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local and state criminal justice issues.
3. Support and fund research focused on reducing crime and improving law enforcement’s
ability to detect and catch criminals.
Title I also established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), which
morphed into the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), the
Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), and other agencies as part of an expanded Justice
Department with the 1979 Justice System Improvement Act. The remainder of the Omnibus
legislation raised the minimum age of purchasing guns to 21, provided rules for wiretapping,
expanded the FBI, and clarified the system of Miranda rights for those accused of crimes.

Secure our Schools Act 2001
HR 4108 was the first addition to the Omnibus Act that specifically devoted grant money
to making schools safer. Written and introduced 1 year after the attack at Columbine High
School, the intent was to take steps to help prevent and respond more effectively to similar
events. The Secure our Schools Act placed the Attorney General in charge of approving
proposals for grants to states, local government agencies, or Indian Tribes. The funding would be
awarded to grantees who could demonstrate improving school safety through (a) installing metal
detectors, lighting, locks, or other deterrent measures; (b) security assessments; (c) security
training of personnel or students; (d) coordinating with local law enforcement; (e) any other
measure that may provide a significant improvement in security (Jones, 2015).
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STOP School Violence Act
After a series of well publicized shootings in schools throughout the late 1990s,
legislators focused their attention on schools by updating the Omnibus Act with provisions in the
Secure Our Schools Act that reallocated and added funding from the original Omnibus grant
program to organizations implementing safety measures in schools. The STOP School Violence
Act was an update and enhancement of the Secure Our Schools Act. Since President Donald
Trump Signed the legislation into law in March of 2018, states, counties, and schoolboards have
produced grant requests to back a myriad of programs and technologies for school safety
improvements (Jonson, 2017; Ujifusa, 2018).
The extended name for HR 4909 is, The Students, Teachers, and Officers Preventing
School Violence Act of 2018 (STOP School Violence Act). The law provides grant funding
through the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and the Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS) to train teachers, students, and law enforcement in methods for preventing
school violence. Money is earmarked to develop anonymous reporting systems, security
enhancements, and mental health programs to make schools safer. There are also provisions for
programs intended to train local law enforcement agencies, in conjunction with schools, to
improve the response to active shooter scenarios.
Up to 100 million dollars is available each year from 2019 through 2028. This is an
enhancement on the 2001 amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968 -The Secure our Schools Act- which provided 60 million dollars toward similar goals for
the fiscal years 2001-2009. Grant funding is provided to appropriate and effective research-based
programs that show valuable and measurable evidence for violence prevention. The verbiage in
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the law refers to “evidence-based strategies and programs to prevent school violence” (34. USC.
§10551). The provisions include metal detectors and various safety equipment along with
reporting systems and training programs directed at students, school faculty, and local law
enforcement to identify, mitigate, and respond to violence.
A portion of the bill funds effective threat assessment systems. This threat assessment
model was developed under a coordinated effort between the Department of Education and the
Secret Service to identify early warning signs for possible targeted school shootings and provide
effective mediation to prevent acts such as the attack at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School
in Parkland, Florida on February 14, 2018 where 17 students were killed by a 19 year old former
student of the school (Chapman, 2018; Modzeleski, & Randazzo, 2018). The threat assessment
model has four important objectives to help prevent school violence (Modzeleski & Randazzo,
2018).
1. Identify the person or people who may become a threat.
2. Gather information about the person or people from multiple sources.
3. Evaluate whether there is a threat of violence to others.
4. Develop an individualized plan to reduce the threat.

Florida Law and Policy for School Safety
This study focused on teachers enrolled in graduate-level education courses at a large
university in the southeastern United States. Education is a power reserved to states, and as each
state works toward solutions to this indiscriminate problem of school shootings, it is important to
understand the political landscape that impacts school policy (Cowan et al., 2013).
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Marjory Stoneman Douglas Act
Passed in the aftermath of the shooting in Parkland, Florida that claimed 17 lives, The
Marjory Stoneman Douglas Act law was an attempt by lawmakers to promote research-based
solutions through grant funding while also making updates to Florida schools particularly in
areas of security and mental health. The bill also contains provisions for the removal of personal
guns from individuals where documentation supports a threat to others or themselves, restrictions
on the sale of guns to individuals labeled by law enforcement and mental health professionals as
dangerous, and updated definitions of terms such as ‘bump-stock’. The creation of the Office of
Safe Schools and the establishment of the Coach Aaron Feis Guardian Program represent main
portions of the legislation geared toward providing more security for schools while also
promoting research in the area of school shootings for future policy. One of the most
controversial portions of the bill promotes the training and arming of school staff members. The
law also calls for upgrades for school practices to include active shooter response training and
annual drills as well as threat assessment teams.

Senate Bill 7030
This bill was approved by the governor on May 8, 2019. This law expanded the Marjory
Stoneman Douglas Act and implemented protocol for specific aspects of the Stoneman Douglas
Act. It notably added teachers and other certified staff members to the list of those who could be
trained to carry guns as long as the district voted to approve the plan and the superintendent
made recommendations for individuals eligible for the training to carry guns. Two important
technical additions were provided for schools. The first is called FortifyFl, and it is a mobile
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reporting tool that allows individuals to report suspicious activity in an anonymous way that
leads directly to school officials and local law enforcement for investigative purposes. The
second is the School Environment Safety Incident Reporting (SESIR) for logging and reporting
behavior infractions and related incidents in a connective system. These tools were devised to
provide more fluid lines of communication to help prevent mass targeted school attacks. Other
components of the new Florida Law require the use of the Florida Safe Schools Assessment Tool
(FSSAT) for school districts to evaluate the safety practices and protocol in schools annually.
Reference is also made to altering zero-tolerance discipline policies that have been controversial
since their passage in the 1990s in response to increased gun violence.
Nation and state legislators continue to respond to the public outcry for help in the
aftermath of school shootings (Jones, 2015). The response is pervasive but is it enough?
Analyzing these incidents in new ways will help lead to more effective solutions (Dumitriu,
2013). The efforts and research regarding school protection and response against active shooters
has been singularly focused either on the attackers and their motives (Langman, 2009), or on
increasing school security factors (Jonson., 2017), or on school and district policy (DeVos et al.,
2018). A more collective look at the entire issue from the standpoint of the school as an
organization through an effective lens of crisis management theory can offer a more collective
overview and possibly provide novel and useful solutions (MacNeil & Topping, 2007; Pearson &
Claire, 1998).

Crisis Management Theory
Crisis management theory has developed into a research-based, multi-faceted method for
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analyzing crises that occur in organizations. This field of research dates to the early 1960s and
has expanded through the decades to political science, economics, world governments, history,
psychology, and public administration (Boin et al., 2016; Mitroff et al., 2004). Active shooter
events in schools qualify as organizational crises and the crisis theoretical frame can help better
explain these attacks and promote possible solutions for prevention and response (MacNeil &
Topping, 2007; Rider, 2016)

Mass School Shootings and Crisis
In chapter 1, crisis was explained as a 5-stage process that begins with a low-impact
systems or human failure, followed by a crisis triggering event. The crisis event then begins to
spread its impact to all stakeholders. After this diffusion of impact, questions of blame and
liability are raised. The final step is the creation of a “new-normal” (Shrivastava et al., 2013).
Mass school shootings follow this model of crisis in stages.
In 87% of all mass shooter cases, the assailant told someone about the attack either in
person or though social media posts (Lankford, Adkins, & Mathis, 2019). The attackers in nearly
all the school mass shooting attacks (93%) behaved in a way that caused concern for teachers,
friends, parents, or others they knew (Bonanno & Levenson, 2014). In 68% of mass school
shooting cases the perpetrator(s) obtained the weapons used from their own home or from the
home of friends and family (Bushman et al., 2016; Katsiyannis et al., 2018). In addition, 85% of
shooters came from dysfunctional homes, were suicidal or depressed, or suffered from a major
mental illness (Bushman et al., 2016; Newman et al, 2004). Each of these elements clearly fit the
idea of a low-impact human or systems failure. Failure to report what was heard or read on social
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media, ease of access to weapons, and lack of response to student mental health needs, represent
incidents of failures that could have potentially prevented a shooting (Bonanno & Levenson,
2014; Jagodzinski, 2019; Jonson, 2017).
In Stage 2, major damage is caused in a crisis-triggering event (Shrivastava et al., 2015).
In 2004, Dr. Newman and colleagues wrote a book about the roots of rampage shootings. In this
book “five necessary but not sufficient conditions” for a school rampage shooting were identified
and are explained below.
1. Marginality refers to poor or unsuccessful peer social interactions (Newman et al. 2004).
The degree of marginality is difficult to measure but the researchers used personal
testimony from living shooters, family members, and peers, along with the journals of
some of the perpetrators who committed the shooting acts to classify the shooter’s social
standing and interactions (Bushman et al., 2016; Newman et al., 2004). Approximately
78% of the shooters were found to have been marginalized by their peers and family to
some extent (Bushman et al., 2016; Newman et al., 2004).
2. Individual vulnerability refers to personality and mental health disorders, either
diagnosed or un-diagnosed (Newman et al. 2004). The major measurable component had
to do with individual narcissism and individual self-control. Students who committed acts
of violence showed a lack of self-control and high levels of narcissistic behaviors
(Bushman et al. 2016). The fact that 85% of the shooters either came from dysfunctional
homes, showed previous incidents of suicidal tendencies, or suffered from a major mental
illness points to a high correlate for the factor identified as individual vulnerabilities
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(Bushman et al., 2016; Newman et al., 2004).
3. Cultural scripts can come from family examples or from media and video games or from
peers that provide imagery and ideas that point to violence. The ability to measure this
influence, contrary to media hype, is difficult since there are millions of people who
watch violent movies, listen to violent songs, and play violent video games but never
commit rampage shootings (Bushman et al., 2016; Langman, 2009; Newman et al.,
2004). Exposure to media violence has shown an effect size of d = 0.2 for violent
criminals and 0.47 for aggressive actions in students (Bushman et al., 2016). According
to Cohen (1988) a small effect size is less than .25, a medium effect size is between .25
and .40, while a large effect size is .40 or higher.
4. Under the radar refers to the characteristic of school shooters and events that either went
unnoticed or failed to be reported due to the lack of cohesive information processing
systems (Harding et al., 2002; Newman et al., 2004). This also points to the need for
more reporting systems in schools and more mental health professionals performing
evaluations for students in need. Roughly 61% of high schoolers who knew of someone
bringing a gun to school did not report it and 56% of those who heard a student threaten
to use weapons did not report it (Bushman et al., 2013). In the past two decades 10 or
more school shootings were prevented due to peer reports (Agnich, 2015; Bushman et al.,
2016; Page, 2017).
5. Access to guns made multiple headlines after shooting incidents in 2018 (Lankford et al.,
2019; Lott; 2019). The prevalence of guns in the United States, combined with the fact
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that the majority of gun owners practice gun safety, makes this a difficult singularly
identifiable cause of rampage shootings (Bushman et al., 2016; Chapman, 2017;
Langman, 2009; Newman et al., 2004). The facts show that 62% or more of rampage
shooters obtained guns from their own home (Borum, 2017; Bushman et al., 2016).
Stage 2 is the culmination of many factors, and the major crisis event is the shooting
itself. As a school shooting unfolds, the impact is felt immediately. During and immediately after
the shooting, stage 3 begins with the expansion of the crisis to stakeholders. In a mass school
shooting the victims, the families, the staff, and the entire community are impacted by the
tragedy (Fox & Fridel, 2018). The media reports following an event greatly expand the impact,
exasperating fears nationwide about the safety of schools (Nicodemo & Petronio, 2018). During
Stage 4, questions of blame and liability are raised as officials and stakeholders begin looking at
the tragedy in search of reason in an effort to place blame. Some stakeholders blame the
prevalence of guns and certain types of guns (Lankford, 2016), others point to mental health
issues (Langman, 2009; Langman, 2018; Newman et al., 2004), some see a need for even greater
increased security measures in schools (Jonson, 2017; Trump, 2019). After the February 14,
2018 attack at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida the actions of the
security guard on campus were pointed to as inadequate, and blame and liability were projected
(Siemaszko, 2019). A new normal, or equilibrium state, develops during Stage 5 (Shrivastava et
al., 2013). Schools in America are still seeking this new normal. The reactions in each
community affected differ widely, but support, vigils, and thoughtful steps toward solutions
continue (Kubena & Watts, 2019; Page, 2017).
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Applying Crisis Management Theory to Active Shooter Prevention
Early crisis management research in the 1960s pointed to three levels of crisis
intervention: (a) primary intervention, which includes methods and systems to prevent a crisis;
(b) secondary intervention, which takes place during and in the immediate aftermath focused on
minimizing the effects and expansion of a crisis; and (c) tertiary intervention, which provides
long-term assistance for those affected by a crisis (Caplan, 1964). In 1988, Comfort continued
the tradition of using three levels to explain crisis management but adapted the names for each
level to include, preparation, coping with crisis, and back to normal (Comfort, 1988). Wildavsky
(1988) narrowed three components down to two in the identification of (a) anticipation, or efforts
made to predict and prevent crises and (b) resilience, which is the capacity to cope with and
bounce back from the damage caused by a crisis. In 1993, Shrivastava proposed the 4Cs,
(causes, consequences, caution, and coping) to frame crisis management theory. The causes are
the failures and triggering events that led to the crisis. The consequences are the impacts during
and following the crisis event. The caution component involves efforts taken before a crisis
occurs to prevent a crisis and minimize damage during a crisis. While coping, the fourth C,
relates to steps taken in response to, and in the aftermath of, a crisis (Shrivastava, 1993). There is
also a PPRR model (Boin et al., 2016) that contains prevention, protection, response, and
recovery as the four main tenets. This study focuses primarily on the PPRR model since it is the
one utilized most frequently in research related to crisis management in schools and since it is
the basis of culminating research that synthesized the other major crisis management models in
its inception.
As school leaders, politicians, and researchers worked since the late 1990s to develop
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programs and protocols to assist schools in combating deadly school shooting attacks, very few
have applied the ideas of crisis management theory (Dumitriu, 2013; Lawrence, 2007). Research
in the areas of political science, psychology, criminal justice, and communications working
toward solutions to make schools safer, only focus on one or two aspects in the complex web of
events surrounding mass school shooting attacks (Lawrence, 2007). According to Dumitriu in a
2013 article, crisis management theory can be applied to all aspects of school shooting attacks.
This application provides a frame for prevention efforts before an event, response training and
drills to limit the immediate damage during an attack, and recovery planning to assist with the
aftermath of the attack to bring the school and community to a new normal state (Dumitriu,
2013). Using the complex definitions of the topic, the goal of applying crisis management theory
is to develop plans and protocols in schools that prevent an active assailant from committing
severe targeted mass violence through proactive systems and training. Since teachers are
consistently on the front lines of school safety (Rider, 2016) and have the most constant
connections with students (Brown, 2008), their perceptions of the crisis management strategies
used in schools are supremely important (Embry-Martin, 2017).
Crisis management capacity, resilience, and preparedness define an organization’s ability
to predict and prevent crisis, while establishing human and technological systems that limit any
damage that might be caused by a crisis (Boin et al., 2016; Rider, 2016; Wildavsky, 1988). The
focus of this study involves those systems within the organization of schools as they relate to
teachers. If teachers are better prepared to deal with crisis through training, practice, planning,
and protocol, then fewer attacks will occur and when they do occur, teachers will be able to
respond with confidence in those systems and in their own abilities.
48

Components of Active Shooter Prevention and Response
Prevention, protection, response, and recovery were identified in a 2007 school crisis
response document endorsed by former secretary of education, Margaret Spellings, as the four
integral elements of crisis protocol for schools (Department of Education, 2004). Spellings also
pointed out the importance of all stakeholders knowing their role during an attack.
Knowing how to respond quickly and efficiently in a crisis is critical to ensuring the
safety of our schools and students. The midst of a crisis is not the time to start figuring
out who ought to do what. At that moment, everyone involved – from top to bottom –
should know the drill and know each other. (Department of Education, 2004, p. 6)
To guide this study’s efforts to analyze teacher perceptions of crisis management plans,
these four components are utilized to explore and expand upon current research regarding factors
that impact teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter crisis. The
elements of prevention and protection include anything done to attempt to stop a school shooting
from taking place and limit the amount of damage caused in the event of a crisis (Department of
Education, 2004; DeVos et al., 2018). This involves the climate of the school, threat assessment
teams, mental health professionals on campus assisting in identifying student needs, anonymous
reporting systems, and security measures such as gates, screenings, and cameras. These elements
protect students, and they offer methods of preventing a devastating act by analyzing the school
environment and providing ways to identify threats, mitigate them, and stop an active shooter
before they can harm anyone.
Threat assessment was a model for school violence prevention developed by a
coordinated effort between the United States Secret Service and the United States Department of
49

Education in 2002. The model has been studied and expanded since its inception (Chapman,
2018; Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018; Mohandie, 2014; Vossekuil et al., 2004). The model
involves a 7-step process and is recommended for Florida Schools by Florida Statutes section
1006.07(7). Cornell and Sheras (2006) describes seven components of the threat assessment
model for use in schools:
1. Evaluate threat.
2. Decide whether threat is transient or substantive.
3. Respond to transient threat.
4. Decide whether substantive threat is serious or very serious.
5. Respond to serious substantive threat.
6. Conduct safety evaluation.
7. Implement a written safety plan.
Response and recovery, in this study, include all elements that are intended to limit the
damage done by an active shooter during and after an attack. This will also involve components
of school crisis programs and safety plans that relate to the recovery and aftermath of an active
shooter. The elements included in the response realm consist of, security officers on campus,
connections with local law enforcement, active shooter drills with students and faculty, mental
health professionals on campus to help deal with possible issues that may result from an attack,
and other elements such as school personnel carrying weapons, that are intended to limit the
damage caused by an active shooter. Table 3 explains the major components within active
shooter prevention and response categories.
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Table 3
Prevention and Response Components
Active Shooter Prevention and Protection:
Stop the attack from happening

Active Shooter Response and Recovery:
Limit the damage from an attack

•
•
•
•

School climate
• Security officers on campus
Physical security systems
• Connections with local law
enforcement
Threat assessment teams
• Active shooter drills and training
Security cameras, limited entry
points, and screenings for campus
• Armed teachers and school
visitors
personnel
• Mental health professionals and
• Mental health professionals to
screenings for students and faculty
assist with long-term needs
• Anonymous
reporting
Compiled
from (Department
ofsystems
Education, 2004; DeVos et al., 2018).

Self-Efficacy Theory
The concept of self-efficacy was developed by Bandura in the late 1970s and refined by
Tschannen-Moran in the early 2000s. Bandura’s initial concept proposed that individual teacher
beliefs about their abilities greatly influenced their effort, persistence, resilience, and
performance in the face of stress and demanding situations (Bandura, 1977; Goddard & Hoy,
2000). This theory also states that an individual’s perception of their capability, practiced
proficiency, and self-confidence in a task, help produce better quality outcomes in test-based
situations (Bandura, 1977; Tschannen-Moran, 2004). This form of belief in one’s ability to
perform a given task promoted by practice, information gathering, and effective training results
in improved outcomes when the given task is needed, even under stressful or taxing conditions
(Bandura, 1993; Tschannen-Moran, 2004). An active shooter in a school setting would be very
taxing and stressful, therefore, utilizing self-efficacy principles to analyze teachers provides a
useful model.
51

Understanding Self-Efficacy in Schools
Self-efficacy has been used in a wide range of studies since its initial discussion in the
1970s by Bandura (Bandura, 1993; Blanchfield, 2013; Borum, 2009; Brouwer, 2018; Graveline,
2003; Tshannen-Moran, 2001). These studies examined self-efficacy in many areas, but most
notably in terms of both teachers and principals in school settings. The findings of each support
the use of self-efficacy as a construct for better understanding how various factors impact
important educational outcomes. Some of the studies are directly related to schools, where selfefficacy perceptions offer a meaningful way to analyze how individuals will likely respond to
specific incidents of violence (Embry-Martin, 2017; Graveline, 2003; Rider, 2016). Self-efficacy
research in education has mostly been used to focus on teaching or leadership methods and how
these methods impact student achievement (Brouwer, 2018; Tschannen-Moran, 2004). The selfefficacy theoretical frame in this mixed methods study helped provide a deeper understanding of
school safety perceptions among teachers and supplied a measurable construct to guide data
collection and analysis (Lunenburg & Irby, 2008; Tschannen-Moran, 2004).
The self-efficacy of teachers in responding to school violence and active shooter
scenarios stands as an important factor in developing training programs for schools (Graveline,
2003; Embry-Martin, 2017). A better understanding of how training methods, school safety
protocol, school security measures, and demographic factors affect the confidence among
teachers in responding to serious incidents of school violence is needed. Studies in Virginia
schools demonstrated connections between school safety measures, demographic factors, and
teacher perceptions of safety (Gregory & Cornell, 2009; Gregory et al., 2012). The results
showed little influence regarding gender and school size, but years of experience, school climate,
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school disciplinary practices, and school location showed moderate to high correlates with
teacher perceptions of threats (Gregory & Cornell, 2009; Gregory et al., 2012).

Value of Mixed Methods Research Model
One of the studies used to help guide this current work conducted by was conducted by
Rider (2016) who suggested using a mixed methods study to provide a deeper understanding of
teacher perceptions. Embry-Martin (2015) conducted a study comprised only of qualitative data
through nine interviews with teachers in elementary, middle, and high schools in California. He
called for more quantitative approaches to provide more substantial backing for elements that
affect teacher perceptions (Embry-Martin, 2015). The intent of this study was to combine both
quantitative and qualitative findings to analyze teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to
an active shooter crisis. Though the population and sample were limited geographically, the
intent was to utilize both quantitative and qualitative methods to add to the literature on this
important issue of school safety.

Summary
The literature review above provided a detailed review of active shooter cases in K-12
settings as well as an overview of the need for more cohesive terminology. These shooting
attacks have altered national and state legislation. Law makers hope the new laws will provide
more effective programs and protocol to help make schools safer (DeVos et al., 2018). Yes, these
mass shooting attacks on schools are rare, and this helps qualify them as crises in schools. Crisis
management theory can be used to better understand mass school shootings from a more
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complete and organization-based model (Dumitriu, 2013; MacNeil & Topping, 2007). The next
chapter presents details of the methodology of the current study to analyze teacher perceptions of
their ability to respond to active shooting incidents. Chapter 3 begins with an introduction then
presents the methods used to collect data for the quantitative components of this mixed methods
study using a survey. The chapter also outlines the procedures used to collect qualitative data
through nine interviews in a multiple-case study design.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
This study sought to provide a better understanding of perceptions among teachers
enrolled in graduate-level education courses at a large university in the southeastern United
States concerning active shooter preparedness. A deeper understanding of teacher perceptions
concerning their ability to respond to an active shooter was developed using a combination of
quantitative and qualitative data collected and analyzed using an explanatory mixed-methods
research design. The following sections describe the design of the study, the participants, how
participants were selected, the data collection procedures, the instruments used in the study, and
the methods used to analyze the data. Each subsection begins with a description of the
quantitative components, followed by the qualitative components.

Design of the Study
In order to better analyze teacher perceptions, an explanatory mixed-methods research
approach was used. This mixed-methods approach included a survey instrument, the Active
Assailant Prevention and Response Survey (AAPRS) found in Appendix B, supplemented by a
multiple-case study using nine semi-structured interviews. Interviews were conducted until a
point of saturation of data was reached. Use of the term saturation, was first introduced by Glaser
and Strauss (1967) where they describe saturation as the point in which the collected data
becomes redundant and no new findings are presented (Creswell, 2009). Selecting the
explanatory mixed-methods design was purposeful to provide depth in the analysis of teacher
perceptions, to capitalize on the strengths of quantitative and qualitative approaches, and to use
the quantitative data to provide themes for analyzing the qualitative data from interviews
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(Fraenkel, Wallen, & Hyun, 2011; Simons, 2009).
Fraenkel, Wallen, and Hyun (2011) outline three distinct types of mixed-methods
research designs; exploratory, explanatory, and triangulation. The focus of this study was teacher
perceptions and the seven research questions aligned best with the explanatory model. The
purpose of the exploratory model is to identify relationships and assist in developing instruments
in a model where the qualitative component usually comes first, followed by the quantitative
(Schensul, 2008; Schram, 2006). The triangulation design involves convergence on a particular
phenomenon while collecting qualitative and quantitative data simultaneously (Fraenkel et al.,
2011). Neither of these methods fit the intent of the researcher for this study. The researcher
chose the explanatory design over the others because the quantitative data was collected first
using a previously constructed survey instrument and then supplemented by information from
semi-structured interviews using open-ended questions to help clarify and expand on the findings
from the survey (Fraenkel et al., 2011; Simons, 2009). This matched more cohesively with the
parameters of the explanatory model.

Participants
At the time of the study there were approximately 1,200 teachers enrolled in graduatelevel education courses at the large university in the southeastern United States where this study
was conducted. This population of teachers was selected to provide a purposive sample where
participants represented a range of demographic factors, multiple districts, and school types. The
researcher also sought participants that represented a wide range of teaching experience.
Educators seeking higher level degrees were selected to provide valuable information regarding
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their perceptions of planning, training, and safety strategies for responding to active shooter
incidents at multiple schools.

AAPRS Response Sample
The AAPRS was sent as an electronic link to approximately 1,200 graduate students at a
large university in the southeastern United States enrolled in graduate-level education and
educational leadership courses during the fall and spring semesters of 2019 and 2020. It was
unknown exactly how many of the 1,200 graduate students were working teachers at the time the
survey was distributed. The survey was completed or attempted by 165 individuals, representing
a 14% response rate. Each participant provided their consent by selecting the appropriate
agreement option within the survey instrument. The consent form with guidelines for
participation is provided in Appendix F.
The first item in the survey served as the consent form. Participants were asked to read
the consent form and indicate whether or not they agreed to. There were 151 who agreed to
participate. The second item asked if the participant was currently a teacher in a school. Thirtytwo individuals responded that they were not teachers. These participants were then sent to the
end of the survey since they were not part of the purposive sample. Fourteen participants did not
answer this question at all. Either they chose not to participate in the first question, or they chose
not to complete the survey for various reasons. There remained after the first two questions, 119
possible valid responses for the survey. Valid responses for each section of the AAPRS varied
from 111 to 114. A sample size of 113 with a population of 1,200, provides a 95% confidence
level with a confidence interval of 8.66. Only valid responses were used in the data analysis.
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Table 4
Participant Demographic Information
Gender

School type

Female
77.5

Teaching
Experience
1-3 Years
13.3

Grade
Configuration
Elementary
School
42

Presence of
Security
Yes
80.5

Male
21.6

4-6 Years
22.1

Private
39.8

Middle School
10.5

No
19.5

Undeclared
0.9

7-9 Years
19.5

Charter
1.8

High School
13.2

n = 113

Alternative
Configuration
34.2
n = 114

Public
58.4

10 + Years
45.1
n = 111

n = 113

n = 113

Note: Measures represent the percentage of valid responses.
Out of the 165 participants who started the survey, 111 of them completed the question
asking them to identify their gender. The sample was made up of 24 men (21.6%) and 86 women
(77.5%). One participant refused to identify their gender. Participants represented a variety of
teaching experience. Out of 113 valid responses, 15 (13.3%) reported 1 to 3 years of teaching
experience, 25 (22.1%) had 4 to 6 years of experience, 22 (19.5%) had 7 to 9 years teaching
experience, and 51 (45.1%) reported 10 or more years of teaching experience. There were 113
valid responses for the question regarding school type and 66 people reported working for public
schools, 45 for private schools, and two worked for charter schools. For the survey item in which
participants were asked to identify their school grade configuration there were 114 valid
responses. Forty-Eight (42%) worked at elementary schools, 12 (10.5%) worked at middle
schools, 15 (13.2%) worked in high schools, and 39 (34.2%) worked in alternative school
configurations. A majority of participants, 91 (80.5%) said their school had a security guard or
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resource officer on campus during the school day, with 22 (19.5%) reporting that their school did
not have security personnel on campus during the school day. Table 4 synthesizes the school and
individual demographics for participants.

Interview Participants
The survey yielded 48 participants who provided consent and contact information for the
interview. The researcher selected interviewees in an effort to create a purposive sample that
would provide maximum variance to represent the widest possible range in terms of
demographics, teaching experience, and school settings (Merriam, 1998). The interview selection
process ended after the ninth interview, when a point of saturation was reached and repetition
was found in the data provided (Glasser & Strauss, 1967). Participants represented public and
private schools across five different grade configurations. Two interviews were conducted with
elementary school teachers who worked in standard kindergarten through fifth-grade schools.
Two interviews were with teachers who worked in pre-kindergarten through sixth-grade private
schools. One of the subjects worked in a seventh through 12th grade school, while two of the
participants worked in standard high schools with ninth through 12th grade students. One
participant worked at a private pre-kindergarten through 12th grade school as a math teacher on a
separate campus for seventh and eighth-grade students. One participant worked at a public
middle school. Five of the participants were women and four were men. The sample contained 3
teachers with less than 10 years teaching experience, 4 teachers with 10 to 20 years teaching
experience, one teacher with 25 years teaching experience, and one teacher with 45 years of
teaching experience.
59

Table 5
Interview Participant Demographic Information
Participant

Gender

Years at
current
school
6 years

School grade
configuration

Current
grade level

School
Type

Female

Total years
teaching
experience
12 years

Mari

K - 5th

1st

Public

Alice

Female

5 years

3 years

K - 5th

2nd

Public

Bettie

Female

17 years

5 years

K4 - 6th

5th

Private

Shannon

Female

45 years

18 years

K4 - 6th

6th

Private

Newman

Male

17 years

1 year

K4 – 12th

7th and 8th

Private

Jack

Male

25 years

2 years

6th - 8th

7th and 8th

Public

Mark

Male

6 years

5 years

7th - 12th

9th and 10th

Public

Bobby

Male

8 years

8 years

9th - 12th

10th, 11th,
and 12th

Public

Connie

Female

10 years

7 years

9th - 12th

9th - 12th

Public

Case study research requires detailed description in order to provide context (Bloomberg
& Volpe, 2012). Table 5 displays demographic details for the interview participants to provide
context. This background information was derived from interview questions, and researcher
notes during each interview. Detailed notes were also recorded during the interviews for nonverbal cues, such as long pauses or laughter, that helped enhance the thick descriptions of each
case. Erlandson, Harris, Skipper, and Allen (1993) promote the use of rich, thick descriptions as
a method to ensure validity and reliability within a qualitative study. In order to promote
trustworthiness and protect the confidentiality of participants, each subject was provided a
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pseudonym (Meriam & Tisdell, 2016). The interviews were recorded using an electronic
recording device, which stored the recordings in a password protected file on the recording
device. Once recorded, the interviews were transcribed verbatim by the researcher and
identifying elements such as name, school name, and district name, were removed from the
transcripts for confidentiality. The transcripts were then stored in a password protected file on
the researcher’s laptop for analysis.

Instrumentation
The survey instrument and the interview questions were selected from models derived
from other studies and adapted to the needs of this explanatory mixed-methods research study.
To identify possible instruments for use, the researcher used key terms: teacher perceptions,
school safety, crisis management, self-efficacy, and active shooter preparedness to search a
university’s library databases. In order to analyze perceptions, one method that offers measurable
data is a survey (Benbenishty, Astor, & Estrada, 2008). A 2016 study conducted by Rider
provided the Active Shooter Preparedness Training Survey (ASPTS). The ASPTS was developed
using a 4-point Likert-scale. The scale contained a rating system where 1 = strongly disagree, 2 =
disagree, 3 = agree, and 4 = strongly agree. These options were followed by a section for
participants to mark “I don’t know” as a response (Rider, 2016). Rider (2016) consulted a panel
of experts to help with question creation and she piloted the study to provide validity and
reliability (α = .936). The open-ended interview questions used for the qualitative component of
the study were modeled after those developed in a study conducted by Embry-Martin in 2017 at
Northcentral University titled: Perceptions in Preparing for and Responding to an Active Shooter
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Incident: A Qualitative Study of K-12 Teachers’ Self-efficacy (Embry-Martin, 2017).

Active Assailant Prevention and Response Survey (AAPRS)
Developing an instrument for research is a complex process (Fraenkel et al., 2011;
Simon, 2009). Simplifying the research process by utilizing and modifying previously developed
instruments is common in research (Fraenkel et al., 2011). Protecting the validity and reliability
of instruments is the goal of utilizing previously constructed instruments. Validity is a construct
that identifies whether an instrument accurately measures the intended phenomenon, while
reliability denotes ability of the instrument to produce consistent results (Fraenkel et al., 2011).
Rider used a panel of experts to create and refine the items in the ASPTS as well as a pilot study
to promote validity and reliability (Fink, 2009). To fit the needs of this study, attempts were
made through email and through phone book searches of the Mississippi area to contact Carole
Rider to gain permission to use her instrument. Once contact was made, Rider was sent a request
to use the instrument she created for her study. The request was granted. The email confirmation
from Rider can be found in Appendix E. The ASPTS components were valuable and useful but
limited by the parameters of Rider’s study, which focused on high school teachers in Mississippi
schools. The study also focused on teacher perceptions of principals’ ability and preparation in
response to active shooters in schools (Rider, 2016). Since the current study was based on
Florida teachers in multiple grade levels, and since the researcher was not concerned with
teacher perceptions regarding their principal’s effectiveness, the ASPTS was modified to create
the Active Assailant Prevention and Response Survey (AAPRS).
The ASPTS instrument used as the model for the AAPRS contained five sections. The
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first section gathered both individual and school demographic information from participants for
categorization and for use in the descriptive analysis of self-efficacy (Rider, 2016). The second
section was developed to analyze perceptions of planning methods in schools to develop their
response to active shooter scenarios. The Cronbach’s alpha, a commonly used statistic to
determine the reliability of a Likert-scale survey, was calculated by Rider for each section of the
ASPTS (Rider, 2016). An alpha score greater than α = .80 is considered to have moderate to
strong internal consistency and reliability (Fraenkel et al., 2011). The Cronbach’s alpha for
section two of Rider’s instrument, which collected information about teacher’s perceptions of the
planning protocol in their school, was .945 (Rider, 2016). The third section collected perceptions
regarding practice and drill procedures and had a Cronbach’s alpha of .959 (Rider, 2016). The
fourth section analyzed teacher perceptions of their preparedness to respond effectively to an
active shooter scenario. This section had a Cronbach’s alpha of .903 (Rider, 2016). The fifth
section of the ASPTS was developed to analyze teacher perceptions of their principal’s abilities
and attitudes about school crises. Since teacher perceptions of their principal’s preparedness was
not a focus of this study, these items were eliminated when adapting the ASPTS for this study.
In modifying the ASPTS to fit the needs of this study, great care was taken to protect the
validity of the major sections of Rider’s instrument. The ASPTS sections concerning planning,
practice and drills, and teacher preparedness were completely unchanged in the development of
the AAPRS. This served to preserve the validity measures for those sections. One component of
the ASPTS that needed modification was the demographics section. Item number 2: “What
region of the state do you currently teach in?” was modified to read: “Which of the following
best describes your school type?” (Rider, 2016, p. 164). An item was added to the demographic
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section for participants to identify the grade configuration of their school, and a second item was
added for participants to identify whether or not their school has a security guard on campus. In
order to develop the AAPRS, the demographics section was moved to the end of the survey for
ease of use for participants. Items in this section were also adjusted to fit the purposive sample of
participants. Rider’s study focused on high school teachers in areas of Mississippi, while this
study included teachers from multiple grade levels in Florida schools who were enrolled in
advanced degree education and educational leadership courses.

Interview Questions
To provide a detailed understanding of elements that impact perceptions among teachers
regarding their competence in responding to active shooter incidents, a multiple-case study
approach was selected as a follow-up to the data collected from the AAPRS. A multiple-case
study is explained by Simmons (2008) as a useful method for documenting and interpreting
complex experiences and phenomenon. The elements that influence the sense of safety and
preparedness in schools are pertinent examples built around the complex experiences of teachers
in their schools. The use of multiple-case studies through semi-structured interviews fit the needs
of this study beyond other qualitative models such as grounded theory or phenomenological
studies (Fraenkel et al., 2011). The goal of interviewing teachers enrolled as graduate students in
education classes, within the parameters of the multiple-case study model, was to provide thick
descriptions and detail regarding teacher perceptions of factors related to response and protocol
for active shooter incidents (Fraenkel et al., 2011; Simmons, 2008).
The semi-structured interviews were conducted using a list of 12 open-ended questions
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that allowed participants to describe their perceptions in detail and provided the researcher with
the freedom to ask follow-up questions for clarity. Creswell (2007) recommends the use of openended questions and semi-structured interviews to allow the researcher to adapt to the
information provided. The first three questions were demographic in nature to provide context
and help clarify data for research questions 6 and 7 that intended to identify whether
demographic factors affect perceptions of ability to respond during an active assailant crisis. This
information included teaching experience, gender, school population, school grade configuration,
presence of security during the school day, and whether the school was public, private, or
charter. Questions 4 through 12 were developed to provide more detail regarding teacher
perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter scenario and the factors that might
influence these perceptions. The interview questions are listed in Appendix D. Having a set of
guiding questions is also helpful to promote fluidity and continuity in the interview process
(Creswell, 2013). In order to develop guiding questions, the researcher used the following steps
as outlined by Sampson (2004) and Yin (2009) for developing interview questions for case-study
research.
•

Step one: A set of 14 questions was found in a qualitative research study regarding
teacher perceptions of response to active shooter incidents (Embry-Martin, 2017).

•

Step two: These questions were presented to a panel that included a high school teacher,
an elementary school teacher, a school security manager, and the head of a private
school. The panel advised to shorten the original set of questions by combining
demographic questions. They also revised the wording in the last two questions.
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•

Step three: Two pilot interviews were conducted. One with a fifth-grade teacher from a
private school, and another with a sixth-grade teacher from a private school. After the
pilot interviews, questions were reordered so that questions were placed together by
categories. The categories included, demographics, planning methods, drills and
procedures, teacher perceptions of response, and recommendations from teachers for
improving safety.

Data Collection
This explanatory mixed-methods study, to better understand teacher perceptions of their
ability to respond to an active shooter crisis, relied on data collected from teachers enrolled in
graduate-level education courses at a large university in the southeastern United States. The
AAPRS was sent as an electronic link to approximately 1,200 possible participants enrolled in
graduate courses for teacher education and educational leadership courses in a large southeastern
university during the fall and spring semesters of 2019 and 2020. The researcher sent an email
request to the university’s program coordinator for graduate education degree programs. The
request asked for contact information for professors teaching graduate-level education courses in
educational leadership, teaching and learning, and curriculum development where the majority of
students enrolled consisted of working teachers. The researcher was informed by the program
coordinator that there were no records that would contain the exact number of students in
graduate courses offered through the university who were currently teaching. The survey was
sent to 45 professors whose contact information was provided by the graduate affairs academic
support program coordinator for the university.
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Survey AAPRS
The coordinator provided contact information for the requested professors and also
agreed to send the AAPRS link with a summary request for participation through an email
database. The summary request posted by the program coordinator is provided in Appendix C.
The database email list used by the program coordinator contained all students enrolled in
graduate education and graduate educational leadership courses within the college. The estimated
number of students in the list was approximately 1,200 but there was no way to know how many
of those students were full-time teachers. The participant recruitment letter, found in Appendix
C, was sent to the 45 professors whose contact information was provided by the program
coordinator. This request solicited permission to use approximately 10-minutes of one class
session during the fall of 2019 semester to recruit participants for the study. This email included
a summary of the benefits of the study along with the Qualtrics electronic link to the AAPRS
with a request for each professor to distribute the survey to their students after the presentation.
Three of the 45 professors from the list agreed to the presentation component for recruitment of
participants. The researcher conducted 3 presentations to 55 possible participants. These
presentations provided detail about the importance of the study, a description of efforts to protect
the identity of participants, and a disclaimer that participation was voluntary. During each
presentation, the researcher informed students that participating, or refusing to participate, would
not impact their grade in the course. The remaining 42 professors agreed to post the description
of the study along with the electronic link to their students through their class email list or
through their online Canvas web-course system.
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Interviews
The final item in the AAPRS requested contact information for those interested in
participating in a voluntary interview. The survey yielded 48 participants who provided consent
and contact information for the interview. The researcher selected interviewees in an effort to
create a maximum variance sample, which is a sample that represents the widest possible range
of participants in terms of their demographics and experiences to provide a broad range of
information in an effort to improve transferability of the findings (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012;
Merriam, 1998). Interviews were conducted until a point of saturation was reached in the data
collection. Saturation, defined by Glasser and Strauss (1967), refers to the point where the
information collected begins to repeat itself and no new information is provided. Volunteers for
the interview were contacted individually to establish a method (phone or in person) and time for
the semi-structured interview. Four interviews were conducted face-to-face and five of the
interviews were conducted over the phone. The interviews were audio recorded while the
researcher took notes. Detailed notes were recorded during the interviews for non-verbal cues,
such as long pauses or laughter, to enhance the thick descriptions of each case. Erlandson,
Harris, Skipper, and Allen (1993) promote the use of rich, thick descriptions as a method to
ensure trustworthiness in a qualitative study. The audio recordings of each interview were
transcribed verbatim by the researcher and then sent to the participants for review to ensure the
accuracy of the information provided. This served as a method of member checking, which is
recommended to establish trustworthiness and promote reliability for the findings (Bloomberg &
Volpe, 2012). The purpose of the interviews was to provide more detail for understanding
teacher perceptions beyond what was provided in the AAPRS Survey (Timmons & Cairns,
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2011). The interview transcripts were stored in a password protected file on the researcher’s
computer. Identifying elements such as name, school name, and district name, were removed
from the transcripts for confidentiality and each participant was provided a pseudonym.

Data Analysis
The goal of this study was to identify, analyze, and understand perceptions of teachers
regarding their ability to respond to active shooter scenarios. Since the study was mixed
methods, the quantitative data and the qualitative data had to be analyzed using a combination of
methods in order to address the research questions. Participant answers to the AAPRS survey
instrument were entered into the Statistical Package for Social Sciences software system (SPSS)
and analyzed using descriptive and correlational statistics. The data collected from the interviews
was coded and analyzed to produce key findings that related to the research questions and
provided rich descriptions from participants to further analyze perceptions.

Quantitative Data Analysis Methods
Research questions 1, 2, and 3 addressed teacher perceptions of crisis planning, drills and
procedures, and ability to respond to an active shooter. These research questions were answered
through descriptive statistics from the AAPRS instrument. Each of these components were
represented in the survey with separate questions labeled as Q1, Q2, and Q3. Each question
contained multiple statements for participants to rate on a on a 4-point Likert scale. The seven
statements in Q1 related to the planning protocol for crisis management planning. The seven
statements in Q2 related to drills and procedures for active shooter incidents. The four statements
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in Q3 encapsulated teacher perceptions of their ability to respond. The Likert-scale assigned a
value of 1 to the selection, strongly disagree. Disagree was marked by a score of 2, agree was
represented by 3, and strongly agree represented a score of 4. Participants were given a fifth
option to select, don’t know, which registered a score of 0. In order to compute the various
correlational tests required to address the research questions, an overall mean score for each of
the three main sections (Q1, Q2, and Q3) was needed. The variable Plan Mean was calculated
using scores for the seven statements in Q1, Drill/Proc Mean was calculated using mean scores
for the seven statements in Q2, and the variable Response Mean was calculated using scores for
the four statements in Q3.
Research questions 1, 2, and 3 were answered using descriptive statistics, frequencies,
percentages, and mean scores from SPSS for participant responses to statements in Q1, Q2, and
Q3 within the AAPRS. These sections sought to describe teacher perceptions of crisis
management planning, drills and procedures for active assailant incidents, and teacher
perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter crisis. Research question 4 required a
Pearson r correlational analysis using SPSS to identify possible relationships between planning,
identified by the variable Plan Mean, and participant perceptions of their ability to respond,
identified as the variable Response Mean. Research question 5 required a Pearson r correlational
analysis to identify possible relationships between practice and drill procedures (Drills/Proc
Mean) and participant perceptions of their ability to respond (Response Mean). Research
question 6 involved two parts. To answer the first part, an independent samples t test was used to
identify relationships between the Response Mean variable and whether or not the school had
security personnel on campus during the school day. The second portion of research question 6
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was answered using a one-way-ANOVA, or analysis of variance, based on school grade
configuration, and the Response Mean variable. Research question 7 also contained two parts.
For the first part, an independent samples t test was used to identify relationships between
Response Mean and gender. The second portion of research question 7 was answered using a
one-way-ANOVA based on participant’s years of teaching experience and the Response Mean
variable. Table 6 outlines the analysis methods used for each research question.
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Table 6
Research Questions and Data Analysis
Research Questions
1. How do teachers perceive their ability to respond
effectively to active shooter scenarios?

Data Analysis Methods
Descriptive statistics from the
AAPRS

2. What are the perceptions of teachers regarding their
school’s planning in preparation for active shooter
scenarios?

Descriptive statistics from the
AAPRS

3. What are the perceptions of regarding their school’s
drills and practice procedures for active shooter
scenarios?

Descriptive statistics from the
AAPRS

4. What relationships exist, if any, between perceptions
of planning in preparation for active shooter scenarios
and preparedness to respond effectively to an active
shooter incident among teachers?

Pearson r for AAPRS section 1
and section 3 scores

5. What relationships exist, if any, between perceptions
of procedures and drills, and perceptions of preparedness
to respond effectively to an active shooter incident
among teachers?

Pearson r for AAPRS section 2
and section 3 scores

6. What effect, if any, do school factors such as presence
of security, and grade-configuration have on the
perceptions of teachers in responding to active shooter
scenarios?

Independent samples t-test for
security personnel

7. What effect, if any, do individual demographic factors
such as gender, and years of educational experience have
on the perceptions of teachers in responding to active
shooter scenarios?

Independent samples t-test for
gender
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One-way ANOVA for school
grade-configuration

One-way ANOVA for years of
experience

Qualitative Data Analysis Methods and Coding
The descriptive and correlational statistics were supplemented by descriptions from nine
interviews to provide understanding using interview data coded based on multiple-case study
qualitative research concepts. Saldaña (2013) defined coding as using “a word or phrase that
symbolically assigns a summative, salient, essence-capturing, and or evocative attribute for a
portion of language-based or visual data” (p.3). Main categories for coding were prefigured prior
to the interviews based on the research questions and the literature, while new categories
emerged based on the answers provided in the interviews. Crabtree and Miller (1992) describe
coding and category development as a continuum from prefigured to emergent. This allows
researchers to construct categories before analysis of data begins. Creswell (2009) warns that A
priori coding restricts analysis and can allow for the intrusion of bias if the researcher is not
responsive and open to allowing participant responses to guide the analysis of the data. Although
this coding methodology was developed for grounded theory research, it can be applied to
coding for case study analysis because these methods for developing categories are universal
(Merriam, & Tisdell, 2016). Grounded theory allows for building coding schemes based on
participant responses to interview questions and researcher notes. The main difference in this
study is the lack of development of an overall theory as a result of the analysis, which is a
requirement in grounded theory qualitative research (Fraenkel et al., 2011). Case study research
seeks to provide description and detail as opposed to creating a theory (Merriam, & Tisdell,
2016).
The theoretical framework for this study was the theory of crisis management. The
phases of a crisis can be juxtaposed with efforts to combat a crisis. If each phase of a crisis can
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be identified and accounted for in a crisis management plan, then avoiding the crisis or limiting
the possible impact of a crisis becomes possible (Gilpin & Murphy, 2008). Research in the areas
of political science, psychology, criminal justice, and even communications only focuses on one
or two aspects of the actual crisis (Dimitriu, 2013). Crisis management theory can be applied to
all aspects of school shooting attacks dealing with prevention efforts and response planning
before an event, response training and drills to limit the immediate damage during an attack, and
recovery planning to assist with the aftermath of the attack on all stakeholders to bring the school
and community to a new normal state (Dimitriu, 2013). The phrases used for coding the data
were derived from the elements of crisis management as applied to the phases of a crisis. The
four components of crisis management consist of prevention, protection, response, and recovery
(Boin et al., 2016).
Crabtree and Miller (1992) describe coding and the development of categories on a
continuum from priori, or prefigured, coding to emergent. This continuum allows for category
development prior to data collection based on the literature and based on the research questions
(Crabtree & Miller, 1992; Creswell, 2009). Emergent categories are derived explicitly from the
participants or other data sources as the data is collected and analyzed (Crabree & Miller, 1992).
Original categories were prefigured for this study, but based on participant answers to interview
questions, new categories emerged. The A priori categories consisted of (a) crisis planning with a
subcategory labeled security personnel, (b) drills and procedures, (c) perceptions of
preparedness, and (d) safety perceptions. After analyzing the data and transcribing the
interviews, new subcategories emerged. A subcategory for school safety measures was added to
the crisis planning category. A new subcategory for training emerged based on descriptions of
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training faculty, training students, and training recommendations during the interviews. The
category for perceptions of preparedness was expanded to include personal perceptions of selfpreparedness and perceptions of school preparedness. Appendix G contains the coding scheme
that details categories and subcategories used in the coding process. A coding scheme is
recommended for promoting trustworthiness and for outlining the process for category
development (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012).

Establishing Trustworthiness
Qualitative research studies must establish credibility, dependability, confirmability, and
transferability in the data collection and analysis methods. (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012; Lincoln
& Guba, 1985). These elements substantiate the research findings by validating that the methods
used in the study consistently and reliably produced findings that represented the actual
experiences of participants (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012; Creswell, 2013). Credibility,
dependability, confirmability, and transferability are also components used to establish
trustworthiness (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012, Lincoln & Guba, 1998). The purpose of establishing
trustworthiness is to mitigate bias in the research findings while maintaining components of
validity and reliability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The terms validity and reliability are more
commonly used in quantitative studies. Validity means that the findings and analysis closely
represent the population in the research and in the study (Fraenkel et al., 2011). Reliability means
the study, if repeated by another researcher, would yield similar results and findings (Fraenkel et
al., 2011). Due to the differences between quantitative and qualitative methods, researchers have
developed different terms and procedures for qualitative research to ensure that their findings
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represent the population, are free from bias, and utilize methods that, if repeated, would reveal
consistent results (Creswell, 2007; Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
Research theorists have collected and outlined many different useful methods to protect
and ensure trustworthiness in qualitative studies (Creswell, 2007; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016;
Volpe & Bloomberg, 2012). It is recommended to utilize a minimum of three of the outlined
factors to ensure that a qualitative, or mixed-methods study such as this, contains equivalent
protections for validity and reliability (Creswell, 2013). Efforts utilized by the researcher to
develop trustworthiness consisted of clarifying research bias (Merriam, 1988), using a maximum
variation sampling method (Patton, 2015), verbatim transcripts from a quality recording device
(Creswell, 2013), member checking (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), peer review and intercoder
agreement (Miles & Huberland, 1994), and use of rich thick descriptions (Schram, 2003).

Clarifying Research Bias
This is a method outlined by Merriam (1988) that requires the researcher to provide a
self-portrait related to the study to help identify any bias. This self-portrait is provided in
Appendix H. The researcher provides means and descriptive statistics from answers to the
AAPRS as well as answers to interview questions. Full disclosure of researcher perceptions helps
identify any possible bias (Merriam, 1998).

Maximum Variation Sampling and Saturation
Selecting a maximum variation sample for interviews is a method to promote
trustworthiness and transferability by purposefully selecting a wide variety of participants to
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allow readers to identify with one or more perspectives embodied by one or more of the
participants (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Patton, 2015). Out of the 48 participants who agreed to
the interview, participants were selected to provide a maximum variation sample. After nine
interviews were conducted, saturation was indicated in the data as a repetition was identified in
the responses (Glasser & Strauss, 1967).

Quality Recording Device and Verbatim Transcripts with Detailed Notes
Creswell (2013) recommends the researcher use a quality recording device for interviews,
personal transcription of the interviews, and the use of detailed notes during the interviews.
These elements ensure that the design is repeatable, that the information collected represents the
actual perceptions and ideas of participants, while improving the researchers grasp of the
intricate details within the data (Creswell, 2013; Schensul, 2008).

Member Checking
Lincoln and Guba (1985) state that it is important to make sure that the information from
interview transcripts matches clearly with the ideas of the participants. To help prevent mistakes
or misinterpretations in the transcribed data, the transcripts for this study were sent to the
participants for review and editing. Once edited and reviewed, the transcripts were returned to
the researcher for analysis.

Peer Review and Intercoder Agreement
This process helps mitigate bias and provides elements of reliability to qualitative
research and mixed methods studies (Creswell, 2013). The process for intercoder agreement and
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peer-review requires assistance from a peer/colleague during meetings throughout the process of
coding and analysis to discuss, interpret, and delineate the categories and coding schemes (Miles
& Huberman, 1994). For this study, the researcher met with a colleague after transcribing
interviews to discuss the initial priori categories developed from research questions and the
literature. As the researcher began to see emergent codes from participant answers to interview
questions, a second consultation with the same colleague resulted in a discussion about emergent
codes. The colleague and the researcher worked from the same sections of interview transcripts
to code separately. The majority (88%) of coding and passage designations matched. Those that
were discrepant, were discussed until a point of agreement was reached. The process for
intercoder agreement was derived from similar processes described by Creswell (2013), and
Miles (1994).

Thick, Rich Descriptions
The use of thick, rich descriptions promotes transferability of the findings for qualitative
research (Erlandson et al., 1993; Schram, 2003). These descriptions should include context for
participants and depth of detail in the explanation of results in order to support any claim that the
findings are applicable on a scale beyond the participants in the study (Schram, 2003). This study
includes thick, rich descriptions and context details for the interview participants as well as
triangulation of data between the quantitative and qualitative components.

Summary
This chapter contained descriptions of the study in substantial detail to allow the steps of
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the study to be repeated for future research. More information is needed regarding teacher
perceptions of their ability to respond to active assailant crisis situations in schools. An
explanation of the procedures to select participants, develop instruments, and analyze the data in
accordance with research theory for this mixed methods study demonstrates the measures taken
by the researcher to add to the available information on this important topic of safety for
students. An explanation of efforts taken by the researcher to uphold the validity, reliability, and
trustworthiness of the data collection and analysis methods was also provided. The value of the
recommendations for practice and results of this study depend on the strength of the methods
used to arrive at those conclusions. The next chapter discusses the results from the quantitative
and qualitative components of the study.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
This study analyzed perceptions of teachers regarding their ability to respond to an active
shooter crisis. Data was collected using an explanatory mixed-methods design. Quantitative data
was collected through the Active Assailant Prevention and Response Survey (AAPRS). A
multiple case study approach using open-ended, semi-structured interviews with nine
participants provided detailed descriptions of teacher perceptions to supplement data from the
survey. The results and findings from the data are presented in this chapter starting with the
results from the AAPRS relevant to each of the seven research questions. The findings from the
multiple case study interviews are explained according to the explanatory research model design
(Fraenkel et al., 2011; Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The A priori and emergent categories
developed in the process of coding the interviews provide the organizational structure to explain
the qualitative findings from the nine interviews.

Survey (AAPRS) Results
There were 165 participants who attempted the AAPRS. This represents a 14% return
rate accounting for approximately 1,200 registered students in the graduate programs in the field
of education and educational leadership. The 1,200 students in the population contained a
mixture of teachers, coaches, and school administrators. This study focused solely on teacher
perceptions. There was no way to tell exactly how many of the 1,200 students were currently
teaching at the time, but it is known that some of the 1,200 students represented school
employees of all types, not just teachers. Thus, the actual return rate is likely higher than the 14%
estimate. Fink (2009) suggests a 20% response rate for a population of 1,200 to promote
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generalizability of findings.
The survey included demographic questions to ensure that participants fit the purposive
sample of teachers enrolled in graduate-level education courses at a large university in the
southeastern United States. The AAPRS survey contained three sections identified in the
Qualtrics survey system as questions. The first question (Q1) asked participants to indicate the
degree to which they agree or disagree with seven statements related to the planning process
used to create the crisis management plan for active shooter scenarios in their school. The second
question (Q2) asked participants to indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with
seven statements regarding the drills and procedures used in their school to prepare for, and
respond to, an active shooter crisis. The third question (Q3) asked participants to indicate the
degree to which they agree or disagree with four statements regarding their ability to respond to
an active shooter. Each of the Likert scale response options in the AAPRS contained a score
value for calculations. Participants could choose from: strongly disagree (1), disagree (2), agree
(3), strongly agree (4), or don’t know (no score). Scores lower than 3 indicated less confidence
or negative perceptions, while a score of 3 or higher indicated higher levels of confidence and
positive perceptions.
In order to compute the correlational analyses, the mean for each participant was
calculated for responses to each statement within Q1 to create the variable, Plan Mean. The
overall mean of responses to statements in Q2 was calculated to form the variable Drills/Proc
Mean. The mean was also calculated for the four statements in Q3 to produce a Response Mean
score for each participant. To identify teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to an active
shooter, the key section of the AAPRS was Q3. This question involved four statements related to
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a teacher’s perceptions of their ability to respond in an active shooter crisis situation. The results
are described in the sections below and organized to address each of the research questions. All
of the calculations and descriptive data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social
Sciences software system (SPSS).
The first three research questions were answered with descriptive statistics such as
frequencies, percentages, and means. Research question 4 required a Pearson r correlational
analysis using SPSS to identify possible relationships between planning, identified by the
variable Plan Mean, and participant perceptions of their ability to respond, identified as the
variable Response Mean. Research question 5 required a Pearson r correlational analysis to
identify possible relationships between practice and drill procedures (Drills/Proc Mean) and
participant perceptions of their ability to respond (Response Mean). Research question 6
involved two parts. To answer the first part, an independent samples t test was used to identify
relationships between the Response Mean variable and whether or not the school had security
personnel on campus during the school day. The second portion of research question 6 was
answered using a one-way-ANOVA, or analysis of variance, based on school grade
configuration and Response Mean. Research question 7 also contained two parts. For the first
part, an independent samples t test was used to identify relationships between gender and
Response Mean. The second portion of research question 7 was answered using a one-wayANOVA based on participant’s years of teaching experience and the Response Mean variable.

Testing the Research Questions
To better understand teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter
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crisis, seven research questions were posed. Results from the Active Assailant Prevention and
Response Survey (AAPRS) are explained below using descriptive statistics and correlational
analysis. Each research question is addressed separately for clarity.

Research Question One
How do teachers perceive their ability to respond to active shooter scenarios?
The AAPRS question 3 (Q3) asked participants to indicate the degree to which they agree
or disagree with statements regarding their preparedness to respond during an active shooter
crisis. For the first statement, Q3-1, “I am confident in my ability to respond appropriately in the
event of an active shooter incident in my school,” there were 103 valid responses. The majority
of participants (80.6%) stated that they agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and 19.5%
either disagreed or strongly disagreed. The mean score for this statement was M = 3.03. For the
next statement, Q3-2, “I have received adequate training and have the professional knowledge to
respond effectively in the event of an active shooter incident in my school,” 73.6% agreed or
strongly agreed, while 26.4% disagreed or strongly disagreed and the mean was M = 3.00. For
Q3-3, “I am confident that I can control my classroom in the event of an active shooter incident,”
81.9% agreed or strongly agreed, 18.1% disagreed or strongly disagreed, and the mean was M =
3.14, the highest of the four statements. The final item, Q3-4, states, “I am confident that I can
protect my students in the event of an active shooter incident.” For this item, 68.6% agreed or
strongly agreed, 31.4% disagreed or strongly disagreed, and the mean was M = 2.88. This was
the lowest score for Q3. Table 7 provides frequencies and descriptive statistics regarding teacher
responses for each statement in Q3.
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Table 7
Perceptions of Preparedness Descriptive Statistics
Q3-1
Q3-2
Q3-3
Q3-4
Valid Percent
Valid Percent
Valid Percent
Valid Percent
Strongly Disagree
7.8
4.7
6.7
10.8
Disagree
11.7
21.7
11.4
20.6
Agree
50.5
42.5
42.9
38.2
Strongly Agree
30.1
31.1
39.0
30.4
Valid
103
106
105
102
Mean
3.03
3.00
3.14
2.88
Q3-1
I am confident in my ability to respond appropriately in the event of an active shooter
incident in my school.
Q3-2
I have received adequate training and have the professional knowledge to respond
effectively in the event of an active shooter incident in my school.
Q3-3
I am confident that I can control my classroom in the event of an active shooter
incident.
Q3-4
I am confident that I can protect my students in the event of an active shooter
incident.
Note: The overall Response Mean score was M = 3.01.
Participant answers to the statements in Q3 were averaged to form the variable, Response
Mean. This variable indicates an overall perception of ability to respond to an active shooter
scenario by considering four factors that relate to one’s ability to respond. The intent of the
Response Mean variable was to encapsulate responses for all four statements in Q3. The
Response Mean was used in calculations for research questions 4, 5, 6 and 7. The majority of the
Response Mean scores (63.1%) were at or above the threshold of M = 3.00. A total of 36.9% of
the participants had Response Mean scores lower than M = 2.75, and 24.3% had Response Mean
scores of M = 2.50 or lower. Most participants agreed or strongly agreed that they were confident
in their ability to respond, that they had adequate training to respond effectively, that they were
confident they could control their classrooms, and that they were confident they could protect
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their students. More than 20% were less confident or had negative perceptions of their ability to
respond in an active shooter crisis. In fact, 13.5% of the Response Mean scores were M = 2.00 or
below. The overall mean for this subset was M = 3.01. Table 8 contains frequencies, and
percentages for the Response Mean variable.
Table 8
Response Mean Frequency Table
Response Mean

Frequency

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

3
2
4
6
5
7
2
12
22
11
8
2
11
16
111

2.7
1.8
3.6
5.4
4.5
6.3
1.8
10.8
19.8
9.9
7.2
1.8
9.9
14.4
100.0

2.7
4.5
8.1
13.5
18.0
24.3
26.1
36.9
56.8
66.7
73.9
75.7
85.6
100.0

1.00
1.50
1.75
2.00
2.25
2.50
2.67
2.75
3.00
3.25
3.50
3.67
3.75
4.00
Total
Research Question Two

What are the perceptions of teachers regarding their school’s planning and preparation
for active shooter scenarios?
AAPRS survey subsection Q1, asked participants to indicate the degree to which they
agree or disagree with 7 statements concerning active shooter planning protocol. The first
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statement, labeled as Q1-1, states, “My school has a crisis plan addressing procedures for
handling active shooter incidents,” had a score of M = 3.41 and 88.7% of the participants agreed
or strongly agreed. The second statement, Q1-2, “My school works cooperatively with local
emergency personnel in developing a crisis plan for active shooter incidents,” had a mean of M =
3.47. Nearly 80% of participants agreed or strongly agreed, 10.3% did not know, and 10.3%
disagreed or strongly disagreed. For Q1-3, “My school has a crisis team in place,” 11.2%
disagreed or strongly disagreed and 27.6% of the participants either did not know if their school
had a crisis team in place or disagreed with the statement. More than 72% agreed or strongly
agreed and the mean for Q1-3 was M = 3.38. For item Q1-4, “I have a copy of my school’s
active shooter response procedures,” 38% of the participants in this study either did not have a
copy of their school’s crisis management plan for active shooter scenarios, or they did not know
if they had a copy of the plan. More than 62% agreed or strongly agreed. The mean for Q1-4 was
the lowest for the Q1 subset at M = 2.84.
The fifth statement, Q1-5, “My school’s planning procedures for active shooter incidents
are effective,” had a mean of M = 2.99. Eighteen participants (15.5%) selected “don’t know” for
this statement, 16.3% disagreed or strongly disagreed, while 68.2% either agreed or strongly
agreed that the plans were effective. This equates to 31.8% of teachers in the sample who either
felt their school’s active shooter response plans were ineffective or did not know if the plans
were effective. The mean score was M = 2.93 for Q1-6, “I know where to access information
about my school’s official procedures in case of an active shooter incident.” A majority of
participants (68.9%) agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, 23.2% disagreed or strongly
disagreed, and 7.8% reported that they did not know. This suggests that more than 30% of the
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participants did not know how to access information about their school’s active shooter crisis
management plans. For Q1-7, “I believe it is important to routinely update active shooter
incident procedures,” the mean was the highest at M = 3.67. Overall, participants agreed they
were aware of their school’s crisis plans for active shooter incidents, and most agreed that the
plans and procedures were effective. Table 9 contains descriptive statistics for responses to each
statement in subset Q1.
Table 9
Perceptions of Planning Descriptive Statistics
Q1-1
Q1-2
Q1-3
Q1-4
Q1-5
Q1-6
Q1-7
Valid
Valid
Valid
Valid
Valid
Valid
Valid
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
Don’t Know
1.7
10.3
16.4
7.8
15.5
7.8
7.8
Strongly Disagree
6.0
6.0
4.3
11.2
6.0
10.3
3.4
Disagree
3.4
4.3
6.9
19.0
10.3
12.9
0.9
Agree
28.4
20.7
25.0
20.7
46.6
26.7
18.1
Strongly Agree
60.3
58.6
47.4
41.4
21.6
42.2
69.8
Valid
116
116
116
116
116
116
116
Mean
3.41
3.47
3.38
2.84
2.99
2.93
3.67
Q1-1
My school has a crisis plan addressing procedures for handling active shooter
incidents.
Q1-2
My school works cooperatively with local emergency personnel in developing a
crisis plan for active shooter incidents.
Q1-3
My school has a crisis team in place.
Q1-4
I have a copy of my school’s active shooter response procedures.
Q1-5
My school’s planning procedures for active shooter incidents are effective.
Q1-6
I know where to access information about my school’s official procedures in case of
an active shooter incident.
Q1-7
I believe it is important to routinely update active shooter incident procedures.
Note: The overall Plan Mean score was M = 3.22
The scores for each participant for each statement in Q1 were averaged to form the
variable, Plan Mean. The Plan Mean provided a measure of perceptions related to crisis
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management planning protocol. The overall Plan Mean for all participants in this section was M
= 3.22, with a standard deviation of .732. The majority of participants knew their school had a
plan in place for active shooter scenarios. The majority of participant’s schools worked with
local emergency personnel to develop the plan. Most schools had a crisis team in place and the
majority of participants had access to, or at least knew how to access, their school’s crisis
management plan. Most participants believed the crisis management plans for their school were
effective and that it was important for these plans to be routinely updated.

Research Question Three
What are the perceptions of teachers regarding their school’s drills and procedures for
active shooter scenarios?
The AAPRS section identified as question 2 (Q2), asked participants to indicate the
degree to which they agree or disagree with seven statements regarding procedures and drills for
active shooter incidents at their school. For the first statement (Q2-1), “The possibility of a
school shooting incident is taken seriously at my school,” the mean was M = 3.44. The majority
of participants (86.1%) agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, 11.3% disagreed or
strongly disagreed, and 2.6% reported that they did not know. For the second statement (Q2-2),
“My school provides instruction sessions about live active shooter incident preparedness to
staff,” 17.3% disagreed or strongly disagreed, 4.3% did not know, and 78.2% agreed or strongly
agreed. The mean score for this statement was M = 3.30. The third statement (Q2-3), “My school
provides classroom instruction about live active shooter incident preparedness to students,” had
the lowest mean for this subset at M = 2.65. Q2-3 recorded the highest percentage of
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disagreement with 44.7% of participants selecting disagree or strongly disagree. Seven percent
selected don’t know, and 48.3% agreed or strongly agreed. Q2-4, “The classroom instruction
portion of our active shooter incident preparedness is effective,” had the second lowest mean
score at M =2.72. More than 20% selected, don’t know, for this statement, while 33.2% either
disagreed or strongly disagreed. Less than half (43.9%) agreed or strongly agreed.
The statement for Q2-5, “My school provides drills for staff in order to practice active
shooter incident preparedness,” had a mean of M = 3.31. In addition, 81.8% of the participants
either agreed or strongly agreed, 14.8% disagreed or strongly disagreed, and 3.5% selected don’t
know. For Q2-6, “My school provides drills for students in order to practice active shooter
incident preparedness,” 56.5% strongly agreed, 29.6% agreed, 6.1% disagreed, 6.1% strongly
disagreed, and 1.7% did not know. The mean for Q2-6 was M = 3.39. The final statement in this
subsection, Q2-7, “My school’s active shooter incident drills are effective,” had a mean of M =
3.00. Twenty percent selected don’t know and 20% either disagreed or strongly disagreed. Sixty
percent of the participants either agreed or strongly agreed that their school’s active shooter
incident drills were effective. Table 10 contains descriptive statistics for the Q2 subset of the
AAPRS responses.
Participant responses to all of the statements in subset Q2 were averaged to form the
variable Drills/Proc Mean. The overall Drills/Proc Mean was M = 3.12 with a standard deviation
of .687. Most areas in this subset show that teachers are confident and knowledgeable in active
shooter training, drills, and procedures in their schools. The results also show an area of concern
regarding the training for students. Scores for items related to training for students and
confidence in the effectiveness of the drills demonstrate a need for policy adjustments. More
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uniform training tools and techniques to help students better understand their roles in active
shooter incidents could improve teacher confidence in the overall effectiveness of active shooter
crisis management drills and procedures.
Table 10
Perceptions of Drills and Procedures Descriptive Statistics
Q2-1
Q2-2
Q2-3
Q2-4
Q2-5
Q2-6
Q2-7
Valid
Valid
Valid
Valid
Valid
Valid
Valid
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent
Don’t Know
2.6
4.3
7.0
21.9
3.5
1.7
20.0
Strongly Disagree
7.0
4.3
11.4
10.5
7.8
6.1
5.2
Disagree
4.3
13.0
33.3
23.7
7.0
6.1
14.8
Agree
25.2
27.8
24.6
21.1
29.6
29.6
34.8
Strongly Agree
60.9
50.4
23.7
22.8
52.2
56.5
25.2
Valid
115
115
114
114
115
115
115
Mean
3.44
3.30
2.65
2.72
3.31
3.39
3.00
Q2-1
The possibility of a school shooting incident is taken seriously at my school.
Q2-2
My school provides instruction sessions about live active shooter incident
preparedness to staff.
Q2-3
My school provides classroom instruction about live active shooter incident
preparedness to students.
Q2-4
The classroom instruction portion of our active shooter incident preparedness is
effective.
Q2-5
My school provides drills for staff in order to practice active shooter incident
preparedness.
Q2-6
My school provides drills for students in order to practice active shooter incident
preparedness.
Q2-7
My school’s active shooter incident drills are effective.
Note: The overall Drill/Proc Mean score was M = 3.12

Research Question Four
What relationships exist, if any, between perceptions of planning and preparation for
active shooter scenarios, and preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident among
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teachers?
To analyze this question, the mean scores from the planning section (Q1), and the
response section (Q2) of the AAPRS were compared. Question 1 (Q1) consisted of seven
statements rated on a 4-point Likert Scale regarding crisis planning for active shooter incidents.
An overall mean of M = 3.22 for these seven questions was calculated as the Plan Mean variable.
The 4 statements in Q3 were combined in a similar fashion to provide an overall Response Mean
of M = 3.01. Table 11 contains the means and standard deviations for the Plan Mean variable and
the Response Mean variable.
Table 11
Planning and Response Descriptive Statistics
Plan Mean
Response Mean

Mean
3.22
3.01

Std. Deviation
.703
.739

N
116
111

A Pearson r calculation for the Plan Mean variable and the Response Mean variable was
calculated using the SPSS software. The results showed that r (109) = .520, p < .001. The critical
r for this value is between .232 and .254 at the .01 level. This allows the researcher to be 99%
confident that these scores are related and that their relationship is not due to mere sampling
error. Understanding and confidence regarding crisis planning protocol directly relates to teacher
perceptions of how they will respond in an active shooter crisis. Table 12 displays the SPSS
output data for the Pearson r calculation.
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Table 12
Pearson r for Planning and Response
Plan Mean
1

Plan Mean

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
116
Response Mean
Pearson Correlation
.520**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
N
111
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Response Mean
.520**
.000
111
1
111

Research Question Five
What relationships exist, if any, between perceptions of procedures and drills, and
perceptions of preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident among teachers?
To analyze this question, the drills and procedures section of the AAPRS (Q2) was
compared with the preparedness to respond section (Q3). Q2 consisted of seven statements rated
on a Likert scale regarding drills and procedures for active shooter incidents. An overall mean of
M = 3.12 for these seven statements was calculated into the variable Drill/Proc Mean. The four
statements in Q3 were combined in a similar fashion to provide a Response Mean score of M =
3.01. Table 13 Shows the descriptive data for these two variables.
Table 13
Drills/Procedures and Response Descriptive Statistics
Drills/Proc Mean
Response Mean

Mean
3.12
3.01

Std. Deviation
.687
.739

N
115
111

A Pearson r for Drill/Proc Mean and Response Mean was calculated at r (109) = .637, p
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< .001. The critical r for this value is between .232 and .254 at the .01 level. The Response Mean
scores and the Drills/Proc Mean scores are correlated at the .01 level, and this relationship is not
due to mere sampling error. Confidence in, and understanding of, drills and procedures directly
impacts teacher perceptions of how they will respond during an active shooter crisis. Table 14
displays SPSS output for the Pearson r calculation for the Drills/Proc Mean and the Response
Mean.
Table 14
Pearson r for Drill/Procedures and Response
Drills/Proc Mean
1

Drills/Proc Mean

Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
115
Response Mean
Pearson Correlation
.637**
Sig. (2-tailed)
.000
N
111
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Response Mean
.637**
.000
111
1
111

Scores for each of the statements in AAPRS Q3 were separated by participant responses
to Q8, which asked how many times per year active shooter drills were conducted. Participants
could choose, (a) 0 drills, (b) 1-2 drills, or (c) 3 or more drills. For Q3-1, “I am confident in my
ability to respond appropriately in the event of an active shooter incident in my school,”
participant scores were as follows: 0 drills (M = 2.71), 1-2 drills (M = 2.52), and 3 or more drills
(M = 3.21). For Q3-2, “I have received adequate training and have the professional knowledge to
respond effectively in the event of an active shooter incident in my school,” participant scores
were as follows: 0 drills (M = 3.28), 1-2 drills (M = 2.72), and 3 or more drills (M = 3.06). For
Q3-3, “I am confident that I can control my classroom in the event of an active shooter incident,”
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participant scores were as follows: 0 drills (M = 3.00), 1-2 drills, (M = 2.86), and 3 or more drills
(M = 3.24). For Q3-4, “I am confident that I can protect my students in the event of an active
shooter incident.” participant scores were as follows: 0 drills (M = 3.00) , 1-2 drills, (M = 2.81),
and 3 or more drills (M = 2.94).
Table 15
Response and Number of Annual Drills
Drills Conducted
Q3-1
Q3-2
Q3-3
Q3-4
Response
Annually
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
Mean
0 Drills
2.71
3.28
3.00
3.00
2.80
1-2 Drills
2.52
2.72
2.86
2.81
2.72
3 or More Drills
3.21
3.06
3.24
2.94
3.14
Q3-1
I am confident in my ability to respond appropriately in the event of an active shooter
incident in my school.
Q3-2
I have received adequate training and have the professional knowledge to respond
effectively in the event of an active shooter incident in my school.
Q3-3
I am confident that I can control my classroom in the event of an active shooter
incident.
Q3-4
I am confident that I can protect my students in the event of an active shooter
incident.

For the Response Mean variable participant scores were as follows: 0 drills (M = 2.80), 12 drills (M = 2.72), and 3 or more drills (M = 3.14). Scores for participants in schools with 3 or
more drills per year were higher than scores for participants whose schools conducted fewer
drills. Another notable factor is that every participant who worked in a public school reported
that their school conducted active shooter drills two or more times during the year. There were
seven participants who reported that their school did not conduct drills during the year. Three of
these were universities, three were private schools, and one was a charter school. These factors
account for the values regarding the scores for 0 drills being skewed. Table 15 displays the
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comparative response scores for each item in Q3 as well as the Response Mean for the number of
annual drills reported by participants.

Research Question Six
What effect, if any, do school factors such as presence of security and gradeconfiguration have on the perceptions of teachers in responding to active shooter scenarios?
To identify if the presence of security personnel on campus during the school day impacts
teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter, an independent samples t test
was calculated using SPSS. The sample contained 89 participants who reported the presence of
security during the school day and 22 participants who worked at schools with no security
personnel. The calculations had to account for this variation in sample size.
The resulting calculations from SPSS resulted in t (109) = 0.090, p > .10. There was no
significant difference between the Response Mean scores for participants working in schools
with security and those working in schools without. The critical value for a t test with 109
degrees of freedom is 1.6. The value of .090 falls well below this threshold. The critical value
corresponds to t test scores that demonstrate significant differences in participant scores. Since
the t score for this test was significantly lower than the critical value, any differences between
the Response Mean for participants with security and those without security were likely
attributed to sampling error; or the difference was too small to be considered significant. With a
.016 difference in the means, no significant difference existed between Response Mean scores
for the two groups. Table 16 shows the means and standard deviations of the Response Mean for
each group. Table 17 shows the SPSS output for the t test calculation.
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Table 16
Presence of Security and Response Descriptive Statistics
Presence of Security
Yes
No

Response Mean

N
89
22

Mean
3.02
3.00

Std. Deviation
.729
.794

Table 17
Presence of Security and Response t test results

Response
Mean

f

sig

t

df

.002

.969

.090

109

Sig
(2-tailed)
.928

Mean
difference
.016

School grade configuration was also a school demographic factor tested in reference to
participant perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter incident. Due to the
discrepancies in the grade configurations reported in the data, an adjustment was required to
group the participant responses into three alternative grade configuration categories. In the
survey, participants could select elementary school, middle school, high school, Kindergarten-8th
grade, or other as their options. The selection of other, prompted an open response for
participants to describe their school’s grade configuration. For the purpose of calculations, the
responses were regrouped into elementary school (pre-kindergarten through grade 5), secondary
school (grades 6 through 12), and other (mostly kindergarten – grade 8, or kindergarten – grade
12). Regrouping was necessary to create more equity in the sample sizes for each school type
since equal sample sizes is needed for an analysis of variance. The Response Mean was lowest
for secondary schools (M = 2.82) and highest for schools with alternative grade configurations
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(M = 3.11). Eighteen of these alternative configuration schools spanned early childhood
education through 12th grade. The response mean for elementary school teachers was M = 3.06.
Table 18
School Grade Configuration and Response Mean Descriptive Statistics

N
Elementary School
46
Secondary School
29
Other Configuration 36
Total
111

Mean
3.06
2.82
3.11
3.01

Std.
Deviation
.6956
.7851
.7469
.7387

Std.
Error
.1026
.1458
.1245
.0701

95%
95%
Confidence
Confidence
Interval for
Interval for
Mean
Mean
Lower Bound Upper Bound
2.853
3.266
2.523
3.121
2.854
3.359
2.874
3.152

Differences were noted in the Response Mean scores for the various groups and the
significance of these differences was tested using a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). The
ANOVA results showed F (2, 108) = 1.360, p > .10. An actual probability of p = .261 for the
ANOVA shows that the differences between the Response Mean were minimal and likely due to
sampling error. School grade configuration had minimal impact on perceptions of ability to
respond to an active shooter incident. Tables 18 and 19 show descriptive statistics and output
from SPSS for the one-way-ANOVA.
Table 19
Grade Configuration and Response Mean ANOVA

Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of
Squares
1.475
58.556
60.031

Mean
Square
.737
.542

df
2
108
110
97

F
1.360

Sig.
.261

Research Question Seven
What effect, if any, do individual demographic factors such as gender and years of
teaching experience have on the perceptions of teachers in responding to active shooter
scenarios?
To identify if gender impacts teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to an active
shooter, an independent samples t test was calculated using SPSS for the Response Mean
variable. The sample contained 85 women and 24 men, so the calculations had to account for this
variation in sample size. The Response Mean score for men was M = 3.10 and the Response
Mean for women was M = 2.99. Table 20 shows the scores and standard deviations of the
Response Mean separated by gender.
Table 20
Gender and Response Mean Descriptive Statistics
Gender
Male
Female

N
24
85

Mean
3.10
2.99

Std. Deviation
.649
.764

Std. Error Mean
.132
.083

Although the score for men was slightly higher, to test the significance of this
relationship, an independent samples t-test was used. The resulting calculations from SPSS
resulted in t (107) = 0.657, p > .10. There was no significant difference between the scores for
men and women regarding perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter. The
critical value for a t test with 107 degrees of freedom is 1.6. The value of .657 is well below this
threshold. The critical value determines the depth of the relationship in a t test. Calculated t
scores that fall below the critical value support the acceptance of the null hypothesis. In this case,
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the researcher was able to accept the null hypotheses that no significant difference exists between
the perceptions of men and women, in this study, regarding their ability to respond to an active
shooter. Table 21 shows the SPSS output from the t test calculation.
Table 21
Gender and Response Mean t Test

Response
Mean

f

sig

t

df

.146

.703

.657

107

Sig
(2-tailed)
.513

Mean
difference
.112

To test the relationship between years of teaching experience and perceptions of ability to
respond to an active shooter, a one-way ANOVA was conducted using SPSS software. Teaching
experience was organized by frequencies for participants. The first level consisted of teachers
with 1 to 3 years of experience. The Response Mean score for this group was M = 2.88. The
second level consisted of teachers with 4 to 6 years of teaching experience. The Response Mean
score for this group was M = 2.94. The third level consisted of teachers with 7 to 9 years of
experience. The Response Mean score for this group was M = 3.08. The fourth level consisted of
teachers with 10 or more years of teaching experience. The Response Mean score for this group
was M = 3.06. Teachers with 1 to 6 years of teaching experience had Response Mean scores that
were lower than 3.00, while teachers with seven or more years of experience had Response Mean
scores higher than 3.00. Table 22 shows the descriptive data for participant teaching experience
and Response Mean scores.
Although differences were noted in the Response Mean scores for the various groups, the
significance of these differences was tested using a one-way ANOVA. The ANOVA results
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showed F (3, 107) = .364, p > .10. An actual probability of p = .779 for the ANOVA shows that
the differences between the Response Mean scores were minimal and that any differences were
small and possibly not related to teaching experience. In other words, teaching experience had
minimal impact on teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter incident.
Table 23 shows output from SPSS for the one-way-ANOVA.
Table 22
Teaching Experience and Response Descriptive Statistics

1 - 3 years
4 - 6 years
7 - 9 years
10+ years
Total

N
15
25
20
51
111

Mean
2.88
2.94
3.08
3.06
3.01

Std.
Deviation
.870
.759
.757
.694
.739

Std. Error
.225
.152
.169
.097
.070

95% Confidence Interval for
Mean
Lower Bound Upper Bound
2.401
3.365
2.623
3.250
2.721
3.429
2.868
3.259
2.874
3.152

Table 23
ANOVA for Teaching Experience and Response Mean
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total

Sum of Squares
.606
59.425
60.031

df
3
107
110

Mean Square
.202
.555

F
.364

Sig.
.779

Interview Results
The following sections provide rich, thick descriptions of results from the multiple case
study interviews used in this study to analyze teacher perceptions of their ability to respond in an
active shooter crisis. First, a description of the interview process is outlined. Next, biographies
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for participants are presented to provide context. Finally, a description of the coding scheme is
explained to clarify the organizational structure used to present the findings.

Interview Process
Each of the nine interviews provided detail to enhance what was ascertained from the
AAPRS. The semi-structured interviews were conducted using a list of 12 open-ended questions
that allowed participants to describe their perceptions in detail and provided the researcher with
the freedom to ask follow-up questions. Creswell (2007) recommends the use of open-ended
questions and semi-structured interviews to allow the researcher to adapt to the information
provided and respond with fluidity to participant responses. Appendix D shows the interview
questions used as a guide during the interviews. The first three questions were demographic in
nature to provide context and help clarify data for research questions 6 and 7, which intended to
identify whether demographic factors affect perceptions of ability to respond during an active
assailant crisis. This information included teaching experience, gender, school population, school
grade configuration, presence of security during the school day, and whether the school was
public, private, or charter. Questions 4 through 12 elicited detail regarding teacher perceptions of
the crisis management planning protocol, drill procedures for active shooter response, and their
ability to respond in a crisis. The nine interview participants were selected from 48 individuals
who volunteered by providing contact information in the AAPRS question 13. These nine were
selected to provide a maximum variation sample. Four of the interviews were conducted face to
face and five of the interviews were conducted over the phone. All interviews were recorded,
transcribed by the researcher, and analyzed using the coding scheme. Biographical context
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descriptions are provided below for each of the nine participants who were given pseudonyms to
protect their confidentiality. Interviews were conducted until a point of saturation was reached
and no new information was provided in the interviews.

Interview Participant Context Descriptions
The nine interview participants represented a range of school types, experience, and
grade configurations to achieve a maximum variation sample. Case study research requires
detailed description in order to provide context (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2012). This background
information was derived from interview questions, and researcher notes during the interviews. In
order to promote trustworthiness and protect the confidentiality of participants, each subject was
provided a pseudonym and references to school name or district name were omitted from the
report (Meriam & Tisdell, 2016).

Alice
At the time of the interview, Alice was working at a public elementary school with
approximately 550 students. She had been at the school for 3 years but had 5 years of teaching
experience. She was a self-contained teacher in a second-grade classroom. She pointed out that
the school was a public, Title I school with a large percentage of students who were English
language learners. In the state of Florida, Title I schools are identified by a Local Education
Agency (LEA) as having a sufficient number of students in poverty to apply for subsistence
funding and programs that help meet the needs of students to improve the achievement gap
(Fldoe.org, 2007). She also reported that her classroom was made up of 21 students that she felt
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the need to protect in the case of a crisis.

Mari
At the time of the interview, Mari was working as a self-contained, 1st grade teacher in a
Title 1 public school in Central Florida, where she had been working for the past 6 years. She
had taught in Puerto Rico for 6 years prior to moving to Florida, giving her a total of 12 years
teaching experience. She described her school as a pre-kindergarten through fifth grade school
with 779 students. Her class had a total of 19 students.

Bettie
At the time of the interview, Bettie was working in a private, pre-kindergarten through 6th
grade school. She had worked at the school for 5 years, but she had over 17 years teaching
experience. Before switching to the private sector, she worked for 12 years in a public middle
school teaching 7th grade Language Arts. She said that her school had approximately 600
students and that the annual tuition was roughly $14,000.00 or more depending on the gradelevel. She informed me that the fifth grade at her school was departmentalized, which meant that
students traveled from class to class for each subject. At the time of the interview, she was
responsible for four rotating classes each day and the size of the classes ranged from 12 students,
to 18 students per group.

Shannon
Shannon had the most teaching experience of all the interview participants. She had been
a teacher for 45 years and spent 18 of those years working as a fifth and sixth grade science
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teacher in a departmentalized private school for pre-kindergarten through sixth grade students.
Shannon’s status was part time when the interview was conducted, and she worked Monday
through Thursday with Friday off each week. She taught three groups of 6th graders each day in
classes that contained 16, 18, and 20 students. Bettie and Shannon worked at the same school.
This selection was purposeful in order to compare perceptions in the same setting by different
teachers across different grade levels.

Jack
Jack was the only teacher who represented a public middle school model, which
contained grades six through eight. He taught technology for seventh and eighth graders. He said
that his class sizes ranged from 25, to as many as 43 students at a time in a computer lab. Jack
had 25 years of teaching experience with the majority of his tenure working in an Embassy
school in Beijing, China. At the time of the interview, he had spent the past 2 years working at a
middle school in Central Florida with 1,260 students.

Newman
Newman had just started at his school when we conducted the interview. He had 17 years
of teaching experience with students in grade 5 through grade 8 and had only worked in private
schools during his tenure as a teacher. He had worked at a total of three different schools in his
career. Newman’s school covered pre-kindergarten through 12th grade with 1,296 students.
Newman’s campus where he worked consisted of about 450 students in grades seven and eight.
Newman said that his campus had two full time security staff, and that there were regular patrols
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conducted by separate security staff from the main campus that housed the lower school and the
high school. According to his knowledge, the guards were not armed with guns. Not only had he
coached several sports; he had also spent time working as the athletic director for two schools.

Mark
Before becoming a teacher, Mark was as a Ranger in the United States Army. He served
in Iraq and experienced combat during his tour. At the time of the interview, he was working in a
public school that served 1,600, 7th through 12th grade students in what he referred to as a juniorsenior model school. He taught 9th and 10th grade students. He had 6 years of teaching experience
with 5 years at the 7th-12th grade school. Mark primarily taught grades 9 and 10 and said that his
school had five guidance counselors to serve the student population.

Bobby
At the time of the interview, Bobby had spent his 8-year teaching career at the same
school. He showed a great affinity for his students and his fellow teachers, and he mentioned the
importance of authenticity for teachers in their interactions with students and colleagues. He
taught 10th, 11th, and 12th grade English 2 honors as well as advanced placement psychology.
Bobby was also a certified mental health counselor. The traditional high school in which Bobby
taught had approximately 2,200 students in grades 9 through 12.

Connie
With 10 years in education, Connie reported that she had worked with nearly every grade
level from kindergarten through 12th grade. At the time of the interview, she was a behavioral
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specialist at a public, Central Florida high school with more than 3,000 students. Her
participation was allowed, even though she was not a classroom teacher, because she said that
her daily job description required her to work directly with groups of students in a classroom
setting. As part of the administrative team, she discussed the drills and active shooter protocol
from a perspective that was not provided in the other interviews.

Coding Categories
The thematic coding methodology used in this study to analyze teacher perceptions was
based on universal methods created initially for grounded theory qualitative research (Bloomberg
& Volpe, 2012). Development of categories for coding was done on a continuum from priori, or
preformed categories from the literature and research questions, to emergent categories derived
from the data collected (Crabtree and Miller, 1992; Creswell, 2007). For this study, the literature,
the data from the AAPRS, and the research questions led to the development of four prefigured
categories used to analyze the data from interviews. The priori categories consisted of crisis
planning, drills and procedures, perceptions of preparedness, and perceptions of safety. Emergent
categories and subcategories were added based on participant answers to interview questions.
For category 1, crisis planning, the following subcategories were added: (a) origins of crisis plan
and teacher involvement, (b) security personnel, and (c) other safety features. For category 2,
drills and procedures, subcategories for (a) drill and procedure descriptions, (b) training faculty,
(c) training students, and (d) training recommendations emerged. The category for perceptions of
preparedness included personal perceptions of self-preparedness and perceptions of school
preparedness. Bloomberg & Volpe (2012) recommend providing a coding scheme as an
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appendix to outline the categories and subcategories used in the coding process. Appendix G
contains the coding scheme used in this study.

Category 1: Crisis Planning
The open-ended interview questions asked participants to identify aspects of their
school’s crisis management plan for active shooter incidents. Responses were consistent with the
results from the AAPRS and this element of coding corresponded to research questions 2 and 4.
Research question 2 sought to identify perceptions of teachers regarding their schools planning
protocol for active shooter attacks and question 4 sought to identify and analyze relationships
between perceptions of planning and perceptions of ability to respond among participants. The
interview questions and follow-up questions that prompted responses related to planning
protocol were as follows:
•

Does your school have security personnel on campus during the school day?

•

Are the security personnel armed?

•

Describe how your school developed its planned response for active shooter scenarios?

•

Were teachers involved in developing the crisis management plan? What are/were their
roles?

Category 1a: Origins of crisis plan and teacher involvement.
The origins of the crisis management plans were consistent across the interviews. Each of
the participants stated that the crisis plan was developed in a top-down approach from state
mandates and school district policies, if working in a public school or from an administrative
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group, if working in a private school. The level of involvement of teachers in the development of
crisis management plans was nonexistent in public schools according to the participants and the
involvement was limited in the private schools where Bettie, Shannon, and Newman worked.
Bettie indicated that there were avenues that allowed teachers to provide input in the planning
process. Every few years during school accreditation, a committee was formed to analyze and
document the crisis management plan. Committee teachers were able to suggest updates and
modifications in league with school security. Mark, who worked at a public seventh through 12th
grade center, and Jack, who worked at a public middle school, both stated that teachers were able
to provide input regarding crisis plans to their administrators. Jack also stated that he had the
opportunity to be on the school’s crisis management team if he so chose, but at the time of the
interview he had elected not to participate.
The AAPRS survey indicated a large percentage of teachers (38%) who did not have
access to crisis management plans for review if needed. Further review of the data from
interviews demonstrates that teachers have little to no involvement in the development or
adaptations of the crisis management plans in their schools. Having a sense that school
leadership listens to and responds to teacher feedback and having a sense of involvement in the
process of decision-making are factors that positively impact teacher self-efficacy (TschannenMoran, 1998). Perhaps, if planning input can positively affect teacher self-efficacy for improving
student achievement, it can also positively impact teacher perceptions of their ability to respond
to a crisis. Brown (2008) asserts: “It is better for a school to develop a personalized plan than to
simply pay someone to do it. Plans need to be a group effort. Staff members need and desire to
be trained” (p. 60). All nine participants knew their school had a plan in place but none of them
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had been involved in helping to develop the crisis management plan for active shooter incidents.

Category 1b: Security personnel.
Every participant interviewed had security on their campus during the school day. Having
visible and reliable security makes teachers, faculty, staff, students, and parents feel safer at
school (Brown, 2008, Rider, 2017). Alice and Mari, who both worked in public elementary
schools had one security staff member on campus during the school day. Alice stated that her
school had one security guard who was, “a retired police officer who is there at least 95% of the
time.” She also stated that she believed he was armed. Alice’s elementary school had roughly
550 students with one security guard. Mari explained, “There is always one deputy present that is
assigned to our school.” Mari’s school had roughly 779 students with one security guard on
campus during the day who was an armed deputy from the county.
Bettie and Shannon worked at a private school that served 580 students in prekindergarten through 6th grade. Bettie stated, “Yes, we have a security guard. In fact, we have
multiple security guards that overlap. One of them is a retired police officer. We have two but
there are certain times of day when they overlap.” When asked if the security guards were armed
Bettie explained, “Yes, I think that they are armed. They don’t openly carry a gun that I can see.”
Shannon said that one of the security guards was retired from a local police department, and the
other was a retired corrections officer. The security staffing model described by Bettie and
Shannon showed that the school had two retired officers on an overlapped schedule. One of the
retired officers arrived at the school when it opened each morning to assist with morning arrival
and remained on campus until 4:00 pm. The other security guard arrived at 9:00 am and stayed
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on campus until 6:00 pm when the last students were picked up from afterschool activities.
Newman stated that his campus of 450 students had two security personnel on staff each
day. He did not believe they were armed, and he did not know much about their background
since he had just started working at a new school. Jack, who worked at a public middle school
with 1,260 students, described the security for his school as follows:
There is one full time resource officer all the time and sometimes there is a Half. A Half
is an officer that is shared between two schools in our district. So, some days of the week
there are two officers, some days there is just the one. By the way, both of those officers
have their dogs. So, sometimes there is an officer and a dog, and sometimes there are two
officers and two dogs. Yes, the officers are armed, they are police officers.
Jack also spoke with confidence about his school resource officer. “I trust our resource officer
who is highly visible. I trust that if there was an active shooter, I believe that she would respond
to it as quick as possible.” The phrase, highly visible, is important. Brown (2008) found that the
visibility and involvement of security on campus impacted teacher perceptions of safety in their
schools.
Mark, who worked teaching 9th and 10th graders at a school serving 1,600 students in
grades 7 through 12, said, “Our security guard is a guardian, where our SRO (school resource
officer) is a county sheriff’s deputy. Both individuals are armed.” Terminology for school
security varies from state to state and county to county. In the state of Florida, the term guardian
refers to individuals who have been trained under the requirements of the Coach Aaron Feis
portion of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act (Fldoe.org). Guardians
are described by the Florida Department of Education as volunteers from within a school or
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external civilians that are selected and must undergo minimum training requirements of 144
hours in firearms, mental-health, tactics of active shooter prevention, as well as legal and
diversity issues. One section of the Aaron Feis Guardian program allows for the selection of
school staff to undergo this training and become guardians (Fldoe.org). The guardian referred to
by Mark in his statement was not a teacher at the school because Mark worked in a district where
district policies regarding the Coach Aaron Feis portion of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas Act
prevented teachers from acting as school guardians. The issue of arming teachers has been met
with some controversy (Jonson, 2018; Trump, 2019). Mark responded to a follow-up question
about whether or not having a gun would make him feel more prepared or safer at school by
stating the following:
No. And the reason is that while it might address a security risk that most likely will
never happen to me, the likelihood of something going wrong, administratively and
through policy, of me having a weapon on campus whatever security I might have based
on having something along with me that would add security if a horrible incident took
place. The reality of it is, that the potential of liability of me losing my career based on
something unrelated to that happening is much higher than me getting killed at the
school.
Before becoming a teacher, Mark was a US Army Ranger. Even though Mark reported that he
was comfortable using firearms, his concern for liability issues and possibly losing his job,
outweighed the protective factors of being armed in the classroom. Shannon shared the
sentiments of Mark when asked if she thought that arming teachers would make her feel safer.
This question was not part of each interview for this research project, so only Shannon and Mark
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provided input on the issue. Some states and schools have used similar programs for arming and
training teachers and there are lawmakers who support this as a viable option for school safety
(Morabia, 2018; Rajan & Branas, 2018). There is a divide regarding support for arming teachers.
Rajan and Branas (2018) say that arming teachers costs too much, might negatively impact
school climate, and that there is not enough research to support arming teachers as a deterrent for
active shooter attacks. Morabia (2018), states that research regarding the use of firearms has been
blocked by lawmakers and lobbyist making it difficult to find out if this policy would work or
not. Lott (2019), after researching 20 US states that currently utilize this policy, says that schools
where teachers are armed have not experienced any school shooting incidents, but schools that
do not allow teachers to be armed have seen an increase in the number of school shootings.
Bobby and Connie both worked at public high schools in Central Florida. Bobby reported
that his school had seven staff who were considered security and Connie reported that her school
had five on campus during the school day. Bobby reported that his school had 2,200 students and
Connie’s school had over 3,000. Bobby described the security personnel on his campus by
stating the following:
We have four security officers that wear bright yellow shirts and are visibly present on
campus. We also have three school resource officers. The three resource officers are
police department officers, and they are armed. They have cop cars when they come to
school, and they are legitimate police officers. The four security guards are hired through
the district. They are county security. In total there are seven.
Connie, who worked as a behavior specialist at a high school with 3,500 students expanded her
answer beyond the armed guards and the personnel specifically hired for security purposes to
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include other members of the faculty and administrative team at the school. Connie stated:
We have three who are security, and they are to monitor the campus and monitor the
front gate. They are called security staff. We also have two SROs on campus at all times.
There are also three deans currently, and we have four Assistant Principals. Anyone who
has a radio can respond to security issues on campus. The SROs are armed. I know that
our security staff are not armed and that they really only have the power to let everyone
else know what is going on, but not really to interact as far as becoming hands-on. They
can’t do any of that. They really are just eyes for the campus and only 3 of them on
campus is pretty lacking.
Including administrative staff in her answer to the question about security personnel was a
unique feature presented by Connie. Extending some of the responsibilities for school safety
beyond staff specifically hired as security personnel is a model that some schools are adopting
(Kubena & Watts, 2019). This factor was addressed by Shannon and Bettie when they described
the role of teachers in asking individuals that they saw on campus without proper identification
to go to the office and check in immediately. Bettie described a similar sentiment during a
training session at her school by a security specialist and consultant. “During the training, he told
the entire staff that we were all part of the security team” (Bettie).

Category 1c: Other safety features.
Security gates, access codes for building entry, badge identification systems, phone and
computer reporting applications, security cameras, limited and monitored entry points, and
locked classroom doors were among the many safety features reported by participants when
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asked about safety measures implemented in conjunction with their school’s crisis management
plan. Within the past decade, schools nationwide have implemented numerous safety features in
response to active assailant attacks as well as in response to other types of violence in schools
(Johnson, 2017; NCES, 2017). Several new safety features were added to Florida schools within
the 2 or 3 years prior to this study. Many of the safety features implemented in Florida were part
of the Marjory Stoneman Douglass High School Public Safety Act.
Each participant who worked in a public school reported that their classroom door was
locked during the school day. Most had to be opened by a faculty badge or a key in order to enter
from the outside. Bettie and Shannon, who worked in a private school, were not required to keep
their doors locked, but Newman, who also worked at a private school, stated that his classroom
door locked automatically and required a key to enter. Newman also pointed out that the
buildings themselves could only be entered with an access badge. For Bettie and Shannon, the
majority of the buildings in their school (not including their classrooms) could only be opened by
a faculty access badge. Eighteen of the classrooms on the campus were usually unlocked during
the school day out of the 42 total classrooms on the school’s campus. Eight of the nine
participants stated that their school had an external gate that was locked during the day and that
their school had limited entry points for visitors who were required to check in at the front office
and show identification before entering the school. Jack’s school was the only school without a
security gate, but he said that construction on a gate had begun and would be complete by the
end of the 2020 school year.
Connie mentioned the use of security cameras on her campus. She was not happy with
the lack of monitoring of the cameras and thought that there were not enough cameras on campus
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to provide any useful measure of safety. No other participant mentioned the use of cameras as a
safety feature in their school. There were two participants (Bobby and Jack) who mentioned
iPhone and computer applications that were used in their schools for emergency purposes.
Each teacher on the smart phone has an app. We have two apps. One app is to alert for
the shooter or any other trouble spot. The other app is to check the status of the people
and the students once you’ve run into an emergency situation. A teacher is to use that app
if they saw anything that was wrong. They have this app to use to communicate to the
emergency departments immediately. (Jack)
Although both participants felt that the applications were a useful tool, there were some issues
with the technology. Bobby described a situation in which a teacher inadvertently triggered a
school lockdown by accidentally pressing the panic button on the iPhone application. This
incident sent the entire school into a lockdown unnecessarily.
The results of the AAPRS demonstrated a need to provide easier access to the details of
crisis management plan for teachers. The element of protecting the plan to ensure that it is not
accessed by parties who might use it to do harm to the school is also an important issue for
consideration. The participants knew there was a plan in place, but the details of the plan were
not as readily accessible for participants as indicated in the AAPRS. The safety features and
updates to school crisis management plans are important for making schools safer and helping
the school community feel safer (DeVos et al., 2018). Findings from the AAPRS suggested that
participants felt that the crisis plans should be evaluated frequently. The findings also suggested
that although the participants were knowledgeable about the main aspects of the plans, they did
not have access to the plans and their knowledge regarding methods for routinely reviewing
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those plans was limited. One safety feature supported by research is the creation and use of threat
assessment teams (Vossekuil et al., 2004). None of the participants mentioned threat assessment
or threat assessment teams during the interviews. Jack mentioned a crisis team that he could
volunteer to be part of if he chose, but he did not provide any more detail about the functions of
that crisis team.

Category 2: Drills and Procedures
The interview questions involved issues related to the drills and procedures in schools for
active shooter scenarios. These questions were intended to address research questions 3 and 5.
Research question 3 asked, “What are the perceptions of teachers regarding their school’s drills
and practice procedures for active shooter scenarios?” Research question 5 asked, “What
relationships exist, if any, between perceptions of procedures and drills, and perceptions of
preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident among teachers?” Each teacher knew the
procedures and could explain them in depth. Several elements of the drills were similar, some
factors related to the drills differed across school types and grade configurations. The training for
students and faculty regarding the drills was also addressed. According to Graveline (2003),
crisis management plans are ineffective unless the faculty and students are well-trained regarding
the plan. Training is an essential component to learning the process for reacting to an active
shooter (Perkins 2018). The following questions asked during the interviews provided content
for this category.
•

Describe the protocol for your school’s response to an active shooter incident. (Who
activates the plan? What are your individual roles? How do you know an incident is
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over?
•

Are lockdown drills conducted at your school? If so, how often? Describe the drills and
how they are conducted?

•

What types of training have you received from your school or district to help you learn
how to respond during an active shooter incident? How are students trained?

•

Are there areas of additional training that you feel would be beneficial in helping you feel
safer and better prepared?

Category 2a: Active shooter drills and procedures.
The six participants who worked in public schools reported that they had more than three
drills for active shooters each year. Some reported that they had an active shooter drill every
month (Alice, Mari, Bobby, and Connie). Jack said his school conducted code red drills about
every 2 months. Mark indicated that lockdown drills occurred more than three times per year. By
the date of the interview, which was February, he stated that there had already been three code
red drills. The three participants who worked in private schools stated that they conducted active
shooter drills twice per year. Terminology for the active assailant school response either
consisted of a color coded system (Alice, Mari, Jack, and Bobby ), where code red indicated that
there was an active assailant on campus, or the use of the term lockdown (Bettie, Shannon, Mark,
Newman, and Connie). These terms were used during the event of a drill. Bobby explained the
differences between a code red and a code yellow that was consistent with schools that used the
color-coded emergency system.
Basically, we have a code red and a code yellow system when something happens. Code
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yellow means: some creeps are going on around campus, we’re not sure what it is. You
can keep teaching, but don’t let kids go to the bathroom kind of a gist. Code red means
there is an active shooter or a threat to campus. We all have a hard corner in our
classroom that we are taught to go to and where it is safe for the kids. We all go there,
turn off the lights, everybody’s phones are off, nobody is posting on social media, and the
school is essentially on lockdown until further instruction from our principal. (Bobby)
The lockdown terminology used in schools entails similar responses for teachers and
students. There were four participants whose procedures were not part of a color-coded response
system. These schools used the term lockdown for the response to an active shooter on campus,
and the term shelter-in-place for the response to a dangerous or threatening situation in the area
surrounding the school.
There are specific terms. So, there are three different specific terms that mean do three
different things. One is lockdown, which is…the idea is the proximity of imminent harm
on campus. Let’s say it’s an active shooter or whatever the case may be, which is where
you totally, your doors are locked, you get away from all entry points, you shut off the
lights, you go hide in the corner and you wait until somebody comes and rescues you.
Another level is shelter-in-place. Your doors are locked, the campus is locked, and there
may be something that’s within proximity of the community that the campus is close
enough. So, as an example, I’ve robbed a bank, I’m driving through the neighborhood, I
could drive into the school campus. So, they lock the gates, and the idea would be that
you would just stay in place and no movement outside the classroom. Instruction can take
place as usual, just don’t leave the room. So, if you have to use the restroom or something
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like that…That’s not happening. (Mark)
Mark stated that he could not remember the third coded response or what it was for. Every
participant stated that drills involved turning off the lights, making sure doors were locked, and
covering windows. The students were required to get into a location away from any windows or
doors with the intention of making it look from the outside like the classroom was empty. Jack
explained the scenario in his classroom.
We have a process. We have a procedure. As a matter of fact, we just practiced one
yesterday. Here’s how it goes. So, in my classroom, my room is full of computers, so the
very first thing I would do if I were to hear that there was a code red, I would ask my
students to turn off their monitors and that takes a second. I would say immediately go to
what we would call a hard corner. Every classroom, every space in our school, has what
we call a hard corner, and it’s a misnomer because it is not a corner at all. It’s just a spot
where all the students would walk over to the wall, they would sit down on the wall. In
my classroom the way it works is, they do not have their bookbags with them during the
class period, but the bookbags are located at the hard corner. So, they walk over to the
hard corner and pick up their bookbag, put it on top of their chest, and they sit down on
the floor. They tuck themselves down with their book bag in front of them. While they
are doing that, and they are doing that as quietly as possible. While they are doing that, I
go and I take the blinds on the windows, I shut them. Then I go to my door where I have
a black material that is dropped and then it is secured, it is fastened, so that nobody can
see in or out of the window. The door is already locked so I don’t have to lock it. Then I
hit the light switches. All of this takes about 3 to 5 seconds total. The directions are this:
119

when you get over to the wall you are not to move, and you are not to make any noise.
You are to keep us protected by maintaining silence; and they have done this extremely
well. (Jack)
Using the bookbag as a shield was only described by Jack. The term hard-corner, defined as the
location for students to wait during a drill or active shooter incident, was used by Bobby, Jack,
Mark, and Connie in their descriptions of response and drill protocol. Newman explained that in
his classroom the saf- corner, as it was termed in his school, was labeled with a large, posted
sign on the wall above the location. Newman said that this helped ease his mind because it
eliminated the need of having to try to think of the best place in his room to hide and protect the
students in a stressful situation such as an active shooter attack.
In eight of the participant’s schools, the lockdown drills were conducted and identified
prior to the event as a drill. The students and faculty knew the drill was going to occur, and in
some schools, parents were also sent a calendar or email communication regarding the times and
dates for code red or lockdown drills.
One thing that has happened is that a school went into a drill and the parents and students
didn’t know about it, so the students started texting the parents and saying, hey we are in
a lockdown…and then people go into panic mode. So, that’s been prevented, and they
learned from that. So now what happens is that the community is informed. (Jack)
Mark’s school was the only one where the drills were conducted as live incident drills. Both
Bettie and Connie stated that they thought it would be more purposeful and valuable to have live
incident drills, but Mark, who worked at the only school in the sample that conducted drills as
live incidents felt differently.
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So, every time we have a drill, I don’t know if it is real or not. I am going to go and
protect both myself and my kids by trying my best to get rid of whatever that problem is
because that is what I was trained to do and I think that I would rather do that. Every time
we have a drill, for about 3 days after, that brings back some stuff that doesn’t need to be
part, I think, of a teacher’s life. I think that drills are good. I don’t believe that it is
necessary to keep it secret that it’s a drill. You can go through the drill and go through the
practice of teaching the kids to get into the proper position and hide without making it a
live situation. (Mark)
Mark, who was a combat experience Army veteran, experienced levels of emotional discord after
drills and did not feel it was properly thought through in the planning for drills how it might
impact the emotions of students and faculty to be placed in a live drill situation. Mark’s response,
as the only school in the sample to host live scenario drills, contrasted with Bettie and Connie
who stated that they thought the drills should be treated more like live scenarios.
I think that you perform the way you practice. So, the more we practice realism, the more
comfortable I would feel in a real situation. I think it comes down to how you practice it.
We are in a difficult situation and I know that most high schools are. You have a lot of
students who are seeing this stuff in social media every day. So, to really try to perform a
true lockdown in practicing, we would probably have kids trying to run off the campus
because that is reality. If you could get out, then you would want to get out. If we were to
perform a lockdown drill that was unexpected, it would probably freak a lot of people
out. They wouldn’t perform the way that we’ve practiced. It is a challenge for sure, but I
think that it is important for them to know what it is going to be like if it really happens,
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because this is the world we live in now. (Connie)
Bettie, who taught fifth grade, showed concern for younger students and the fear that would be
elicited by drills treated as live scenarios. This dilemma caused her some concern since she also
thought that the drills would be more effective if they were more authentic in nature.
Three of the participants (Jack, Mari, and Bobby) mentioned an aspect of the response
that consisted of taking the students off campus and evacuating the school if possible. These
teachers described an external location outside of the school where teachers and students were
supposed to gather if they were unable to protect themselves by going into a locked classroom.
All three were very unsure and unclear on this portion of the crisis management plan. When Jack
was asked how he would know whether to hide in a classroom or evacuate the campus, he said
the following:
How would I know for certain? I can see that I might need to review the procedures
again, but I’m assuming that me as a teacher, I’m supposed to make a decision. I’m
supposed to do one of two things. I could stay until the police…I could stay until I feel
secure that the police are coming through. Or, if there is an opportunity. If I’m in such a
situation where I’m not in a secure place, and if I’m with a group of students, I’d need to
get them secured. So, I would try to find a place.
All teachers with locked doors said they were not supposed to let anyone in the door once the
lockdown began. If students were outside or in transition during an attack, it was up to the
teacher to keep their class of students together and find safety by evacuating the school. Jack also
said the reporting app could be used to alert the school and authorities if a student was missing.
None of the nine participants said that this portion of the response had been practiced as part of
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the drills. Alice also showed great concern about the lack of training regarding what to do if her
room was the location of the attack. “We really only have the plan basically trying to avoid
someone knowing you’re in your classroom. There isn’t really a plan, like, if someone were to
get inside.” Anther very important issue, particularly to Connie, was related to the vulnerability
of the exceptional education students (ESE) with significant disabilities.
Part of my responsibility is to work very closely with our ESE students who are selfcontained. This is a very difficult population and in an active shooter situation they are
very vulnerable because many of them don’t want to be sitting in a closet somewhere and
they are probably going to be loud and crying. So, I fear that they are going to be the
most vulnerable on the campus and many teachers are probably fearful of that. (Connie)

Category 2b: Training of faculty.
Each of the nine participants described the methods used for training faculty regarding
the active shooter protocol. This initial training took place during a single school pre-planning
meeting session at the start of the school year. All nine participants explained that these training
sessions took place during a collective faculty assembly in a whole group setting. The
information about what to do during a lockdown, or code red, was presented in a method
described by Bobby as, “sit and get”. PowerPoint presentations, videos, posters on walls in
classrooms, informational emails with reminders of the procedures, and discussions among
faculty through mentor teachers were the primary methods used to train teachers in the steps for
lockdown and all other crisis procedures. In some schools the training was conducted by the
school’s security staff or by the school’s designated deputy (Bettie, Shannon, Newman, Mari). A
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few participants stated that they were required to watch a video outlining the steps teachers must
take during all types of crises including an active shooter incident (Bettie, Shannon, Mark,
Alice). Connie explained the training in her school, “It is usually a PowerPoint presentation that
our assistant principal would go through with us. It all takes about 5 to 10 minutes. If there are
any questions it might take a little longer.” She also said that email reminders were sent
periodically, usually right before a scheduled drill, and that classrooms had posters on the walls
with the steps to take during a crisis. Mark said that his school also used posters and printed
cards but that only about 75% of the classrooms had the posters.
Bettie, Shannon, and Bobby stated that a safety training consisted of a presentation and
videos. Mari and Bobby describe explicit training programs utilized in their schools. Mari
explained that the procedure taught in the videos used a method called run, hide, fight.
The first things is that you have to hide…No, the first thing is that you have to run, but if
you cannot run, then you have to hide, and if there is no other way that something like if
there is imminent danger, then you have to fight. It is like: run as far away as you can, or
you have to hide if you cannot run out of the building, and if there is no other way
because someone is actually in the place where you are, then you have to fight with
everything and with anything that you have. (Mari)
Bobby also described the run, hide, fight system in his school but said that the school had
recently transition to a system he referred to as ALERT. He did not remember exactly what the
acronym stood for and he also said that it was basically the same as the run, hide, fight model.
Upon further examination, Bobby’s school district had recently converted to a model called the
ALICE model. The steps in this system consist of the following:
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•

Alert

•

Lockdown

•

Inform

•

Counter

•

Evacuate

Bobby’s misunderstanding likely originated from the first element within the ALICE system,
alert, which is prominent at the top of the posters displayed in classrooms where this method is
used. ALICE, like the run, hide, fight model presents a multi-option response approach to an
active assailant attack as opposed to the single-option model of turning off lights and hiding
students from view behind a locked classroom door (Jagodzinski, 2019; Jonson, 2017). There are
mixed opinions regarding these options for response models (Frazzano, & Snyder, 2014; Jonson,
Moon, & Hendry, 2018). The multi-option models promote a differentiation of strategies in
response to active shooters such as: evacuating if possible, hiding if necessary, barricading doors
with objects in the classroom, and using classroom items as weapons to fight off an attacker if
necessary (Kubena & Watts, 2019; Page, 2017). The argument against multi-option response
methods is that they do not apply as well to students in elementary and pre-school, and that these
methods may in some cases put children and adults in harm’s way (Frazzano, & Snyder, 2014,
Trump, 2019).
One main concern regarding the training, drills, and procedures was that there were no
drills or training that described what to do if the attacker gets into the classroom. Alice voiced
this concern regarding the drills and procedures in her school:
I think that there should be a plan for if someone does get in your room. Like someone
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you are supposed to call or an action you are supposed to do. Because, like I said, we
only practice being out of sight, we don’t practice what to do if someone gets in our
room.
Alice did say that faculty had watched a video in the past, but it was hard to apply the lessons in
the video to her students in her situation.
A few years ago, we watched some videos that were supposed to train us, um, but those
videos were from a college campus. So, if the person got in the room in those videos it
showed to like spread out and have kids in all different areas gathering items to attack the
shooter but that is not what they tell us to do for our lockdown. They want everyone on
like the one wall where you can’t see from the doorway. (Alice)
Bettie described a training session at her school that involved teaching and practicing physical
confrontation with an active assailant. This type of training session was unique among the nine
teachers interviewed.
Yes, there was a physical component where they, on two different occasions, there was
sort of walking through this idea of unarming someone if they were coming through your
door. So, the first time they actually had everybody line up and you were supposed to do
it. Then, the second time, there were a couple of different volunteers to come up and you
basically took the stance of somebody who was behind a door when someone came in
and they were armed. They had some type of weapon, and you went through what you
would do in order to try to force the gun out of their hand. So, a position that would work
in order to do that. I think just walking through that was helpful because, you can talk
about it as much as you want to, or watch as many videos as you can, but until your body
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gets into a particular position, you don’t know. Now, whether I would be able to do those
things or reenact that in a real situation, I have no idea; but I do know that it did make me
feel somewhat more confident or prepared than not getting up and doing it at all. (Bettie)
Connie, in her interview, stated, “I would feel safer if I knew that the teachers had more
training specifically from the Sheriff’s Department.” Connie also describe a training that she had
received while working at a previous school.
We got special training from the Sheriff’s Department who came out and taught us
specifically about our different roles. I didn’t understand why teachers were not also
sitting in on that training. Even if they were not assigned a role, they would be given the
chance to be exposed to the realism, pointing out who all the people are and what they
will all be doing. I believe that the Sheriff’s department or police department should be
coming in spending more time talking to teachers and staff about what that really looks
like. Not just locking the door and turning your smart board off, but what you might hear,
what you might smell, what you might be thinking…There’s not enough of that.

Category 2c: Training of students.
Each of the nine participants said that training for students was not officially conducted
or designed by the school as part of the crisis management plan. The onus for training students
fell on the teachers, who discussed and reviewed the procedures for students during the first few
weeks of school, usually just prior to conducting a drill. Connie said that students were directed
to read the code of conduct which contained information about the lockdown procedures, and
that students, “go through the same PowerPoint, or something similar. Then, the teachers use that
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flyer that explains what to do when you hear the intercom announce the various types of drills or
emergency protocol codes.” Bobby said that the students at his school created a video to
demonstrate the response for an active shooter or code red. He said that the video was shown to
students during the first week of school and that time was allotted during the first week for
teachers to explain the emergency procedures for all crisis situations using videos and a similar
PowerPoint presentation to what was shown to teachers during pre-planning training. Jack said:
“We train the kids. On the very first week of school we go through our expectations and one of
the expectations is to show them how to handle a code red. Then the teacher explains the code
red.” Shannon explained the process for training students in her school:
The students are trained by the teachers in the classes. Usually the day of the drill or at
the start of the school year. That is really all they get. Each teacher would go over it in
their own rooms, but all kids would not necessarily have the same training or understand
the same things depending on the grade and the class they are in at the time.
Mari explained the training for students in her school, and since the students were first graders,
she felt there were important emotional factors to consider.
All the training for students is done in the classrooms. At the beginning of the year, yes,
some of them cry because they think there is a stranger at the school and I just let them
know we are just practicing. We want to make sure that everyone knows what to do in
case you hear the code red message. Basically, we talk about it at the beginning of the
year, but we go over it again every time we have a drill for a couple of minutes.
Alice’s biggest concern with training and drills dealt with the fact that her school offered no
information about what to do if the assailant were to get inside of the classroom. She also stated
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that students were trained by the teachers in their class with no assistance, materials, or content.
The only teacher who mentioned that materials were provided to assist in training
students was Bobby. A second video was mandated by the county but the information in the
training video was not focused on active shooter drills. Instead, it was a video about mental
health for students. Bobby Described the video:
There was this whole mental health training that we had to do. The state mandated we all
had mental health training for 5 hours recently. It was all about prescription drug use,
alcohol use, and overall mental health. It was mandated by the state and we all had to get
those 5 hours’ worth. We had to take 5 hours out of our instruction time. We had to go
through the modules with the students. They had to watch it, they had to participate. We
didn’t have to do it as teachers, the students did. Because in the past, I think, the main
school shooters have been students at the school who went to the school. There was
nothing in the video about school shooters. It was all about overall mental health and how
to take care of yourself. (Bobby)

Category 2d: Training Recommendations.
Each participant was asked what types of training would help them feel safer in schools
and more prepared to respond to an active shooter crisis. Answers were specific to the individual
and ranged widely in their content. Developing training methods and protocol for students and
teachers to learn the steps and the procedures for responding to a crisis are important factors for
policy makers and school leaders to consider (Brown, 2008; Rider, 2017). Listening to teacher
recommendations made it clear that training needs to be more deliberate, personal, and specific
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to each school and classroom. Conducting drills during class transitions, during lunch, or during
arrival and dismissal was also recommended. The recommendations ranged from the type of
training to the content but most of the participants recommended a training approach that was
more personalized to the school and tailored to meet the needs of the individual teacher’s
classroom and location.
Alice’s biggest concern was that she did not know what to do if an attacker entered her
classroom. Alice felt that training in this area would help her feel more prepared. Mari had to
think about her answer and after a brief pause stated, “Practicing at open places like the field or
cafeteria when it is full. The situation is so complex, that is probably why we don’t practice
during those times. There is always something else that can be done.” Bettie recommended more
realistic drills, walk-through discussions with security to analyze each classroom with the teacher
for possible ways to barricade the door or evacuate safely, and physical self-defense training to
demonstrate ways to fight off an attacker.
Even if it was our person who does security, who came into each one of our rooms and
talked to us just about…What would you do? What would work? What can you move?
Just to sort of make sure that you had an individual plan based on your room. That would
be helpful.
Bettie also mentioned the idea of “going on autopilot” in a stressful situation and how that type
of instinctive reaction only comes with practice. Shannon recommended more drills and more
individualized training and practice. “You know how if you practice, you practice, you practice
it’s automatic? Well, it definitely would not be automatic if you ask me” (Shannon). Beyond a
recommendation for more drills, Shannon also thought that individual or small group training
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conducted by police officers and security personnel would be beneficial for teachers. In addition,
Shannon suggested the development of “safety teams”, which she described as groups of
teachers in similar areas within a school who discuss ideas and practice together for safety drills.
“You hear about all these things and it is very, very scary, and I feel like the more training, the
more you have to do it to let it become automatic; I feel like that is what I need” (Shannon).
Jack felt comfortable with the training and with the procedures for active shooter crisis
response. Jack was also complimentary of how his students took the drills seriously and followed
directions. Jack had three main recommendations: training and equipment in each class to treat
wounds, training to explain the evacuation procedures, and bulletproof protective windows.
As far as maintaining someone if they’ve been shot, if they’ve been injured, I would say
personally, that would terrify me if I would have to treat someone with gunshot injuries.
If someone were to be shot and I would have to hold them and maintain them for the 20
to 30 minutes that it would take the police to clear the area to get into our class like I’ve
read about in other situations, that would make me feel very uncomfortable. (Jack)
Mark, the former Army Ranger, discussed the emotional impact that conducting live drills
caused, stating, “I don’t believe that it is necessary to keep it secret that it’s a drill. While I
understand trying to make it as real as possible, I don’t think that you need that in order to
accomplish the goal of - teach people where to go and be quiet.” Mark also recommended
“ongoing, open-dialogue for practicing and revising lockdown procedures and increased mental
health counseling for students on campus.” This would demand an increase in mental health
personnel, particularly in secondary schools with large student populations.
When asked about recommendations for training, Bobby focused his response on the
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culture and climate of the school. Research in this area is growing and support for school culture
and climate that fosters student connectedness, consistent discipline practices, and situational
awareness have shown promise in reducing school violence (Duplechain & Morris, 2014; Page,
2017, Redlener, 2006).
When students feel they can talk to somebody at their school and when they feel trusted
at their school, that is when a school won’t see an incident. When a school comes off as
being together as a staff and together as a team, that is when a school won’t see an
incident. When a school comes off as convoluted or messy or disorganized, I think that is
when a school sees an incident. We are all there for our kids. I think that prevents school
shootings more than anything else. Not safe doors, safe windows, or … those are physical
barriers. You have to go from within to prevent a shooting from happening. That is what
is in people’s heads. - school culture prevents shootings- (Bobby)
Connie stated a need for more security personnel to monitor cameras and focus on
protecting the school. Training for teachers conducted by local law enforcement that includes
walk-throughs in classrooms and a more realistic crisis scenario for drills were other items
described by Connie when asked about areas of additional training that might improve
perceptions of preparedness. “I would feel safer if I knew that the teachers had more training
specifically from the Orange County Sheriff’s Department” (Connie). In a follow-up question,
Connie described a program at a school in which she worked called Safety Emergency Response
Team training. Administrators and leaders in the school were assigned specific roles for crisis
response management and the training was conducted by the local Sheriff’s Department.
In my role at my previous school I was able to be part of the SERT team, which is the
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Safety Emergency Response Team (Connie was unsure about the acronym and the name
of the program). They get specific training, and they get assigned specific roles. For
example, one role assigned is for a person to be the one to talk to the media, another role
is to check that the perimeter is clear…Everyone had an assigned role. The Sheriff’s
Department came out and taught us specifically about our different roles. I didn’t
understand why teachers were not also in that training. Even if they were not assigned a
role, they would be exposed to the realism, pointing out who all the people are and what
they will all be doing. I feel like teachers are kind of told, ok, you are just going to stay in
your classroom and keep your kids safe. What happens if your classroom becomes the
one that is being infiltrated by an active shooter? (Connie)
An attempt to find information about Safety Emergency Response Teams led to the discovery of
School Crisis Response Teams (SCRT). The development of these teams was spearheaded by
Brock, Sandovol, and Lewis in California in the 1990’s to combat school violence and crises in
schools (Brock, Sandoval, & Lewis, 2001). The function of the team was to have designated
responsibility spread among individuals in the team for important segments of the necessary
response to a crisis (Eklund, Meyer, & Bosworth, 2018). The team also has community
affiliations with local law enforcement, hospitals, and mental health care providers with
designated liaisons from the team whose responsibility it is to communicate with community
partners during a crisis. The outline for the SCRT also calls for specified individuals in the
school to be the only designated contact for the media in the event of a crisis to help control the
dissemination of information to prevent misinformation and panic (Brock et al., 2001).
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Category 3: Perceptions of Preparedness
The major focus of this study was teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to an
active shooter and protect their students during a crisis. Teachers were asked about these
perceptions and the answers varied. The interview questions that prompted responses related to
perceptions of preparedness were as follows:
•

What are your thoughts and feelings regarding your school’s current level of
preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident?

•

How prepared do you feel personally to respond to an active shooter incident in your
school?

A response matrix was developed to analyze participant perceptions of their ability to
respond to an active shooter scenario in their school. The participant responses to the AAPRS
were analyzed in comparison to the information provided in the interviews. Shannon and Alice
recorded the lowest Response Mean score at M = 1.75. Bettie, Mark and Jack were slightly
confident with Response Mean scores of M = 2.75. Connie’s Response mean was M = 3.00. Mari
and Newman each had a Response Mean of M = 3.25. Bobby recorded the highest Response
Mean at M = 3.75. A response matrix that displays the categorization of interview statements and
each participant’s Response Mean score from the AAPRS is provided in Table 24.
The coding category related to perceptions of preparedness was developed to better
understand teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter crisis. This portion
of the interview corresponded to research question 1, “How do teachers enrolled in graduatelevel education courses perceive their ability to respond to active shooter scenarios?” In an
attempt to quantify the responses to the questions regarding perceptions of preparedness, the
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researcher developed the following four statement categories: confident, confident with
reservations, neutral (about as prepared as I/we can be), and not confident. After transcribing
responses and coding the data, the researcher returned to the AAPRS and was able to compare
the Response Mean scores from the survey to the individual statements from the interviews to
further analyze the perceptions of the nine participants interviewed.
Table 24
Perceptions of Ability to Respond Interview Matrix
Participant
Shannon
Alice
Bettie
Mark
Jack
Connie
Mari
Newman
Bobby

Response Mean
1.75
1.75
2.75
2.75
2.75
3.00
3.25
3.25
3.75

Categorization of Response Statements
Not Confident
Not Confident / Neutral
Confident with Reservations
Not Confident / Neutral
Confident
Confident with Reservations
Confident with Reservations
Confident with Reservations
Confident

Category 3a: Perceptions of ability to respond to an active shooter.
Alice responded to the question about her thoughts regarding her school’s ability to
respond to an active shooter this way:
My kids are pretty well trained, they know how to be out of sight, and be really quiet
(short pause). I would say like a 5 out of 10, because I feel prepared if we can just hide
quietly. (Long Pause) I guess what we are doing is good, but we don’t really have a plan
for if the person gets into our room.
Alice’s responses were categorized as not confident but also fit into the neutral category since
she used the phrase, “like a 5 out of 10”. Mari seemed only slightly more confident in her initial
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response. “I have to say, that even though we have the resources and we’ve been practicing, I
think that we are not prepared.” She also referenced the amount of practice and the drills a
second time in her response but was fearful of what to do during lunch, or outside activities if an
attack were to take place during those situations. “(sigh and pause) …We have practiced and
practiced. We have the drills, we have a deputy, we have everything…But I have to say, that
nothing can prepare you for an unexpected situation like that.” Mari’s final statement equated to
a rating of confident with reservations.
I feel like I am as prepared as I can be with the resources that we have. Can we do it
better? Yes. I’m prepared, as I told you because we have been practicing for a situation
like that, but you never know how you will react. So, we do know what to do if we are in
the building, but not if we are out of the building. (Mari)
Bettie was hesitant and seemed unsettled by the questions regarding preparedness. “I feel that
they’ve done their best as far as what typically happens to prepare people for these kinds of
situations, but you just never feel prepared for that kind of thing.” Bettie also discussed a need
for more specified drills that would include different scenarios as well as a more personalized
approach that would help identify best practices for each individual teacher in relationship to
their classrooms. “There are a lot of blanket things that we all do that somewhat get you prepared
on the surface for things, but I think there is another level of preparedness that we could do that
would be more specific.” Bettie’s responses and reactions led to categorization as confident with
reservations.
Shannon blatantly stated that she did not feel confident. Shannon did not think that the
training was adequate or that drills were conducted often enough. Shannon also referenced the
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layout of her classroom pointing out the numerous windows, the lack of window coverings, and
the fact that the campus was so open as reasons for her statement. As a result, Shannon was rated
as not confident.
Um, no I don’t feel prepared to…I really don’t. I don’t feel adequate to protect my kids. I
mean…the mother in me would take over, but to try to prevent a shooting, to try to
prevent any more of the shooting, or to prevent any intruder, I don’t feel like I would
really know what to do. (Shannon)
Newman was rated as confident with reservation. He mentioned that he felt comfortable
but being new to the school meant that he was adjusting to some of the procedures. “I'm pretty
confident. I am new and haven’t quite figured it all out, but the training was helpful, I like the
fact that the safe corner is labeled, and I feel like the students know what to do” (Newman). Jack
was rated as confident in his ability to respond. His biggest fears were the low-level windows in
his classroom, and the lack of medical training for the possibility of having to treat a gunshot
wound.
I feel confident. There are two parts of it. As far as going through the drill and as far as
keeping people in our classroom, I feel extremely prepared. I feel confident that we are
going to handle it as best we possibly could, given the training that we have all been
given. What the circumstances give us at that time, I think the damage would be minimal.
(Jack)
Portions of Mark’s response to the questions in this segment of the interview were similar to
those of Shannon. When asked how prepared he felt his school was to respond to an active
shooter, he stated, “Horribly! Horribly. When bad things happen, there is no level of preparation
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that is going to take place to address all given scenarios.” Mark expanded on his answer in such a
way that led to a rating of neutral, or about as prepared as possible.
The school has done what it can in order to reduce the amount of people who get hurt.
The reality of it is, I don’t think you are going to be able to teach teachers tactical
situations to reduce problems. I don’t think that as a profession that’s why most teachers
get into it, is to become tactically aware of active shooters. So, at best you are going to
have people hiding in a corner. (Mark)
Bobby was the most confident of the nine participants. He felt that he was physically fit
enough, trained well enough in the drills, and that his level of care for his students would allow
him to make the best decisions possible during a crisis to protect them from harm.
I’d be fine. If something were to happen like that, I would get into fight or flight mode
and I would probably run circles around him and just knock him upside the head. My
school is prepared. Most schools in my county are prepared. No school is 100% prepared
but there is at least a baseline-plan in action and 90%, or more, of our teachers do it. It is
not something that I feel uncomfortable about. (Bobby)
Connie also presented a confident response but felt that more personnel and more training was
needed. Connie expressed concern for the self-contained students in the ESE department of her
school. “I know what I am supposed to do. I know what I am required to do, but I can tell you
the first time we went on a lockdown and it was not a drill, it was terrifying.”
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Category 4: Perceptions of Safety
Participants were asked what makes them feel safe and what makes them feel unsafe in
their schools. The answers covered a breadth of areas related to active shooter prevention and
response. The interview question that prompted responses related to perceptions of safety was as
follows:
•

What about your school makes you feel safe?

•

What about your school makes you feel unsafe?

The coding category related to perceptions of safety was a prefigured category based on the
interview questions and the available literature in an effort to address research questions 1, 2 and
3. It was believed that a teacher’s feelings of safety within a school might be impacted by
perceptions of the crisis plan, the drills and procedures implemented, as well as their perceived
ability to respond to an active shooter attack. Moreover, some participant responses to this
question related to how school and personal demographic factors might impact perceptions of
ability to respond. These demographic issues were part of research questions 6 and 7.

Category 4a: Factors that improve safety perceptions.
Each of the participants described physical safety features implemented at theirs schools
that made them feel safe such as gates, cameras, limited entry points, locked classroom door,
locked building doors, and visitor identification technology. When pressed to provide more
detail, however, other human systems elements were described such as leadership, school
culture, visible security personnel, mental health care, and open communication.
I feel like our school is enclosed much better than it used to be. In other words, we have
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gates around everything. You have to have codes to get in. We have security walking the
campus and they are very aware of what’s going on in the campus. They don’t just sit
around in a desk and watch monitors; they actually physically walk around. I think that is
huge, which is very much different and has only been in place in the last 2 years, 3 years
tops. (Shannon)
Bobby and Mark pointed out aspects of mental health and how mental health care acted as a
safety feature in their schools to make them feel safer regarding an active shooter attack.
There is attention for students who display social emotional concerns, like risk factors.
There is attention to those students. As an example, as a teacher, if we feel that there are
behaviors or there is something that we have identified in a student, we can reach out to a
guidance counselor and the guidance counselors are much more apt to pulling them in.
(Mark)
Mark also stated that his school of 1,600 students had five guidance counselors and one school
psychologist on campus available to consult students with signs of mental health issues. Bobby
referenced a mental health training video that his students were required to watch, but he did not
state whether this made him feel safer at his school.
Bobby, Bettie, and Shannon discussed elements of school culture and climate as safety
features of their schools. Bettie said, “It is also a smaller school; everybody seems to know
everyone too.” This information was offered as Bettie was describing newly implemented badges
and other safety systems for identifying school visitors. The family atmosphere and climate of
her school helped to make her feel safer. When asked what made him feel safe, Jack described
the way students and faculty at his school approached the drills. “I like the fact that we practice
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and that everybody takes it seriously. I like that I feel the atmosphere when we do this is positive,
it is not taken as a joke, it is not taken lightly.” Bobby described the importance of school culture
and climate as a safety feature to prevent school shootings.
I think that is why my school may not see an incident; because only we can talk crap
about our school, but when somebody tries to come from the outside, then we will all
come together and be like: F-you, go away! I will say that about my school. The staff
itself does want to protect the school. Especially the ones who are authentic, they are
there for the right reasons. We are all there for our kids. I think that prevents school
shootings more than anything else. Not safe doors, safe windows, or … those are physical
barriers. You have to go from within to prevent a shooting from happening. That is what
is in people’s heads. (Bobby)
Mari, Jack, and Connie all mentioned aspects of school leadership that contributed to their
perceptions of safety. Mari described an important change to the dismissal procedure instigated
by a new principal at her school that made her feel safer.
Right now, we have a new principal and he changed things that I was not comfortable
with that other administration was allowing. They were allowing all the parents to get in
the building. Usually during dismissal, the parents were allowed to get in the building to
pick up their students. Now they are not allowed to get in the building, the students are to
go and meet with them by the gates, which I think is better because at a certain point you
had people walking around the school and you had no idea who they were. (Mari)
Jack described an incident where an unscheduled fire alarm went off. He said that immediately
his students lined up to follow the fire alarm procedure, but he hesitated when he heard the voice
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of his assistant principal on the intercom announcing that the alarm was false.
In my classroom, I told my students to go to the hard corner. You stay in there and stay
there until this is finished, and they did go to the hard corner and they waited for it.
Finally, the principal came on, and with his calming voice of authority we knew that
everything was ok. We then resumed to normal, but it was a little scary there for a little
while because the other person whose voice we are not used to hearing came on. It was
disconcerting to us because we didn’t believe her, we didn’t know if her message was
coming from duress or not. (Jack)
The sound of the voice of the particular leader in this scenario affected Jack’s reaction and
feelings of safety. Connie also explained the impact of leadership on her safety perceptions.
My administration makes me feel safe. I know they care and that they are doing the best
they can with the resources that they have. I know they would be willing to do whatever
they had to, to try to keep us all safe. (Connie)
Bobby’s answer to what makes him feel safe and what makes him feel unsafe included an
ambivalent description that illustrated the impact leadership can have on perceptions of safety
among teachers. Initially when asked what makes him feel unsafe, he responded with the
following statement:
What makes me feel unsafe is lackadaisical leadership in some ways. There are some
administrators who suck. There are also some phenomenal ones who take the brunt of the
work and do incredible things for my school. My boss, for example, she takes on the
work of two or three people because the rest are incompetent, and they would screw it up.
My principal knows this. Leadership is the administration, and we don’t really know how
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the leadership feels about the plans in place. There is no real sense that the administration
is fully behind the plans. If that makes sense. (Bobby)

Category 4b: Factors that diminish safety perceptions.
Perceptions of elements that reduced feelings of safety ranged widely. Some related to
school design such as classrooms with too many windows, or campuses that were open with lots
of outdoor space. Lack of training, lack of personnel, and limited monitoring of gates and
cameras made some participants feel unsafe. Factors relating to the area surrounding the school
and the population of the school impacted teacher perceptions of safety. Another common issue
participants pointed out that made them feel unsafe was the ambiguity and lack of training for if
an attack were to occur during a transition, a special school event, or during lunch when students
are not in class and readily able to quickly initiate the standard lockdown procedure. School
disciplinary practices and a need for increased mental health care were also factors that
diminished perceptions of safety among the teachers interviewed.
When asked what makes her feel unsafe, Alice referred to the lack of training for what to
do if an assailant were to enter her classroom. She also discussed a lack of exits from her
building if a scenario were to necessitate an evacuation.
There aren’t any emergency exits close by. We would have to go all the way down the
stairs and out a side door if we were trying to get out of the building quickly and that’s
really far. So, there isn’t really a plan for like an emergency exit. We are up on the
second floor and there is only the front door, the back door, and then two side doors in
the whole school building. (Alice)
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Mari pointed to demographic and location factors related to her school that made her feel
unsafe. These factors were also shown to impact teacher perceptions of safety in studies by Rider
(2016) and Brown (2008). The amount of crime in a school’s surrounding area and the
demographic make-up of the school were mentioned by Mari as factors that made her feel
unsafe, while Bobby said that the demographics and surrounding community for his school made
him feel safe.
Our population is 58% free and reduced meals, which means that we have plenty of
families that are in transition or transitional and it doesn’t make you feel that safe,
because you have all types of people coming into the building and whatnot. I’m not
judging but sometimes you don’t feel safe because of the area where the school is. (Mari)
Mari was also concerned about, “places like the teacher center, the media center, the field, the
cafeteria. Places where you don’t have a lot of control and there are large groups of students.”
Bettie said, “overall I feel relatively safe.” The only thing she mentioned in this question
that made her feel unsafe was the lack of coverings for her windows. Shannon, who worked at
the same school as Bettie said she did not feel safe because of a lack of practice, the open design
for the school with multiple buildings, and times when the school was open to parents and
visitors for events and during carpool. Shannon was fearful of the codes on the gates being given
accidentally to the wrong people as well. Mostly she pointed out the design of her classroom as
the major factor that made her feel unsafe. “I don’t feel like I can protect my children because of
the makeup of my room. That is the first thing that concerns me.” Her classroom had two doors
and was located at ground level. The two doors had large windows with no blinds or coverings.
Both of the classroom doors were exterior doors that led directly outside.
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When asked what makes him feel unsafe, Jack stated, “My room and every classroom I
can think of has windows, and those windows are accessible to someone who really wanted to
get in.” Jack also said that he would not want to teach in a classroom without windows and
suggested that schools use protective bullet-proof windows and coverings to prevent assailants
from using windows to gain entry. He also suggested making sure that windows in ground level
classrooms were high off the ground to prevent their usage as entry points for attackers. Jack was
also concerned about the lack of training regarding the evacuation component of the crisis
management plan and the ambiguity surrounding issues of where to take the students and how
best to protect them. When asked what makes him feel unsafe, Newman stated, “nothing really,
honestly. I mean I guess the only thing is that the first floor has large windows in each room.” He
also mentioned the fact that, “teaching in a school without windows that looked like a prison is
not ideal either.”
When asked what makes him feel unsafe, Mark described a scenario in which a student in
his class would not stop talking during a lockdown drill. Even when instructed to be quiet, the
student refused and continued to talk in a loud voice. Mark was concerned about this type of
situation and what it might cause in an actual crisis. Mark went on to discuss disciplinary issues
at his school and how the handling of some disciplinary issues makes him feel unsafe at school.
“Students that are red-flagged with chronic discipline issues, in an effort to reduce bias and avoid
kicking them out of school unjustly or unfairly, a lot of times the support that students actually
need is not given.” To further illustrate this point, Mark provided the following example:
If I have a student that from 8th grade through 10th grade has been a chronic disciplinary
issue. Maybe a parent died, or the family is just absolutely off-the-train and they need a
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tremendous amount of help. When that student gets in his fourth fight of punching kids or
assaults a teacher, they will most likely either be returned to the school or something like
this and the support that students need is not given in an effort of trying to keep the kids
at the same home-school.
When Mark was asked what would make him feel safer at school, he answered by stating, “when
a kid needs it, or a guidance counselor recognizes it, ongoing mental health counseling, on
school premises. Hands down.” Providing mental health counseling assistance by increasing the
number of mental health workers in schools while also utilizing consistent and culturally
responsive disciplinary strategies were both recognized in the Final Report of the Federal
Commission on School Safety (2018) as components needed to create safer schools.
When asked what makes him feel unsafe, Bobby described the location of his classroom,
its proximity to the external school gate, and the fact that his classroom door was openly
accessible from the outside instead of housed inside of a larger building. “Good if there is a fire,
we just run outside and then we are free. If the shooter is at the other end of the school, we could
all run out of my classroom.” Bobby showed concern for if an attacker entered the fence area on
the side of campus where his classroom was located. Another concern Bobby mentioned was the
fact that students often were able to arrive and leave campus at their leisure or as part of their
scheduled school programs. He mentioned that the gates were not always monitored by security
and could be opened by students to allow other students to enter the school campus. “If a kid
were to walk up on campus, they usually have to know someone at the gate to let them in. The
kids don’t really know any better. They shouldn’t be letting them in, but they do anyway”
(Bobby).
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When asked what makes her feel unsafe, Connie described a lack of safety personnel
assigned to a school of over 3,000 students. Connie recognized that security cameras were not
consistently monitored and stated, “it is very difficult with only three security officers and two
SROs who, quite honestly are sometimes filling in as substitutes for teachers and are used for
other duties.” A lack of training for teachers particularly in unforeseen situations that do not fit
the specifications outlined in the drills were also areas that made Connie feel unsafe.
What makes me feel unsafe is the lack of personnel and the lack of training that teachers
have. I feel like teachers are kind of told, ok, you are just going to stay in your classroom
and keep your kids safe. I would feel safer if I knew that the teachers had more training
specifically from the Sheriff’s department. (Connie)

Summary
This chapter explored the data collected and presented the results from the AAPRS as
well as data from the nine interviews. Results were analyzed in an effort to better understand the
perceptions of teachers regarding their ability to respond to an active shooter scenario. The
majority of teachers who filled out the survey were confident in their ability to respond to an
active shooter but were slightly less confident in their ability to protect students. The majority of
participants reported confidence and knowledge of their school’s crisis planning protocol and
their school’s drills and procedures for active shooter scenarios. Knowledge and confidence in
the school’s crisis management planning protocol showed a statistically significant correlation
with the Response Mean variable. This indicates that access to and an understanding of the crisis
management plan improves a teacher’s perception of their ability to respond during a crisis. A
147

significant portion of the teachers surveyed reported that they did not have readily available
access to the crisis management plans and descriptions.
Results from the AAPRS showed a correlation between the Drill/Proc Mean and the
Response Mean. This indicates that frequency, confidence, and understanding of the drills and
procedures increases a teacher’s perception of their ability to respond to an active shooter crisis.
Nearly all of the participants who worked in K-12 schools reported that their school had a
minimum of one active shooter drill during the school year. Over 70% of the participants worked
at schools where three or more active shooter drills were conducted annually. The frequency and
amount of drills conducted has been shown to impact perceptions of ability to respond (Brown,
2008; Graveline, 2003; Rider; 2016). Participants working at schools with three or more active
shooter drills per year recorded higher Response Mean scores than those working in schools with
two or fewer drills per year. Training for faculty and students were areas of concern regarding
the drills and procedures component of crisis management plans in schools. A need for more
individualized training for faculty conducted by local police or school security, that accounts for
the various designs of classrooms, were indicated as methods that would improve teacher
perceptions of their ability to respond. It was also found that training for students regarding
active shooter scenarios was conducted mostly by teachers with little to no resources or guidance
from schools and districts. Teachers are regarded as the first line of defense to help protect
students during an active shooter crisis and the training they receive is vital to ensure they are
properly prepared for the task (Cowan et al., 2013; Duplechain & Morris, 2014; Jonson et al.,
2018). Students and teachers who are trained to react and respond to active shooter scenarios are
more likely to react quickly and competently during an actual attack (Brown, 2008; Frazzano &
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Snyder, 2014; Petrovich, 2016). When asked if the active shooter drills were effective (Q2-7),
20% reported that they did not know and 20% disagreed. If only 60% of the teachers surveyed
believed their school’s active shooter drills are effective, this raises concerns about the drills and
training conducted in schools.
Gender and the presence of security personnel on campus were shown to have little to no
effect on teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter. Teachers in
secondary schools (grades 6 through 12) reported slightly lower confidence levels than teachers
in elementary schools in their ability to respond to an active shooter. Participants with 1 to 3
years of teaching experience recorded lower Response Mean scores (M = 2.88) than those with 4
to 6 years of teaching experience (M = 2.94) and those with 7 to 9 years of experience (M =
3.08). These differences were notable but not shown to be statistically significant.
Findings from the nine interviews supported the data from the AAPRS and provided
personal insights from teachers regarding the crisis management plans and procedures in their
schools. Of the nine participants, three stated that they were not confident in their ability to
respond, four were confident with reservation, and two stated that they were confident. The
interviews revealed that crisis management plans in the nine schools were developed at the
district level or by school administrative teams. Further review of the data from interviews
demonstrated that participants had little to no involvement in the development of the crisis
management plans in their schools. Having a sense that school leadership listens to and responds
to teacher feedback, and including teachers in the process of decision-making are factors that
positively impact teacher self-efficacy (Tschannen-Moran, 1998). Perhaps, if planning input can
positively affect teacher self-efficacy for improving student achievement, it can also positively
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impact teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to a crisis. Brown (2008) asserts: “It is
better for a school to develop a personalized plan than to simply pay someone to do it. Plans
need to be a group effort. Staff members need and desire to be trained” (p. 60).
A positive finding was that all interview participants reported that their school’s
conducted active shooter drills two or more times per year, with the majority of the schools
conducting more than three drills a year. Confidence in, and understanding of, drills and
procedures directly impacts teacher perceptions of how they will respond during an active
shooter crisis (Brown, 2008; Graveline, 2003; Jagodzinski, 2019; Rider 2016). Eight of the nine
participants suggested that the drills be conducted in a more realistic way and during times where
students are not in their regularly scheduled classes. A major concern was shown for the
possibility that an attack might occur during lunch or during a school activity but the drills only
prepare students and teachers for an attack that takes place while students and teachers are in
their classes.
The interview findings showed significant improvements in safety and security systems
over the past 5 years. Each participant mentioned the installation of gates, security cameras, and
updated technology for visitor identification during the 5 years prior to the interviews. Three
schools were provided phone applications for emergencies and one high school implemented
mandatory mental health training for students. School design and layout were also a focus during
the interviews regarding safety and concerns. Several participants showed concern regarding
windows and accessibility of their individual classrooms. One participant suggested bulletproof
plating for windows. Others showed concern for individual classrooms that had specified safety
needs such as location near gates, multiple entry points, and multiple windows that they felt
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made them more vulnerable to attack. Two of the teachers voiced divided feelings related to the
aesthetics of schools and how implementing too many safety features could change the look and
feel of a school environment. The training methods for teachers and students were also discussed
in detail. Most schools utilize what one participant described as, “sit and get” where a
presentation is delivered to the entire staff in an auditorium at the start of each year with little or
no interaction or individualization (Bobby). Training for students was also an area of concern for
teachers. They all mentioned that the individual teachers were responsible for teaching students
the drill procedures and they were not provided with any materials. Participants described a lack
of training for what to do if their classroom was infiltrated by an attacker. Three participants felt
that more individualized training for teachers that focused on specific needs of the school and
specific needs of each classroom would help them feel more confident. Another major issue was
a discussion regarding whether drills should be conducted as live drills or as planned events
where everyone was given advanced notice. Eight of the participants thought that unplanned
drills during unspecified times would be more authentic. Mark, a former soldier, whose high
school conducted live unplanned drills said that live, unplanned drills could lead to unnecessary
emotional turmoil for teachers and students.
The next chapter presents a detailed discussion of the findings to analyze teacher
perceptions of their ability to respond to active shooting incidents in relationship to the crisis
management theoretical framework. Chapter 5 also contains implications for practice and
recommendations for future research. A better understanding of teacher perceptions and the
factors that impact those perceptions can help school leaders and policy makers develop ways to
improve how teachers perceive their ability to respond during an active shooter crisis.
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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSIONS
Teacher perceptions comprised the focus of this study. Teachers act as the first line of
defense during an active assailant crisis (Jonson, 2017). Forty-three percent of school shootings
end before the arrival of police and first responders, which according to Perkins (2018) means,
“teachers are responsible for more than just teaching reading and writing” (p. 71). The previous
chapter outlined the quantitative and qualitative results from the AAPRS and the nine interviews
in this study. This final chapter begins with a summary of the study. The summary is followed by
a detailed discussion that links the findings to the crisis management theoretical framework.
Implications for practice and recommendations for future research are provided to promote
factors that can improve teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter crisis.
The chapter ends with concluding statements regarding this study and its relevance to school
safety.

Summary of the Study
An explanatory mixed methods study was used to identify and analyze teacher
perceptions regarding their ability to respond to an active shooter crisis. Crisis management
theory offered a useful theoretical framework for understanding the elements of an active shooter
attack. This framework also provided context for explaining the impact of school protocol and
crisis management planning on teacher perceptions. The target population consisted teachers
enrolled in graduate-level education courses at a large university in the southeastern United
States. The sample consisted of 165 participants who filled out the AAPRS survey. From the 165
participants, nine were selected to provide a maximum variation sample for the semi-structured
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interviews. The use of multiple case study interviews helped provided rich detail regarding
teacher perceptions of how they might respond during an active assailant crisis and helped
delineate factors that impact those perceptions.

Problem and Purpose
A lack of research regarding teacher perceptions of active shooter response was the
problem identified to guide this study (Embry-Martin, 2017; Graveline, 2003; Rider, 2016). The
purpose of this study was to analyze teacher perceptions, and factors that may impact those
perceptions, in order to understand how best to equip teachers to respond to an active shooter
crisis. A deeper understanding of factors that impact teacher perceptions of their ability to
respond to active assailant attacks is needed (Page, 2017; Rider, 2016). Information from this
study can assist school policy makers as they implement research-based crisis management
strategies to improve teacher perceptions of their ability to protect students. This research
contends that improved teacher perceptions along with effective crisis management strategies
can abate the fear of an active shooter crisis in school communities.

Theoretical Framework
Crisis management theory provided a useful framework for describing active shooter
attacks and for understanding the methods implemented by schools to prevent, protect, respond,
and recover from these crisis events (Boin et al., 2016; DeVos et al., 2018). The Self-efficacy
theory provided research to support the notion that effective planning, drills, and procedures can
impact perceptions of ability to respond to an active shooter incident (Brown, 2008; Embry153

Martin, 2017). “A capability is only as good as its execution. The self-assurance with which
people approach and manage difficult tasks determines whether they make good or poor use of
their capabilities. Insidious self-doubts can easily overrule the best of skills” (Bandura, 1997, p.
35). Pearson and Clair (1998), in their attempt to reframe crisis management, stated that, “those
interested in the psychological view might consider how individual’s perceptions before, during,
and after a crisis are mediated by organizational intervention” (p. 59). A portion of the
theoretical focus of this study involved teacher perceptions of their school’s organizational
interventions concerning active assailant crisis management plans in terms of prevention,
protection, response, and recovery (Cowan et al., 2013). Crisis management theory provides a
valuable lens to comparatively analyze different schools of thought and methodologies for
training and preparing teachers and schools to respond to active assailant scenarios (Dumitriu,
2013). The application of crisis management theories to incidents of active shooters in schools
can provide a theoretical basis for understanding the role of teachers and how best to prepare
them to respond to active assailant attacks.
This study focused on understanding perceptions among teachers concerning their ability
to respond to an active shooter incident. The study also included analysis of teacher perceptions
of the planning and procedures in their schools for active shooter scenarios. Identifying
relationships that may exist between demographic factors and teacher perceptions of their ability
to protect students during an active shooter crisis was also part of this study. A deeper
understanding of these factors may help improve school policy regarding school safety and crisis
intervention by identifying ways to increase the confidence teachers have in their ability to keep
students safe.
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Research Questions
Seven Research questions were developed for this study. The questions are provided
below, and they relate to perceptions teachers have of their ability to respond to an active shooter
as well as factors that may influence those perceptions. The researcher sought to identify
possible correlations between knowledge of planning and perceptions of ability to respond. The
researcher also sought to identify relationships between drills and procedures regarding safety in
schools, and the perceptions teachers have of their ability to respond. The final area of concern
addressed whether demographic factors influence teacher perceptions. This study focused on the
following demographic factors: school configuration, years of teaching experience, teacher
gender, and whether or not the school had security personnel on campus.
RQ 1. How do teachers perceive their ability to respond to active shooter scenarios?
RQ 2. What are the perceptions of teachers regarding their school’s planning and preparation for
active shooter scenarios?
RQ 3. What are the perceptions of teachers regarding their school’s drills and practice
procedures for active shooter scenarios?
RQ 4. What relationships exist, if any, between perceptions of planning and preparation for
active shooter scenarios, and preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident among
teachers?
RQ 5. What relationships exist, if any, between perceptions of procedures and drills, and
perceptions of preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident among teachers?
RQ 6. What effect, if any, do school factors such as presence of security, and gradeconfiguration have on the perceptions of teachers in responding to active shooter
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scenarios?
RQ 7. What effect, if any, do individual demographic factors such as gender and years of
educational experience have on the perceptions of teachers in responding to active
shooter scenarios?

Methodology
The researcher used an explanatory mixed methods model to analyze teacher perceptions
and to address the seven research questions. Mixed methods research combines qualitative data
and quantitative data collection and analysis methods with the intent of providing richly detailed
descriptions (Creswell, 2009). Access to participants was granted after contact with the graduate
affairs coordinator. Contact information was provided for professors teaching graduate-level
education and educational leadership courses. The researcher used this contact information to
request assistance recruiting participants for this study. The graduate affairs coordinator also
distributed the Active Assailant Prevention and Response (AAPRS) survey instrument to over
1,200 graduate students through the college’s message board system. The AAPRS instrument
was adapted from the Active Shooter Preparedness Training Survey for High School Teachers
(ASPTS) created by Brown in a 2016 study of high school teacher perceptions of their ability to
respond to an active shooter crisis. Three sections of the ASPTS were retained in their entirety to
preserve and protect the Cronbach’s alpha measures for reliability. The planning subsection with
seven items had a Cronbach’s alpha of .945. The Practice/Drills subsection with seven items had
a Cronbach’s alpha of .959. The Teacher Preparedness subsection had a Cronbach’s alpha of
.903. A request to use the ASPTS was granted by Brown. The letter of request and the consent to
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use the survey are provided in Appendix E.
The first three research questions were answered with descriptive statistics such as
frequencies, percentages, and means. Research question 4 required a Pearson r correlational
analysis using SPSS to identify possible relationships between planning, identified by the
variable Plan Mean, and participant perceptions of their ability to respond, identified as the
variable Response Mean. Research question 5 required a Pearson r correlational analysis to
identify possible relationships between practice and drill procedures (Drills/Proc Mean) and
participant perceptions of their ability to respond (Response Mean). Research question 6
involved two parts. To answer the first part, an independent samples t test was used to identify
relationships between the Response Mean variable and whether or not the school had security
personnel on campus during the school day. The second portion of research question 6 was
answered using a one-way-ANOVA, or analysis of variance, based on school grade
configuration and Response Mean. Research question 7 also contained two parts. For the first
part, an independent samples t test was used to identify relationships between Response Mean
and gender. The second portion of research question 7 was answered using a one-way-ANOVA
based on years of teaching experience and Response Mean.
The qualitative component of the study consisted of nine interviews in a multiple case
study format. Participants selected for the interviews provided consent to participate in the final
item of the AAPRS, which asked for their contact information. Nine interviews were conducted
over the phone or in person using 12 open ended questions as a guide. The interviews were
transcribed by the researcher and coded based on grounded theory coding methods as well as
methods developed by Crabtree and Miller (1992) that describe a continuum of coding from
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prefigured categories to emergent categories. The categories for coding began with perceptions
of planning. Teachers were asked to explain the origins of the crisis management plans in their
schools and asked what level of involvement was extended to teachers at their school in plan
development. This category was expanded to include security staffing and other safety features
as described by the participants such as: presence of security, gates, badges, cameras, and
reporting tools like cell-phone applications. The second category pertained to descriptions of
drills and procedures for active shooter incidents. This category also contained emergent
subcategories that synthesized participant explanations of the training methods used in schools
for students and staff related to active shooter response protocol. Category 3 was based on
teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter as well as their perceptions of
their school’s ability to respond. The final category outlined perceptions of safety as described
by participants when asked about factors that made them feel safe and factors that made them
feel unsafe. Appendix G contains the coding scheme.

Discussion of the Findings
The findings are discussed and summarized below according to the research questions.
The focus of this study was teacher perceptions of their ability to respond during an active
assailant crisis. The majority of the data from the AAPRS provided positive results, suggesting
participants were mostly confident in their ability to respond to an active shooter crisis.
However, there are still areas of concern that present opportunities to improve the planning,
protocols, and procedures in ways that boost teacher confidence and make schools safer for
families.
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Research Question One
How do teachers perceive their ability to respond to active shooter scenarios?
The AAPRS revealed that 80% of the participants were confident in their ability to
respond to an active shooter event. The results for subset three of the AAPRS demonstrated that
the majority of the participants in the study were confident in their ability to respond, received
adequate training, and that they believed they could control their class when faced with an active
shooter assailant. When asked if they received adequate training to respond effectively to an
active shooter, 25% disagreed (M = 3.00) and 31% of the participants disagreed when asked if
they were confident in their ability to protect students during an active shooter attack. In 2008,
Brown, conducted a study of 202 teachers in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and
Tennessee to better understand perceptions regarding crisis response. The results showed a mean
of M = 2.66 on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree,
5 = strongly agree) suggesting that teachers did not feel adequately trained to respond to a crisis.
Rider (2016), in a similar study about teacher perceptions of responding to an active shooter that
involved over 400 high school teachers from Mississippi, found a score of M = 2.70 in her
survey that asked teachers whether they received adequate training and had the professional
knowledge to respond effectively in the event of an active shooter. The mean in the current study
for the same question was M = 3.00. Though location, school configuration, and other factors
may have influenced the differences in these scores, the differences are notable. A researchbased approach to active shooter crisis management planning can positively impact teacher
confidence in their ability to respond to these attacks (Brown, 2008; Perkins, 2018; Rider, 2016).
Though the results of the AAPRS demonstrated that the majority of teachers were
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prepared and confident, more needs to be done to help increase teacher confidence in their ability
to respond to an active shooter crisis. One out of 4 teachers in this study perceived their training
and professional knowledge for how to respond to an active shooter as inadequate. Confidence is
a key factor within the premise of self-efficacy (Tschannen-Moran et al., 1998). Born in 1976,
the theory of self-efficacy is explained by Tshannen-Moran (1998) as “a cognitive process in
which people construct beliefs about their capacity to perform at a given level of attainment” (p.
203). In 1986, Bandura, proposed that performance, task completion, and success were directly
related to an individual’s sense of self-efficacy. The current study did not include teachers who
experienced an active shooter attack, so the results do not provide a complete model of how selfefficacy can impact a teacher’s actual response during a crisis, but the findings show that the
participants in this study were confident, which is positive for schools and families. The results
also show a need for improvements in training and a need for implementing practices that can
help teachers feel more confident in their ability to protect students.
The interviews provided insights into factors and conditions that impacted participant
perceptions. School layout, classroom layout, lack of training for what to do if an attacker were
to enter the classroom, and lack of training and supplies to provide medical care to wounded
students were described during the interviews as areas that negatively impacted confidence.
Installation of gates, enhancements in security systems, implementation of security screenings
for visitors, school leadership, school climate, and visible security personnel on campus were
factors that made interview participants feel safe.
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Research Question Two
What are the perceptions of teachers regarding their school’s planning and preparation
for active shooter scenarios?
McNeil and Topping (2007) assert that if plans are not based on empirical evidence and
founded on research-based best practices, “well-meaning intervention might actually worsen
outcomes in the short or long run” (p. 65). Having a strategic plan is invaluable for schools when
facing these rare but devastating active assailant attacks (Borum et al., 2009; Cowan et al., 2013;
Kubena & Watts, 2018). Results from the AAPRS revealed that the majority of participant’s held
positive perceptions of the planning protocols at their schools. Most knew their school had a
plan, many of these plans were developed in league with local law enforcement groups. Several
participants reported that their school had a crisis team in place, and access to the crisis plan was
readily available to a large percentage. Moreover, the highest score for Q1 of the AAPRS was for
Q1-7, which asked if participants felt it was important to frequently update crisis plans for active
shooter incidents (M = 3.67). The overall Plan/Proc Mean score was M = 3.22 and most of the
items in the planning subsection of the AAPRS resulted in scores higher than M = 3.00, which
was the indicator for agreement. This demonstrates that most participants’ schools prioritized
planning and that most of the teachers felt confident in the plans provided by their districts or
their administrative teams.
The areas of concern related to teacher access to crisis management plans and perceptions
regarding the effectiveness of the plans. Nearly 40% of the participants reported that they either
did not have a copy of the school’s crisis management plan for active shooters, or they did not
know if they had a copy of the plan. When asked if they had access to their school’s crisis
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management plan for an active assailant crisis, 7.8% did not know, and 23.2% disagreed.
Moreover, when asked if they agreed that their school’s plans were effective, 15.5% said they
did not know, and 16.3% disagreed. It is understandable that people may not know if a plan is
effective if the plan has not been tested in action, but confidence in the effectiveness of the crisis
management plan and ready access to the crisis management plan are integral components of
keeping schools safe and building teacher confidence (Graveline, 2003; Madfis, 2016).
Interview participants revealed that there was little to no involvement for teachers in
developing crisis management plans for their school. A few teachers acknowledged an ability to
influence changes to portions of the plans, but this was only discussed in two of the nine
interviews. Teachers need readily available access to crisis management plans. They should also
be invited to participate in the discussions that develop and modify crisis management plans
since teachers are the closest contact with students and the main people responsible for carrying
out the plans during a crisis. Not having access to plans and not know if plans are effective is
problematic and demonstrates an area of needed improvement. Crisis management plans should
be readily available for review, open to discussion, and accessible so that teachers can reference
the plans as needed (Brown, 2008; Dumitriu, 2013; Page, 2017; Rider, 2016).

Research Question three
What are the perceptions of teachers regarding their school’s drills and practice
procedures for active shooter scenarios?
Rider (2016), whose survey served as the model to create the AAPRS, found that 35.9%
of participants worked at schools in which no active shooter drills were conducted. Participants
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from the current study reported more annual active shooter drills. This finding fits with updated
laws and statutes, nationally and in the state of Florida, that require more frequent lockdown
drills in schools (FLDOE; Jonson et al., 2018; Trump, 2019). Very few participants said their
schools did not conduct active shooter drills (6.3%). Each participant who worked at a Florida
public school reported that they conducted a minimum of two lockdown drills per school year. In
fact, more than 70% of the participants in this study reported that three or more active shooter
drills were conducted each year. Conducting drills can be a valuable tool to help students and
faculty respond more effectively during an active shooter incident.
Concerning results in this study were found in relationship to the effectiveness of the
drills conducted as well as the training provided for students and staff in preparation for the
drills. Q2 of the AAPRS contained seven statements regarding the drills and practice procedures
in schools for participants to rate on a 4-point Likert scale. The lowest scores in this subsection
were found for Q2-3 (M = 2.65), “my school provides classroom instruction about live active
shooter incident preparedness for students,” and Q2-4 (M = 2.72), “the classroom instruction
portion of our active shooter incident preparedness is effective.” Another area of concern was
found regarding participant perceptions of the effectiveness of the drills. The overall mean score
for this statement was M = 3.00, but 20% reported that they did not know if the drills were
effective and 20% disagreed that the drills were effective. Once again, it is understandable that
some participants might have reservations about rating the effectiveness of a drill procedure that
has not been tested with an actual crisis situation, but to have 20% of the participants state that
they do not perceive the drills as effective is concerning.
The nine interviews provided some details about training and drills. The majority of
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participants suggested that live drills conducted during times when students were not in regularly
scheduled classes would be more beneficial in helping schools prepare for an actual crisis
situation. There was one participant, Mark, who was a former Army Ranger, that worked at a
school in which drills were treated as live scenarios. Mark stated that this caused unneeded
trauma and mental anguish for him. He also stated that he didn’t think it was necessary to
frighten the students and that the goal of practicing the act of hiding and protecting everyone
from an active shooter could be conducted without it being treated as a live actual crisis attack.
Training for teachers was also described in a similar way by nearly all participants. The active
shooter drill training for teachers took place at the beginning of the year in a faculty meeting
with the entire staff in an auditorium. Some schools stated that their security personnel
conducted the training, while other stated that administrators at their school conducted the
training. Bobby described the instructional method as, “sit and get”, where information was
disseminated via Power Point or discussion. Shannon and Bettie described a more interactive
approach where a guest speaker was brought in and conducted physical drills to allow teachers
practice disarming an attacker. The most common practice described by the nine interview
participants in lockdown drills was to follow the following steps:
1. Turn off the lights in the classroom and cover any windows.
2. Students move to a safe area within the classroom where they are not visible from the
outside.
3. Wait silently for an announcement or signal that indicates the end of the drill.
The phrase “run, hide, fight” was used by two participants (Mari & Bobby). There was also a
participant who referred to an active assailant drill protocol termed the ALICE alert system
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(Bobby). These practices represent a multi-option approach to active assailant attacks (Jonson et
al., 2018; Trump, 2019). The perceptions described in the interviews also suggested that training
should be more individualized not only to the school, but also to individual classroom needs.
Shannon and Bettie both recommended that security personnel meet with teachers in their
individual rooms to identify the best possible way to protect students in that room. Alice’s
biggest fear was that no training was provided for what to do if an attacker were to enter her
classroom.
Training for students, as described in each of the nine interviews, was conducted by the
teacher in the classroom with little or no resources provided. Teachers went over the procedures
with the class prior to a drill and that was extent of the training. Bobby, explained that his
classroom had a poster on the wall for the ALICE alert system, but he was the only interview
participant that mentioned any materials provided for training students in what to do during an
active shooter drill. The perceptions described through the AAPRS and the interviews of this
study demonstrate a need for improvements in procedures for training students and teachers to
prevent, prepare for, and respond to active shooter attacks.

Research Questions Four
What relationships exist, if any, between perceptions of planning and preparation for
active shooter scenarios, and preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident among
teachers?
A significant correlation was found between the Plan/Proc Mean and the Response Mean.
This suggests that teachers who are knowledgeable about the crisis plans and confident in those
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plans, perceive themselves as more confident and capable in their ability to respond during an
actual crisis. This finding corroborates the findings of Rider (2016) and Brown (2008) which
demonstrate the need for effective crisis management planning in schools to increase teacher
perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter attack. The findings in the current
study, particularly from the nine interviews, also suggest that plans and protective measures in
schools are being implemented and adapting to better fit the needs of this type of crisis. One
example was provided by three of the interview participants who explained that fire drill
procedures in their schools were altered starting in 2017. Students and teachers in these schools
were no longer to respond by immediately exiting the building with students. They were instead
required to wait for a signal or announcement from leadership to indicate if the alarm was an
actual drill or an actual fire. This change was prompted by incidents where attackers pulled the
fire alarm in order to lure students out into the open for an attack. The results of this study
indicated that participants’ schools implemented strategic crisis plans to protect students, but the
results also indicated areas of needed improvement in these plans.

Research Question Five
What relationships exist, if any, between perceptions of procedures and drills, and
perceptions of preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident among teachers?
A significant correlation was found between the Drills/Proc Mean variable and the
Response Mean variable. This indicates that knowledge of drills and confidence in the practices
in place for crisis management have a direct impact on the confidence participants have in their
ability to respond during an active shooter attack. It was also found that the number of drills
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conducted during a school year positively influenced perceptions of ability to respond. The
Response Mean was slightly higher for teachers working in schools with three or more drills per
year than it was for teachers working in schools where drills were less frequent. This is
consistent with findings from studies conducted by Brown (2008) and Rider (2016). Moreover, it
fits with the concepts of self-efficacy that demonstrate how frequent and purposeful practice can
lead to increased confidence and improved performance in a task (Bandura, 1977; TschannenMoran & Hoy, 1998). Interview participant, Shannon, agreed, “I feel like more training, the more
you have to do it to let it become automatic, I feel like that is what I need.” Interview participants
all worked at schools where drills were conducted two or more times per year. Their ability to
describe the drills and explain the protocols demonstrated the value of frequent practice.

Research Question Six
What effect, if any, do school factors such as presence of security, and gradeconfiguration have on the perceptions of teachers in responding to active shooter scenarios?
Active and visible security personnel on school campuses assist with student discipline,
help foster a sense of safety, and protect students and school staff (Kubena & Watts, 2019). This
important role has been part of schools in the United States since the 1950s and has increased as
a result of high-profile active shooter attacks (Zullig, Ghani, Collins, & Matthews-Ewald, 2017).
The majority of active assailant attacks on K-12 schools were carried out by high school students
who attended the school they attacked (Bushman et al., 2016; DeVos et al., 2018). The majority
of studies found regarding teacher perceptions of active assailant attacks and school safety
focused on high school settings (Brown, 2008; Rider 2016; Wright, 2015). Research question six
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was developed to analyze any possible impact the presence of security on campus and school
grade-configuration might have on a teacher’s perception of their ability to respond to an active
assailant crisis.
The AAPRS data results presented a problem answering the first part of research question
six about the presence of security staff. More than 80% of the participants reported that their
school had security personnel on campus during the school day. Calculations revealed that no
significant difference existed between perceptions of ability to respond, as measured by the
Response Mean variable, and the presence of security indicated by participants in AAPRS
question nine. Due to the discrepancy in the number of schools with and without security
personnel, these results may not paint an accurate picture of the impact security personnel have
on teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter. The lack of correlation in
this case may be accounted for by the semantics of the statements posed in the AAPRS, which
were focused on personal factors related to the teacher’s perceptions of their individual ability to
respond in a crisis situation. A factor to consider is that an individual’s perceived ability to
respond might not be altered by the presence of security on campus, where other factors, such as
perceptions of safety, have shown to be improved by the presence of security personnel (Cowan
et al., 2013; Gregory et al., 2012).
In his interview, Jack, who worked as a middle school technology teacher said, “I trust
our resource officer who is highly visible. I trust that if there was an active shooter, I believe that
she would respond to it as quick as possible.” This response is another indicator of how security
personnel may impact teacher perceptions regarding a collective response, but not a teacher’s
personal ability to respond. Connie, who worked at a high school with over 3,500 students said
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that she felt there were not enough security staff on her campus, she also said, “It is very difficult
with only three security officers and two SROs who, quite honestly are sometimes filling in as
substitutes for teachers we do not have a sub for. So, that takes away one of our security
personnel.” These factors represent a need for more research regarding the presence of security
personnel and the particular roles that security staff are required to play. The cost involved in
hiring school security is another issue of contention in research (Addington, 2009; Zullig, et al.,
2017). Connie also stressed her opinion that the school security personnel, or local law
enforcement should be involved in the training of teachers and staff for active shooter crisis
scenarios.
School grade-configuration was not shown in this study to have a significant relationship
with teacher perceptions of their ability to respond. Response Mean scores for high school
teachers in the study were slightly lower than those of elementary school teachers. This
difference could be a reaction by teachers to reports that demonstrate more active shooter attacks
carried out by students, or former students, of high schools whereas attacks on elementary
schools have historically been carried out by adults and are less frequent (Bushman et al., 2016;
Jagodzinski, 2019).

Research Question Seven
What effect, if any, do individual demographic factors such as gender and years of
educational experience have on the perceptions of teachers in responding to active shooter
scenarios?
Brown (2008) found that male teachers perceived themselves to be well trained to
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manage a crisis at school, while female teachers did not perceive themselves as being well
trained to manage a crisis. Gregory (2012) similarly found that in a study of Virginia teachers,
male teachers felt safer and less susceptible to violent attack while at school than female
teachers. The current study revealed no significant difference between the Response Mean
variable for male and female teachers. Among the participants in this study, both men and
women reported perceptions that showed they were mostly confident regarding their ability to
respond to an active shooter crisis. This information is important because gender is an
uncontrollable factor for school leadership and school crisis management plans. The National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES.gov) reported that during the 2017-2018 school year, 24%
of teachers were male and 76% of teachers were female. Gender differences were not significant
in this study, and this is a positive finding for school leadership.
In previous studies, more years of teaching experience equated to more confidence in
one’s ability to respond to a crisis in a school (Brown, 2008; Graveline, 2003; Rider, 2016).
None of these studies found this difference to be statistically significant, but it was a large
enough difference to notice. The current study presented similar findings. Response Mean scores
were highest for teachers with seven or more years of teaching experience, and teachers with
three or fewer years of experience had the lowest Response Mean scores. These findings
demonstrate that training and crisis management planning strategies have a more substantial
impact on a teacher’s perception of their ability to respond to a crisis than gender, presence of
security, teaching experience, and grade configuration. These results are promising for schools
and school leaders. Effective crisis management planning, proper training, frequent drills, and
consistent adaptations of crisis management strategies are controllable methods that school
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leaders and policy makers can implement to improve teacher confidence in their ability to
respond to these scenarios.

Crisis Management Implications
The findings are discussed below in connection with crisis management theory concepts
applied to active assailant attacks in K-12 school settings. The four crisis management
components utilized in this discussion included preparation, protection, response, and recovery
(Boin et al., 2013; Rider, 2016). Teachers have been identified as the first line of defense during
active shooter attacks (Jonson, 2017; Rider, 2016). There are multiple cases of attacks where a
teacher’s response meant the difference between life, injury, or death for themselves and for
students (Jonson, 2017). Teacher perceptions and recommendations are valuable tools
(Graveline, 2003). Understanding how these perceptions are affected by active shooter planning,
drills, protocol, training, and demographic factors may lead to useful methods for improving the
ability of teachers to respond to an active shooter crisis.
Shrivistava (2013) defined crisis as a process, not an event, that expands and spreads in
five stages.
1. Crisis begins with hidden, low-impact systems or human failures.
2. Major damage is caused in a crisis-triggering event.
3. The impacts of the crisis expand and diffuse to stakeholders.
4. Questions of blame and liability are raised.
5. A new normal, or equilibrium state, develops. (p. 8)
Results from the Active Assailant Prevention and Response Survey (AAPRS) and findings from
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the interviews were synthesized into mitigating steps to address these crisis components by
applying the four elements of crisis management theory to active assailant crisis scenarios.
Figure 2 displays the crisis stages along with mitigating factors identified in this study and
through the literature. The figure applies the four components of crisis management to the stages
of an active shooter crisis in a school setting.
The four components overlap in how they apply mitigating factors to the stages of an
active shooter crisis. Some elements, such as mental health care and open communication, apply
to more than one of the crisis management components and can be used across multiple stages in
mitigating the effects of an active shooter crisis. There is also some overlap in the use of the four
components as they are applied to the five stages of a crisis. Prevention, though not fully
explored as part of the current study, has similar components to protection. The response and
recovery components also have overlapping strategic elements as identified in Figure 2. The
figure is followed by a detailed explanation of the findings from the literature and findings from
this study to explore factors that can improve how teachers perceive their ability to respond to an
active shooter.
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Figure 2: Crisis Stages and Active Shooter Crisis Management
Note: Synthesized from Shrivastava et al., 2013; Dumitriu, 2013; DeVos et al., 2018.
Prevent
Prevention of an active shooter crisis was analyzed based on the planning protocols and
safety measures in place for participants’ schools. Although the AAPRS survey did not directly
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ask about issues of prevention, the data collected for planning protocol in Q1 and information
collected from participants about their schools, such as presence of security on campus, provided
information related to methods schools are using to prevent active shooter attacks. The nine
interviews also provided insights regarding issues of prevention. Prevention is an integral
component of crisis management theory and a critical element in making schools safer (Boin et
al., 2013; Bonanno, & Levenson, 2014). Stopping these events from occurring should be a
primary goal of crisis management plans (Page, 2017). There are many factors that can lead to a
school shooting (Langman, 2009; Newman et al., 2004). The first step in a crisis is, “a seemingly
low impact systems or human failure” (Shrivastava et al., 2013, p. 8). This section addresses the
intricacies of preventing an active shooter crisis in conjunction with the findings from the current
study. Prevention requires identifying possible failures in a school system to mitigate the
possibility that those failures might lead to an active shooter crisis.
The seemingly low impact systems or human failures that have led to school attacks
include failure to recognize and report portentous signs displayed by attackers, failure to identify
mental health needs and provide assistance to attackers, failure to prevent potential attackers
from obtaining the weapons used in an attack, and failure of school security systems to prevent
attackers from entering the school armed (Bushman et al., 2016; Duplechain, & Morris, 2014;
Katsiyannis et al., 2018; Langman, 2009; Newman et al., 2004). Crisis management strategies
that focus on the following elements have shown promise in the prevention of active shooter
attacks:
•

school climate

•

mental health care
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•

anonymous reporting systems

•

threat assessment

•

review and update crisis management plan (Chapman, 2018; Cowan et al., 2013; Page,
2017; Skiba & Sprague, 2008)

School Climate
School climate factors have been shown to reduce school violence and increase
perceptions of safety for teachers and students (Cowell & McDonald, 2018; Daniels & Bradley,
2011; Morrison, 2003; Williams, Schneider, Wornell, Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 2018). Programs
such as the Safe School Communities Model (Daniels & Bradley, 2011), authoritative school
climate theory (Gregory & Cornell, 2009), and school connectedness (Blum, 2005; Blum &
Libby, 2004) provide models to assist schools in developing a school climate that can help
prevent violent acts such as an active shooter attack (Wilson, Gottfredson, & Najaka, 2001).
According to Cowell (2018), “addressing safety also includes a comprehensive review of school
climate, in particular primary prevention, that can include evaluation of antibullying programs,
the availability of mental health resources, and assessment of weapon carrying in the school” (p.
254).
School climate factors that have been shown to prevent or reduce the possibility of an
attack include training programs for students and faculty to recognize and report possible signs
of an impending attack (Page, 2017). This climate element would only assist in preventing
possible attacks that would be carried out by members of the immediate school community. This
includes the vast majority of these incidents of mass violence in schools (Katsiyannis et al.,
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2018). The use and development of profiles for active shooters proved ineffective, but warning
signs and risk factors that indicate the possibility of an impending attack have been extensively
outlined by researchers (Bushman et al., 2016; Duplechain, & Morris, 2014; Levin, & Madfis,
2009; Newman et al., 2004; Petrovich, 2016). Newman (2004) presented five, necessary but not
sufficient, conditions for a rampage shooting which included: (a) marginality, (b) individual
vulnerabilities, (c) cultural scripts, (d) under the radar, and (e) access to weapons. Duplechain
and Morris (2014) asserted that behaviors and risk factors for school shooters include bullying,
personal risk factors, family risk factors, societal risk factors, relationships and past traumas, and
brain development. Levin and Madfis (2009) contend that issues of strain and stress lead to mass
shootings. They identified a five stage model they referred to as cumulative strain, which starts
with chronic strain, moves toward uncontrolled strain, followed by acute strain, leading to the
planning stage, and culminating in a massacre at school (Levin & Madfis, 2009). Creating a
school climate with situational awareness where students and teachers understand and seek to
identify these behavioral factors early, is an avenue supported by research to prevent active
assailant attacks (Page, 2017, Petrovich, 2016; Redlener, 2006).
Other important school climate factors shown to reduced violence include consistent and
fair and consistent disciplinary practices (Gregory et al., 2012). In addition, school climate
practices that help students feel connected to the school community have led to decreased school
violence and improvements in academic achievement (Blum, 2005; DeVos et al., 2018; Wilson
et al., 2001). In his interview, Bobby, who taught at a public high school, spoke specifically
about how the climate of his school was a more valuable factor than any of the physical safety
features in the prevention of an attack. “I think that prevents school shootings more than
176

anything else. Not safe doors or safe windows. Those are physical barriers. You have to go from
within to prevent a shooting from happening. That is what is in people’s heads.” Bobby
discussed how teachers in his school created authentic bonds with students through school
programs that helped students and teachers experience a stronger connection with the school
community. Research regarding the prevention of mass violent attacks supports the development
of a school climate that builds resilience, discourages bullying, prevents strain, has consistent
and fair discipline practices, and trains the school community to be situationally aware (Blum,
2005; Duplechain & Morris, 2014; MacNeil & Topping, 2007).

Mental Health Care
Langman (2009), in a study of 10 mass school shooters, found that the attackers fit the
description for identification as being either psychotic, psychopathic, or severely traumatized.
Newman (2004) and Bushman (2016) found that 85% of school shooting perpetrators in their
studies were from dysfunctional homes, were suicidal or depressed, or suffered from a major
mental illness. In the current study, mental health was described by Bobby and Mark in their
interviews as important elements for preventing an attack. Bobby’s high school implemented a
required mental health training session for all students. Mark explained that his school of 1,600
students had five guidance counselors on staff daily with an additional school psychologist that
worked with his school on a scheduled rotation of weekly visits. Mark also explained how his
school had increased efforts to connect students in need with health care workers at school based
on recommendations from teachers. Langman (2009) wrote, “a student threatening mass-murder
is a student in crisis” (p. 399). Mental health care is crucial for schools in the prevention of active
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shooter attacks. A 2019 NCES report showed that there are fewer than 390 school counselors per
student in US schools even though the maximum recommended ratio by the American School
Counseling Association is 250. Reducing the ratio of mental health care workers in schools and
improving training to recognize early warning signs and mental health needs for everyone in the
school community could be valuable, not only as a means of preventing active shooter attacks,
but also as a means to provide the type of care all students need (Eklund, Meyer, Way, &
Mclean, 2017; Petrovich, 2016).

Threat Assessment
The Threat Assessment model was developed by the United States Secret Service and the
United States Department of Education in 2002 and has expanded since its inception (Chapman,
2018; Modzeleski & Randazzo, 2018; Mohandie, 2014; Vossekuil et al., 2004). The model
involves a 7-step process and is mandatory for Florida Schools by Florida Statute 1006.07(7).
Cornell and Sheras (2006) describe seven components of the threat assessment model for use in
schools.
1. Evaluate the threat.
2. Decide whether the threat is transient or substantive.
3. Respond to transient threat.
4. Decide whether substantive threat is serious or very serious.
5. Respond to serious substantive threat.
6. Conduct safety evaluation.
7. Implement a written safety plan.
The threat assessment model depends on the school community’s ability to recognize warning
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signs and behavioral factors that might lead to violence (Mohandie, 2014). This model also
requires a willingness to report these factors along with a strategic method for reporting these
factors to the proper members of a threat assessment team (Modzeleski, & Randazzo, 2018).
Anonymous reporting systems, helplines, and a climate of connectedness to the school
community are integral components of success for the threat assessment model to work properly
in schools (DeVos et al., 2018; Mohandie, 2014). The AAPRS responses revealed that 72% of
the participants worked in schools that employed a crisis team. In his interview, Jack, referred to
an opportunity for teachers to be involved in the crisis team at his school. Since no questions in
the AAPRS or the interviews directly referenced the threat assessment model, more research is
needed in this area to see how schools are implementing this program. In studies regarding
averted school shootings, components of the threat assessment model were integral in preventing
school attacks that were in their late planning stages (Agnich, 2015; Page, 2017).

Review and Update Crisis Plans
In the first section of the AAPRS, Q1-7 asked participants whether they agreed or
disagreed with the following statement, “I believe it is important to routinely update active
shooter incident procedures.” This statement received the highest mean score of any statement in
the AAPRS (M = 3.67) and 87.9% of the participants selected agree or strongly agree.
Consistently updating procedures will help schools ensure that the procedures and systems in
place are adapting to technological and research-based principles as they apply to this important
issue of school safety. Laws and policy continue to shift, and it is important for school leaders to
ensure that the policies in their schools adhere to state and local mandates for safety
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requirements (Cornell, 2015; Rajan & Branas, 2018).
A controversial component of prevention relates to access to firearms. In the majority of
active shooter attacks, the attackers obtained their weapons legally either through purchase or
from friends and family members (Lankford et al., 2019). Increased gun control measures have
been offered as a possible solution, but research also shows that the vast majority of gun owners
do not commit mass murder (Böckler et al., 2013; Silver, Simons, & Craun, 2018). Access to
guns and weapons was one of the five, necessary but not sufficient, elements of a rampage
shooting presented by Newman (2004). One possible avenue for prevention, as it relates to
acquisition of weapons, would be to educate parents on the importance of gun safety and
promote the idea of situational awareness to all school community stakeholders (Duplechain &
Morris, 2014; Redlener, 2006).

Protect
When asked if they were confident in their ability to protect students, 31.4% of the
participants in this study disagreed. Transferring these results to a hypothetical school setting
with 100 teachers suggests that 31 teachers would not feel confident protecting students during
an attack. The Florida Department of Education (Fldoe.org) states that the maximum number of
students in a class in pre-kindergarten through grade 3 is 18, in grades 4 through 8 it is 22, and in
grades 9 through 12 it is 25. This means that more than 550 students could be sitting in classes
where the teacher does not feel confident in their ability to protect them in the case of an active
shooter attack. During her interview, Shannon said,
“I don’t feel adequate to protect my kids. I mean…the mother in me would take over, but
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to try to prevent a shooting, to try to prevent any more of the shooting, or to prevent any
intruder. I don’t feel like I would really know what to do.”
Seven out of the nine interview participants stated that they were either not confident, or
confident with reservations. More needs to be done to improve teacher confidence in their ability
to respond during an active shooter crisis to protect students.
Figure 2 offers protection as the crisis management component to mitigate the second
stage in an active shooter crisis. In Stage 2, a crisis triggering event includes the start of an attack
when the assailant arrives on the school campus with a plan, with the intent to harm others, and
with the weapons needed to inflict harm. Findings from this study and others demonstrate that
knowledge and confidence in the crisis planning process, combined with frequent practice, can
influence teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to an active assailant attack (Brown,
2008, Graveline, 2003; Rider, 2016; Sussman, Jin, & Mohanty, 2016). Confidence in one’s
ability to perform increases self-efficacy, which can improve performance under stressful
conditions (Bandura, 2006; Embry-Martin, 2017; Tschannen-Moran & Hoy, 1998). Protective
factors supported by this study as plausible methods to limit the damage inflicted on students and
staff during an active assailant rampage attack include the following:
•

Access to crisis management plans

•

Confidence in crisis management plans

•

physical security systems

•

security personnel on campus

•

alert system connection with law enforcement and first responders (Brown, 2008; DeVos
et al., 2018; Jonson, 2017; Jonson et al., 2018; Kubena & Watts, 2019; Moraiba, 2018).
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Crisis Management Plan Access and Confidence
Crises are defined by a need for quick and informed decision-making under great stress
(Irvine, 1997; Mitroff et al., 2004). Results from this study demonstrated that the majority of
participants knew their school had a strategic plan, they also reported confidence in the plans.
There was a notable percentage (25%) of participants who were unsure of the effectiveness of
their school’s plan. There was also a notable percentage of participants (40%) who were unsure
whether they had access to their school’s plan if needed. These are concerning figures that can
easily be reduced by providing access to plans for teachers and staff. There is concern over how
these plans might be used if they were to be accessed by individuals planning an attack. Care
must be taken to ensure that crisis plans are guarded against access by those who wish to do
harm but easily accessed by teachers and staff who might want to reference the plans, or even
make suggested improvements to those plans. This is a simple factor that could help improve
teacher confidence in their ability to respond to an active shooter crisis.
Brown (2008) and Rider (2017) focused a portion of their study on perceptions teachers
have of school leadership in terms of the school’s plan and procedures for active shooter
response. Teachers who had more confidence in their school administrators and teachers who
had more confidence in their school’s plan, also had more confidence in their own ability to
respond to an active shooter (Brown, 2008; Rider, 2017). Confidence in leadership, access to
crisis management plans, confidence in crisis management plans, and the ability to participate in
the planning process are factors that improve the perceptions teachers have of their ability to
respond to an active shooter crisis (Brown, 2008; Embry-Martin, 2017; Graveline, 2003; Rider,
2016).
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Physical Security Systems
Protection is provided in the form of physical security systems such as gates, school
access badges, limited entry points, and locked classroom doors (Böckler et al., 2013). Physical
security systems also incorporate the design and layout of school campuses as well as protective
features that can be installed such as bulletproof windows, metal detectors, and security cameras
(Addington, 2009; Harding et al., 2002; O’Neill et al., 2016). During the interviews, all nine
participants reported that their school had a gate or fence, and four of the participants stated that
their schools updated and installed new gates within the last five years at their school. Six of the
participants worked in public schools, and each of those teachers stated that their classroom
doors were locked during the school day. Two interview participants described phone
applications used to alert the school and local emergency personnel to an emergency. When
asked what made them feel safe at school, most of the participants described physical security
systems such as gates, security cameras, as well as access and identification badges for staff and
visitors.
When asked what made them feel unsafe, these same physical security elements were
discussed. School campus layout was an issue for Alice, Bettie, Bobby, Jack, and Shannon. Alice
voiced concern about entry and exit points, stating that the building where her classroom was
located only had one entry point and one exit point, which would make it difficult to exit if an
intruder were to enter the building. Bettie had a similar fear since her classroom was on the
second floor. Bobby was worried about his classroom’s location near a gate entry point that was
not always monitored. He also stated that students were able to open the gates for other students.
Jack and Bettie voiced concern about windows and the possibility that an attacker could use the
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windows into the room as an access point to inflict harm. Jack stated that when he worked in an
embassy school in China, that the United States government installed bulletproof protective
coating on the exterior windows of the school and classroom. He said if schools were able to
implement this practice, it would make him feel safer. Jack, and other participants, also stated
that they did not want their school to look like a windowless prison either.
A balance of physical security components that complement the aesthetics of a school
were important features in the interview discussions. Hirschfield (2008) referred to the increased
implementation of physical security features and security personnel as the criminalization of
schools. This construct also pointed to the disciplinary practices, such as zero-tolerance, that
increasingly led to controversy over how schools handle the balance between education and
protection (Hirschfield, & Celinska, 2011). Zero-tolerance discipline policies sought to increase
safety by allowing schools to expel students for violent acts, threats, or bringing weapons to
school (Morton, 2013). State and national budgets for American schools that were historically
focused on curriculum and education are now being stretched to incorporate safety features and
security (Addington, 2007; Hirschfield, 2008; Madfis, 2016). A balance is needed considering
the rarity of active assailant attacks, but safety is a true concern that impacts a school’s ability to
educate students (Blanchfield & Ladd, 2013). Creating safe schools that retain the aesthetics of a
nurturing environment for students is a complex but critical endeavor.

Security Personnel on Campus
Security personnel on school campuses have been presented as a deterrent and as an onsite response to protect students (Glen, 2019). Addington (2007) and Madfis (2016) say security
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is expensive and that it lacks empirical research to support its effectiveness in preventing a
rampage attack and in limiting the loss of life caused during an attack. After the attack on
Columbine high school in Colorado, several security measures were instituted in schools across
the country such as metal detectors, security gates, security cameras, and security guards
(Addington, 2007). Madfis (2016) pointed to a construct called moral panic as the cause of
implementing these new security features even though none of them had significant research to
substantiate their effectiveness. Zullig (2017) supports the use of security personnel and provides
a model used in Arizona schools that demonstrates the value of security personnel on campus as
a way to reduce all types of violence and crime in schools without criminalizing the school. This
model calls for collaboration and connection with local law enforcement for training and
selection of security individuals that best fit the needs of the school (Zullig et al., 2017). Zullig
also uncovered research that shows how active and visible security on campus has reduced
student fights, gun carrying, rape, and other violent crimes in schools (Jennings, Khey, Maskaly,
& Donner, 2011; Theriot, 2009).
The AAPRS results demonstrated that schools are taking violent threats to campus
seriously. More than 80% of the participants reported that their school had security personnel on
campus during the school day and each of the nine interview participants stated that their school
had security on campus during the school day. The interviews revealed some discrepancy in
terminology for school security. Some schools had school resource officers (SRO), who were
assigned to the school by local law enforcement agencies. They were actual police officers.
Other schools, such as the high school where Connie worked, had additional security staff who
were unarmed and whose role, as explained by Connie, consisted of monitoring the school and
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alerting law enforcement if a danger presented itself. Mark used the term guardian in his
description of security personnel and stated that his school had two SROs and one guardian. He
also stated that both were armed with guns. The private school teachers stated that their security
staff was made up of retired law enforcement hired either through an external security company
or directly through school administration.
More research is needed to determine the best way to utilize security on campus. Connie
expressed that the safety training in the schools should be directed by law enforcement and by
the security staff at the school. Bettie and Shannon agreed, and even suggested more
individualized training where school security works with teachers in their classrooms to
brainstorm the best actions to take during a crisis. Resources officers in schools who educate
students regarding the law, show an active role by building relationships with students, work
with schools to train staff, assist in the development of crisis management protocol is supported
by the limited research in this highly important issue of school safety (Addingtson, 2009: Glen,
2019; Vossekuil et al., 2004; Zullig et al., 2017). Politicians have supported the practice of
arming teachers and school staff with weapons and training to provide assistance during the
response to an active assailant crisis (DeVos et al., 2018; Lott, 2019; Moraiba, 2018; Rajan &
Branas, 2018). The policy of arming teachers is a debated topic where proponents point to it as
an effective deterrent for school attacks, while opponents point to financing and possible liability
as reasons for leaving security in the hands of security personnel (Lott, 2019; Moraiba, 2018;
Rajan & Brana, 2018). Securing schools is a necessary and complicated endeavor that would
benefit from more research to better identify the roles that security personnel should play in
order to provide the safest environment for students and staff.
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Alert System Connection with Local Law Enforcement and First Responders
Most active assailant attacks end before first responders and law enforcement arrive
(Jagodzinski, 2019). The sooner these local agencies are alerted to a crisis, the faster they will be
able to report to the location and protect students and staff. Reducing loss of life is a priority so,
having first responders and police on the scene as soon as possible through alert systems that
notify them immediately can help save lives (Kubena & Watts, 2019). Two interview
participants in this study described a cellphone application used to initiate the lockdown
protocol. This application was connected to local first responding agencies to reduce the time it
takes to contact these groups in a crisis. During a crisis, it may not be possible for individuals
within the school to find a phone and call the authorities. Developing methods to link the
school’s alarm systems directly to local law enforcement and first responders is a useful tool for
protecting schools against an active shooter crisis (Jacob, 2018).

Respond
Response constitutes actions and steps taken during a crisis event to limit the possible
damage caused to life, property, and reputation (Gilpin & Murphy, 2008). This study focused on
how planning, drills, and demographics impact teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to
an attack. Although none of the participants experienced an active shooter attack, findings from
this study provided valuable information for understanding crisis response to a rampage
shooting. Response consists of protocols that bridge crisis stages 3 and 4. In an active shooter
crisis, stage 3 would include the events during the attack until the attack stops. Stage 4 consists
of events that happen in the immediate aftermath of an attack, and the initial reactions from the
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school community, stakeholders, and anyone who learns about the attack. As news about the
event spreads, difficult questions are posed, and initial perceptions of the crisis are developed
(Gilpin & Murphy, 2008).
This study focused on teacher perceptions of how they and their schools might respond to
an active assailant. It is suggested by research in the concept of self-efficacy, that an individual’s
perceptions of their ability often correspond to their reactions, especially in instances where
training and procedures are in place for the specified action (Tschannen-Moran et al., 1998).
Gilpin and Murphy (2008) outlined the important practices of crisis management plans by
stating, “strategies and practices for crisis management consist of ongoing communication with
stakeholders, using communities of practice, environmental scanning, scenario planning focused
on processes, developing teamwork skills through simulations, and ongoing practice and drills”
(p. 137). The results of this study, combined with the available literature, were used to compile
the following mitigating factors as they relate to active shooter response:
•

training for staff and students

•

training with local law enforcement and first responders

•

drills and practice

•

media liaison and legal team designation (Brown, 2008; DeVos et al., 2018; Jonson,
2017; Jonson et al., 2018; Kubena & Watts, 2019; Newman et al., 2004).

Training for Staff and Students
When asked if their school provided instruction sessions for staff, 78% of the participants
in this study agreed. However, when asked if their school provided classroom instruction for
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students about live active shooter incident preparedness, 48% agreed and 44% disagreed. In an
interview, Connie, a behavior specialist at a high school with 3,500 students, stated, “personally,
I think we need to increase the amount of staff that are prepared to deal with a crisis, and I don’t
think that teachers have enough training.” When describing how students were trained to respond
to an active shooter event, each of the interview participants said that the students were told the
procedures by one of their teachers at the start of the year, or just prior to the first lockdown drill,
and that no materials were provided for this training. Interview results and responses to the
AAPRS revealed a need for more effective training for teachers and students. Divergent methods
and materials were used to train students and staff as described in the nine interviews. There
were differences in who conducted the training, in materials used for the training sessions, and in
the expectations for students and teachers. It has already been established that crisis management
plans and protocols should be individualized to the needs of the school (DeVos et al., 2018;
Duplechain & Morris, 2015; Madfis, 2016). Having strategic training methods, research-based
guidance, and teaching materials provided by districts, school leadership, and security personnel
could help ensure that teachers and students are more confident regarding what is expected of
them during an active shooter crisis (Dumitriu, 2013; MacNeil & Topping, 2007).
Interview participants suggested individualized training that accounts for specific features
of individual classrooms based on the configuration and layout of the school as a way to improve
teacher confidence in their ability to respond to an active shooter incident. Teacher training
conducted by security personnel in conjunction with local law enforcement and first responders
were additional suggestions from interview participants to improve teacher confidence in their
ability to respond. Another training method, described by Connie and Bettie, was to have
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security personnel analyze school layout and individual classrooms with teachers and school
leaders to develop a tailored approach to safety, individualized to fit the needs of the school.
Personalized training with specific feedback and directions on what to do if the attacker enters
the classroom along with first aid training and medical supplies were other safety elements
presented in the interviews. Teachers and students need to know their options and have a plan
that is more specific to their school, their classroom, and their needs in order to feel safer and
more prepared for an active shooter crisis.
The interviews in this study demonstrated a range in training practices for schools. In one
school an administrator conducted the training. In other schools, security staff conducted the
training. Other schools had training conducted by local law enforcement. One school received
training from a security consultant that worked with multiple schools in the state of Florida. So
much variety in who delivers the training for staff can be problematic when the expectation to
keep students safe and respond effectively to an active shooter is such an important factor in
school safety. The one consistent factor in the description of the training practices for all schools
was the use of whole group instruction in a large faculty meeting at the start of each year. Bobby
described the training simply as, “sit and get”.
In her interview, Alice’s main concern was that she had no training or discussion on what
to do if an attacker infiltrated her classroom. She felt that some type of training in this area was
needed to help her feel more secure. Bettie and Shannon described a training session at their
school where teachers physically practiced methods of unarming an assailant. Bettie felt that this
type of training was helpful and reassuring, but Shannon would have preferred this type of
training to take place in a small group setting, as opposed to a full faculty seminar.
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Active shooter attacks are rare and deadly incidents (Bushman et al., 2016; Jagodzinski,
2019). The primary focus of school is to educate students (Addington, 2009). Budgets for
education are already stretched to cover staff salaries, curriculum materials, and all the
necessities of providing a quality education (Duplechain & Morris; 2014; Madfis, 2016).
Security and safety have increasingly become a more vital and demanding part of running a
school, and adding more safety training and safety features cuts into the time teachers have to
teach and it cuts into the budget schools are allotted to fund education (Addington, 2009). There
must be a way to restructure the safety training and protocols currently provided for staff and
students in a way that does not break the bank or infringe upon teaching time.

Training with Local Law Enforcement and First Responders
Training that incorporates local law enforcement and first responders was recommended
by the Federal Commission on School Safety led by Secretary of Education, Betsy DeVos
(2018). In the AAPRS Q1-2, which states “My school works cooperatively with local emergency
personnel in developing a crisis plan for active shooter incidents,” nearly 80% of participants
agreed or strongly agreed, and the mean score was M = 3.47. This is a positive finding that
demonstrates how schools are working with local agencies to improve the crisis response effort
to keep students safe. The current study was not designed to explore this topic. Research that
defines the roles of local emergency response and local police agencies and outlines how these
intra-organizational training programs should function, would be beneficial to schools.
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Drills and Practice
This study found a significant correlation between the confidence and knowledge a
teacher has regarding the drills and procedures in their school, and teacher perceptions of their
ability to respond during an active shooter attack. Participant responses to AAPRS subsection Q2
regarding drills and procedures, combined with interview responses, demonstrate that
participants in this study were confident in the ability of their school to provide protection in the
event of an active shooter. The majority of participants were knowledgeable and confident
regarding the procedures and drills according to the AAPRS responses, but the interview
discussions revealed underlying issues with protocol for drills that, if improved upon, could help
teachers feel more confident in their ability to protect students.
When asked in the AAPRS if their schools had drills and practice for active shooter
incidents, over 80% agreed. However, when asked if the drills were effective, only 60% agreed.
Twenty percent of the participants stated that they did not know if the drills were effective. This
is a logical response in schools where drills have not been tested by an actual crisis event.
Rampage shootings are rare, so the majority of schools have never tested the effectiveness of
their drills. However, 20% of the participants disagreed when asked if their drills were effective,
showing a lack of confidence in the drills and practice measures. Every interview participant was
able to describe in detail the procedures of a lockdown, or code-red, drill at their school. The
standard procedure of turning off the lights, covering windows, and finding a safe area in the
classroom to sit and silently wait for an announcement to signify the end of the drill was
described by each of the nine participants. This protocol represents what has been termed the
traditional lockdown procedure. The goal is to hide and hope that the assailant is unable to enter
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in order to inflict harm. A few schools described a multi-response option known as run, hide,
fight. One interview participant, Bobby, described the ALICE alert system, which is also a type
of multi-option response. The multi-options response options contain similar characteristics such
as: (a) hiding according to the traditional lockdown, (b) placing barricades such as furniture
items in front of the door to prevent entry, (c) evacuating the building if it is deemed safe to do
so based on the location of the assailant, (d) using whatever weapons might be available to fight
off an assailant as a final option if cornered and under attack (Frazzano & Snyder, 2014; Jonson,
2017; Jonson et al., 2018, Perkins, 2018; Trump, 2019).
Trump (2019) supports the traditional lockdown approach and expressed fear that the
multi-option response would not work in some school settings especially with younger students.
Multi-option responses require more training and communication and could potentially increase
liability for teachers and schools by placing students in dangerous situations (Trump, 2019;
Perkins, 2018). Jonson (2017) supports the multi-option response, especially for secondary
schools and post-secondary schools where the students are older and better able to defend
themselves if under attack. Jonson (2017) pointed to examples of how teachers used multi-option
response methods and were able to save lives during the Virginia Tech attack in April of 2007
where 32 people were killed and 17 were wounded. Students who hid in a corner and attempted
to run instead of defending themselves were killed, while students and teachers who barricaded
doors and ran toward the attacker as a collective group were able to fend off the attacker as
opposed to being shot (Jonson, 2017; Jonson et al., 2018).
There was a discrepancy in the interview discussion on whether drills should be
conducted as live drills that simulate an actual attack without warning or notification, versus
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scheduled practice drills with pre-notification for staff and students. Eight of the interview
participants worked at schools that use the pre-notification method but suggested that it might
make them feel more confident if drills were conducted in a more realistic way. Bobby described
a change from this method of drill in his school. Initially drills were conducted with no prior
notice to families and students, but this strategy changed when during a drill, students used their
cellphones to contact parents and caused a panic at the school. After that incident, Bobby’s
school changed plans to make sure that everyone in the school community knew when drills
would take pace, and students were instructed not to use cellphones unless give permission from
a teacher. Mark, whose school did conduct drills without prior notification, stated that this
caused unnecessary fear for students and staff. Mark, who was a combat veteran, said that
conducting drills in this way could cause mental harm for students and staff who have
experienced trauma and violence under stressful situations in the past.
One of Mari’s most notable fears was her lack of preparation for what to do if an attack
were to happen during lunch or other activities and events when students were not in their
regular classrooms. A similar sentiment was shared by Connie who voiced concern for students
with severe disabilities in self-contained classes that she felt were extremely vulnerable if an
actual attack were to take place because they posed consistent challenges during drills. One
major recent change in drill procedures, described by Jack, Bobby, and Connie related to fire
drills. Given that incidents where active assailant attackers used the fire alarm to lure people out
of the school building for an attack, some schools instituted a code or an announcement made
prior to evacuation for a fire drill to ensure that the fire drill or alarm is not being used by an
attacker as a way to inflict more harm.
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Connie described the development and implementation of Crisis Response Teams (CRT)
at a school in which she had previously worked. CRT promotes the assignment of specific roles
during a crisis for administrators, teachers, staff, and security personnel that are part of the drills
and procedures (Brock et al, 2001). Informing teachers of each assigned role and involving them
in the discussion was something that Connie felt would improve perceptions of everyone’s
ability to respond to a crisis attack. Another feature of the CRT model involves the
implementation of table-top discussions among the CRT members to develop models and plans
for what to do during a multitude of scenarios when an attack might take place besides when
students are in their regular classes (Brock et al., 2001). In an examination of the CRT model, it
was found that designated roles and having a team in place, promoted more effective planning
and more purposeful drills that helped teachers and students better understand their roles during a
crisis (Eklund et al., 2018).
Protecting students during a crisis involves creating a school environment where teachers,
parents, staff, and students feel safe and prepared to react in the event of a crisis (Borum et al.,
2009; Brown, 2008; Cowan et al., 2013; Jagodzinski, 2019; Wright, 2015). The findings from
this study have uncovered helpful information regarding teacher perceptions of the drills and
procedures in their schools to protect students. Developing drill practices that involve
discussions on a variety of situations when an attack might take place, having an assigned team
with identified roles in the response to an active assailant attack, and adapting drills to fit the
needs of each specific school and each specific teacher are recommendations based on the
literature and the findings from this study.
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Media Liaison and Legal Team
In the immediate aftermath of a crisis, which is part of stage 4 of the crisis model in
figure 2, questions of blame and liability are raised (Shrivastava et al., 2013). As part of the crisis
response team, schools should identify a single person or small group to be the point of contact
for the media (Brock et al., 2001). Bettie, in her interview, explained a training experience
conducted by a school security consultant where the faculty at her school were encouraged to
identify a single person or a small group of people to be the only contact for the media. The
consultant also insisted that everyone on staff be informed of who the media liaisons were so that
all interactions with the media would funnel to the liaisons and no one else would speak to media
or answer any questions. This practice, according to the CRT model, allows the school to control
the message about the attack in a way that calms parents, reduces community fears, and answers
stakeholder questions by providing detailed descriptions of events in a way that reassures the
community (Eklund et al., 2018).

Recover
The final phase of crisis management is recovery (Dumitriu, 2013). This step involves a
return to a homeostatic, normal state after a crisis has occurred (Mitroff, et al., 2004). The
recovery elements in an active shooter attack consist of damage control, mental health
counseling, consistent open communication, and efforts to assist the school community in an
effort to return to a new normal (Boin et al., 2016). Recovery components are necessary
mitigating factors in stage 4 and stage 5 of a crisis. Stage 4 is defined by Shrivastava (2013) as
the stage in which questions of blame and liability are raised, and stage 5 consists of achieving a
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new normal after an attack. Recovery efforts must begin as soon as the attack ends (Beland &
Kim, 2016). None of the participants in this study were involved in the aftermath and recovery
from an active attack so, the findings from this study are limited in their application to the
recovery component of active shooter attacks. The limited findings from this study and
information from the literature on this topic were used to compile the following components to
help schools and their communities recover from a deadly school attack:
•

review and update crisis management plans

•

mental health care

•

consistent open communication

•

establish new routines and supplement with familiar routines (Brown, 2008; Cowan &
Rossen. 2013; DeVos et al., 2018; Graveline, 2003; Eklund, Meyer, Way, & Mclean,
2017; Newman et al., 2004; Rasberry et al., 2020; Schonfeld & Demaria, 2020;
Siemaszko, 2019).
The focus of this study was teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to an active

shooter scenario. The recovery component was not explored in great depth but would be a
valuable exploration for future research. The goal is to prevent and limit the damage from active
shooter attacks in the hopes that this final stage in the process becomes unnecessary. However,
having a plan in place for recovery may help teachers feel more confident in their ability to
respond in accordance with the premises of self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 1993). Recovery from
any devastating crisis is difficult. In the aftermath of an active shooter crisis, students may
experience Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), fear, severe depression, and other
psychological reactions that lead to absenteeism, poor performance in school, suicidal thoughts,
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and feelings of hopelessness (Rasberry, Sheremenko, Lesesne, Rose, Adkins, Barrios, Holland,
Sims, O’Connor, Grasso, James, & Simon, 2020; Schonfeld, & Demaria, 2020).

Review and Update Crisis Plans
The aftermath of a crisis is a difficult and challenging time for the entire school
community (Cowan & Rossen, 2013). An integral part of the healing should include the
evaluation of the crisis management plan (Cowan et al., 2013; Department of Education, 2004).
When asked if crisis management plans for active shooter incidents should be routinely
evaluated and updated, participants agreed overwhelmingly (M = 3.67). This was the highest
mean score for any question in the entire survey. After a crisis, it is important to evaluate the
protocols and plan in order to make needed adjustments for future crisis events (Irvine, 1997).
When asked what he would recommend in terms of training and planning process to improve his
and his school’s ability to respond to an active shooter, Mark, a high school teacher and Army
veteran, recommended “ongoing, open dialogue of revising and updating the lockdown
procedures.” Notable result from the AAPRS were found in response to questions regarding the
effectiveness of plans, training, and drills. Q1-5 asked participants if the planning and procedures
at their school were effective. Sixteen percent disagreed, and 15.5% saith they did not know. Q24 asked if the instruction for students was effective; 31% disagreed and 21% said they did not
know. Q2-7 asked if the drills were effective and 20% reported that they did not know, while
20% disagreed. The aftermath of an active shooter crisis would offer the optimal gauge of
effectiveness for these elements of the crisis management plan. After the attack ends, a full-scale
evaluation of the crisis response is needed (Mitroff et al., 2004).
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Mental Health Care
In the aftermath of an active shooter attack school attendance declines, test scores in math
and reading decrease, feelings of depression increase, and incidents of severe stress such as Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) can plague students and staff (Beland & Kin, 2016; Rasberry
et al., 2020). Cowan and Rossen (2013) stated, “Indeed, the mental health implications of crisis
exposure have emerged as a critical and challenging facet of school safety and crisis response,
expanding our focus to encompass both psychological and physical safety, as well as prevention
and recovery” (p. 9). On Valentine’s Day in 2018, 17 people were killed at Marjory Stoneman
Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida and within a year of the attack, two students who
survived the shooting committed suicide (Keller, 2019). Similar circumstances of suicide and
depression were document in news reports following the 1999 attack at Columbine High School
and the 2012 attack at Sandy Hook Elementary School (Kellar, 2019). Kai Koerber, a survivor of
the Parkland shooting was so impacted by the event at his school, that he partnered with
dignitaries, authors, and graduates from Berkeley University to create Global Dignity, a
curriculum platform with lessons that teach mental health practices to students (Brice, 2019).
Mental health care cannot be relegated only to crisis management preventative measures for
active shooter attacks, it must also be a major component of strategic plans for recovery.

Consistent Open Communication
Communication to families, faculty, and the community are vital in a crisis (Dumitriu,
2013; MacNeil & Topping, 2007). Ensuring that the right message is being portrayed can be
difficult in crisis situations without a strategic plan in place prior to a crisis that identifies a
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media liaison for the school and directs all media conversations to that individual or group
(Brock et al., 2001; Pearson & Claire, 1998). Schools must have strategic plans regarding
communication to parents and stakeholders as a necessary function of operation (Lightfoot,
2004). This connection builds trust and is essential in times of crisis (Hoover-Dempsey &
Walker, 2002). Victims of crisis attacks respond in a multitude of ways, and schools that work
with the victims and families through constant, consistent, and open communication can help
ease fears and mitigate elements of blame and liability (Newgass & Schonfeld, 2000). The
current study did not involve communication methods with families, but future studies that focus
on the recovery component of active shooter attacks would benefit from an evaluation of
communication methods that might best fit the needs of families and schools during and after a
crisis.

Establish a New Normal
Recognition, acceptance, and steps to move forward are complex in the aftermath of a
crisis (Keller, 2019). The sentiments of empathy and authentic caring cannot be methodically
placed into crisis management plans. It is these skills, however that are needed in the aftermath
of a tragic crisis such as an active shooter attack (Beland & Kim, 2016). Schonfeld and Demaria
(2020) contend that children at different age levels need different types of care in the aftermath
of traumatic situations. They also discuss differences between active and passive coping
strategies that must be applied on an individual level in response to the reactions of students and
staff (Schonfeld & Demaria, 2020). It is recommended that schools rely on the help of experts
such as pediatricians and mental health specialists when constructing plans for memorials and
200

commemorative ceremonies of the traumatic attack (Haravuori, Suomalainen, & Marttunen,
2016). The goal is to help students cope, avoid more trauma as a result of crisis related
depression, and help the school community develop a strategic plan for returning to a sense of
homeostasis and normalcy in the aftermath of an active shooter attack (Dumitriu, 2013;
Schonfeld & Demaria, 2020). Although these types of attacks are rare, developing crisis
management plans that contain strategic components focused on long-term recovery can help
school leaders, teachers, and students be better prepared for a crisis.

Recommendations for Future Research
Since the target population and sample size were small, it is recommended to repeat this
mixed methods study with a larger sample of teachers from multiple states. School safety
protocol is both a function of state funding and planning, as well as a function of district
interpretation of laws (Jagodzinski, 2019). Expanding the study to multiple states would provide
greater generalizability of the findings. Utilizing the mixed methods, though it was time
consuming, helped to clarify some of the more ambiguous data from the survey. Clarification
through the interviews helped provide specific descriptions of factors that made teachers feel
more prepared or less prepared. Including more interviews with other school staff besides
teachers would help illuminate more detail regarding the planning phases of school crisis
management protocol. A more detailed look at the relationship between school climate and
safety in a research study that involves students, teachers, and administrators is also
recommended. A study of this nature could help identify climate characteristics that help the
entire school community identify and better understand their role in school safety. As in many
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research studies, this study raised several questions that intrigued the researcher but were beyond
the scope of time and resources allotted for this project. The following topics represent important
items that would be useful and informative for future studies.
1. An in-depth analysis of teachers who survived an active shooter crisis scenario to analyze
how their perceptions prior to the event relate to their experiences and reactions during
the attack.
2. Expanding the sample of the current study to include multiple states and a larger sample
size.
3. An analysis of various factors intended to prevent mass shooting attacks such as school
climate, mental health care, and methods of identification for warning signals that an
attack may take place.
4. A meta-analysis of school and district crisis management plans across several states to
identify a more unified theory regarding what constitutes effective planning and protocol
for crisis prevention and response.
5. An analysis of the recovery component from schools that have experienced attacks in an
effort to identify best practices for implementing proactive strategies for recovery in the
aftermath of a crisis.
6. A study comparing perceptions among administrators, teachers, and staff regarding the
drills and practice protocols of schools that utilize multi-response options vs the
traditional lockdown approach to an active shooter crisis.
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Conclusions
This mixed methods, explanatory study was developed with the hope that the findings
might lead to policy that can help parents, teachers, and students feel safer in schools. Children
cannot learn as well in an environment plagued by fear, teachers cannot teach as well in an
environment plagued by fear, and parents cannot feel safe if the teachers do not feel that they are
adequately prepared to protect students in the event of an active shooter crisis attack (Blanchfield
& Ladd, 2013). A balance between physical security systems, security personnel, and the
concept of schools as facilities for student learning is needed considering the rarity of active
assailant attacks, but safety is a true concern that impacts a school’s ability to educate students
(Harding et al., 2002). This concept applies to budgeting allocations as well as community
perceptions of schools. Should a school look and operate like a warm and comfortable place for
student learning and growth, or should it look like a heavily secured military bunker prepared for
an attack that is statistically unlikely to happen? There must be a functional balance that provides
the safety and security needed as well as the educational environment most conducive to student
learning. Preparation is needed even if there are questions regarding the reality of whether the
fears are accurate, or if they are enhanced in the aftermath of school attacks due to the media’s
interpretation and portrayal (Madfis, 2016).
This study found that the main factors that cannot fully be controlled or altered such as
gender, years of teaching experience, school type, and school grade configuration, have little
influence over a teacher’s perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter. The factors
that do show a correlational relationship to feelings of preparedness are planning and procedures,
drills, training, and practice for faculty, staff, and students. These are elements that can be
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controlled and continually improved to promote safety in schools. A complete and purposeful
crisis management plan should work to prevent an attack, protect students from an attack,
describe the protocols for how best to respond to an attack, and contain the necessary strategic
interventions for helping students, staff, and communities recover from a devastating active
assailant attack.

204

APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL LETTER

205

206

APPENDIX B: SURVEY INSTRUMENT (AAPRS)
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o Yes, I agree to participate (1)
o No, I decline to participate (2)
Q15 I have never taught before?

o True (1)
o False (2)

Q1 Indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the statements below about active
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shooter planning protocol at your school.
Strongly
Disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Agree (3)

Strongly
Agree (4)

Don't
know (0)

1. My school has a crisis plan
addressing procedures for
handling active shooter
incidents. (1)

o

o

o

o

o

2. My school works
cooperatively with local
emergency personnel in
developing a crisis plan for
active shooter incidents. (2)

o

o

o

o

o

3. My school has a crisis team
in place. (3)

o

o

o

o

o

4. I have a copy of my
school’s active shooter
response procedures. (4)

o

o

o

o

o

5. My school’s planning
procedures for active shooter
incidents are effective. (5)

o

o

o

o

o

6. I know where to access
information about my
school’s official procedures in
case of an active shooter
incident (6)

o

o

o

o

o

7. I believe it is important to
routinely update active
shooter incident procedures.
(7)

o

o

o

o

o

Q2 Indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement below regarding
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practice/drills for active shooter incidents at your school.
Strongly
Disagree
Agree
Agree (3)
(2)
(1)

Strongly
Agree (4)

Don't
Know (5)

8. The possibility of a school
shooting incident is taken
seriously at my school. (1)

o

o

o

o

o

9. My school provides
instruction sessions about
live active shooter incident
preparedness to staff. (2)

o

o

o

o

o

10. My school provides
classroom instruction about
live active shooter incident
preparedness to students. (3)

o

o

o

o

o

11. The classroom instruction
portion of our active shooter
incident preparedness is
effective. (4)

o

o

o

o

o

12. My school provides drills
for staff in order to practice
active shooter incident
preparedness. (5)

o

o

o

o

o

13. My school provides drills
for students in order to
practice active shooter
incident preparedness. (6)

o

o

o

o

o

14. My school’s active
shooter incident drills are
effective. (7)

o

o

o

o

o

Q3 Indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement below regarding your
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preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident at your school.
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Agree (3)
(2)
(1)

Strongly
Agree (4)

Don't
Know (0)

15. I am confident in my
ability to respond
appropriately in the event
of an active shooter
incident in my school. (1)

o

o

o

o

o

16. I have received
adequate training and have
the professional
knowledge to respond
effectively in the event of
an active shooter incident
in my school (2)

o

o

o

o

o

17. I am confident that I
can control my classroom
in the event of an active
shooter incident. (4)

o

o

o

o

o

18. I am confident that I
can protect my students in
the event of an active
shooter incident. (5)

o

o

o

o

o

Q8 How many times do you practice active shooter incident drills in your school in a school
year?

o 0 (1)
o 1 - 2 (2)
o 3 or more (3)

Q9 Do you have a school resource officer/security guard on campus during the school day?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)
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Q4 How long have you been teaching?

o 1 - 3 years (1)
o 4 - 6 (2)
o 7 - 9 (3)
o 10+ (4)

Q5 Which type of school do you teach in?

o Public School (1)
o Private School (2)
o Charter School (3)

Q6 Which of the following best describes your school?

o Elementary School (1)
o Middle School (2)
o High School (3)
o Kindergarten - Eighth Grade (K-8) (4)
o Other (5)

Q7 If you selected other above, please describe.
________________________________________________________________

Q10 Which best describes your gender

o Male (1)
o Female (2)
o Decline to answer (3)
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Q12 Are you willing to participate in a short interview/focus group?

o Yes (1)
o No (2)

Q13 Thank you for agreeing to participate in a interview/focus group. Please provide your name
and email address below.

o Name (1) ________________________________________________
o Email Address (2) ________________________________________________
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Hello Educator,
My name is John Courson. I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Central Florida
in the Educational Leadership program. At the recommendation of committee member Dr. Gina
Gresham, I am contacting professors of master’s and doctoral level education courses to assist in
the recruitment of teachers for participation in a study to analyze teacher perceptions of their
ability to respond effectively to an active shooter.
The study is an explanatory mixed-methods model involving a survey which includes a
request for voluntary participation in a follow-up interview. The survey will take about 10minutes to complete and the interview will last approximately 15 to 20-minutes.
I am requesting permission to use approximately 10-minutes during one class session in
the fall semester of 2019, or the spring semester of 2020, to recruit participants. Teachers seeking
graduate-level degrees can provide valuable insights into the many factors that might help
schools and teachers be better prepared if forced to respond to an active shooter.
This study will provide the following benefits to the field of education and school safety:
1. A better understanding of protocol in Central Florida schools regarding active shooter
prevention and preparedness.
2. A better understanding of teacher perceptions regarding their ability to respond
effectively to an active shooter incident.
3. A deeper understanding of factors that may impact the perceived self-efficacy of
teachers to respond to an active shooter incident.
4. A valuable addition to a very limited amount of literature regarding teacher
perceptions of self-efficacy regarding school safety issues.
A reply to this email confirming your agreement to help recruit participants through your
current classes will be greatly appreciated. If you agree to assist, I will contact you to discuss
how best to proceed. Below is an electronic link to the Qualtrics survey instrument, The Active
Assailant Prevention and Response Survey (AAPRS), for distribution to your students either
through the webcourse system or through your class email lists. Thank you for your time and
consideration regarding this important matter of school safety.

Active Assailant Prevention and Response Survey

John Courson M.Ed.
Director of Student Life
Park Maitland School
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Summary Recruitment Letter distributed by the graduate affairs program coordinator of a
large university in the southeastern United States:
Hello Educators and Students,
My name is John Courson and I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Central
Florida in the Educational Leadership program. The focus of my dissertation involves the
important issue of school safety, particularly in reference to school shootings. I am seeking
teachers as participants to complete the anonymous survey below. This study will provide
valuable information about issues that impact teacher perceptions of their ability to respond to an
active shooter incident. There is a request in the survey for a voluntary minute follow-up
interview. The 12 questions in the interview provide a deeper understanding of teacher
perceptions to supplement the data provided in the survey. Thank you for participating in this
valuable study, not only to help increase school safety, but also to help a fellow student complete
the difficult task of writing a dissertation.

Active Assailant Prevention and Response Survey
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Active Assailant Prevention and Response Interview Questions/guide
1. How many years teaching experience do you have? What grade and subject do you
teach? What is your gender?
2. What is the grade-configuration of your school? How many students attend your school?
Does your school have security personnel on campus during the school day? Is (are) the
security personnel armed?
3. Describe how your school developed its planned response for active shooter scenarios?
Were teachers involved in developing the crisis management plan? What are/were their
roles?
4. What types of training have you received from your school or district to help you learn
how to respond during an active shooter incident? Have there been changes in these plans
since you have worked at your current school? How are students trained in the protocol?
5. Describe the protocol for your school’s response to an active shooter incident. (Who
activates the plan? What are your individual roles? How do you know an incident is
over?)
6. Are lockdown drills conducted at your school? If so, how often? Describe the drills and
how they are conducted?
7. What other measures are in place at your school to prevent or limit the damage that may
be caused by an active shooter?
8. What are your thoughts and feelings regarding your school’s current level of
preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident?
9. How prepared do you feel personally to respond to an active shooter incident in your
school?
10. Are there areas of additional training that you feel would be beneficial in helping you feel
safer and better prepared?
11. What about your school makes you feel safe? What about your school makes you feel
unsafe?
12. What would help you feel more confident in your ability to prevent and respond more
effectively to an active shooter?
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Correspondence with Carole Frances Rider for Survey Instrument usage:
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APPENDIX F: INFORMED CONSENT LETTER
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EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH
Title of Project: Active Assailant Prevention and Response: An Analysis of Teacher Perceptions
Principal Investigator: John Courson II
Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Thomas Vitale
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Whether you take part is up to you.
Introduction
You are invited to participate in a study concerning teacher perceptions regarding planning and
preparedness for active shooter scenarios in schools.
Participation
Participation in the study is voluntary and requires the completion of a survey instrument that will
take approximately 10-minutes to complete. The survey is followed by a request for a voluntary, face-toface interview. The interview contains 12 questions and will take 15/20 minutes to complete. These
interviews will be set up according to your schedule and take place in a conference room at the University
of Central Florida’s education building. In order to participate, you must currently be employed as a
teacher in a school that serves students ranging from pre-K through 12th grade.
Risks
The risks are minimal and may consist of some anxiety or fear in discussing active shooter
scenarios in a school setting. Participants may also not feel comfortable expressing their personal
perceptions regarding the planning and protocol at their school, or their confidence in their personal ability
to respond in an active shooter scenario. You have the right to discontinue participation at any time. Your
identity will be kept confidential and protected. Filling out the survey is anonymous, and the names of
those who wish to participate in the interview will be protected and will not be used in the report.
Benefits
There are no immediate benefits provided to you as a participant, but the findings from the study
seek to improve the safety of schools and may lead to improvements in planning and protocol for active
shooter incidents.
Confidentiality
Filling out the survey is anonymous. For those who wish to take part in the interview, your identity
and email address will be needed to set up the interview. This information will be removed from the
survey results, used to contact you for the interview, and then deleted. The interview will be audio
recorded using a digital recording device and then transcribed. If you do not wish to be recorded, then
you will not be able to participate in the interview portion of the study, but you can still complete the
survey. Once transcribed and checked for accuracy, the recording will be deleted and names in the
transcript will be coded using a number system. Once each interviewee is matched with a number
identification code, participant names will be deleted from the records. All transcripts, report components,
and survey responses will be secured on the researcher’s personal computer in an encrypted file, and
password protected. All of the survey response data and interview transcript information will be kept for 5
years after the study and then deleted.
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Voluntary Participation
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You are free to withdraw your consent and
discontinue participation in this study at any time without prejudice or penalty. Your decision to participate
or not participate in this study will in no way affect your relationship with UCF, including continued
enrollment, grades, employment or your relationship with the individuals who may have an interest in this
study.
You must be 18 years of age or older to take part in this research study.
Study contact for questions about the study or to report a problem: If you have questions about the
study, contact me at jcourson36@knights.ucf.edu. Dr. Thomas Vitale is the representative chair for this
study through the University of Central. He can be contacted at Thomas.Vitale@ucf.edu.
IRB contact about your rights in this study or to report a complaint: If you have questions about your
rights as a research participant, or have concerns about the conduct of this study, please contact Institutional
Review Board (IRB), University of Central Florida, Office of Research, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501,
Orlando, FL 32826-3246 or by telephone at (407) 823-2901, or email irb@ucf.edu.

Participant Signature
_____________________
Researcher Signature
_____________________

Printed Name
_____________________
Printed Name
_____________________
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Date
____________
Date
_________

APPENDIX G: CODING SCHEME
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Category 1: Crisis Planning (Prevention/ Protection) – Origins of the crisis plan, how the plan
can be modified, and teacher involvement in planning.
a. Plan development and teacher involvement
b. Security Personnel
c. Other safety features
Category 2: Drills and Procedures (Protection/Response) – Descriptions of drills and explanation
of procedures for an active shooter incident.
a. Description of drills and protocol
b. Training for faculty
c. Training for students
d. Training recommendations
Category 3: Perceptions of Preparedness (Prevention, Protection, Response) – Explanations of
teacher perceptions and what might impact those perceptions.
a. Perceptions of ability to respond
Category 4: Perceptions of Safety (Prevention, Protection, Response) – Explanations of factors
that influence perceptions of safety.
a. Factors that improve safety perceptions
b. Factors that diminish safety perceptions
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Researcher AAPRS Results With Mean Scores.
Researcher
Answer
Q1-1
Agree
My school has a crisis plan addressing procedures for handling active
shooter incidents.
Q1-2 Disagree My school works cooperatively with local emergency personnel in
developing a crisis plan for active shooter incidents.
Q1-3 Strongly My school has a crisis team in place.
Disagree
Q1-4
Agree
I have a copy of my school’s active shooter response procedures.
Q1-5
Agree
My school’s planning procedures for active shooter incidents are
effective.
Q1-6
Agree
I know where to access information about my school’s official procedures
in case of an active shooter incident.
Q1-7 Strongly I believe it is important to routinely update active shooter incident
Agree
procedures.
Researcher Plan Mean = 2.71

Researcher
Answer
Q2-1
Agree
The possibility of a school shooting incident is taken seriously at my
school.
Q2-2
Agree
My school provides instruction sessions about live active shooter incident
preparedness to staff.
Q2-3 Disagree My school provides classroom instruction about live active shooter
incident preparedness to students.
Q2-4 Disagree The classroom instruction portion of our active shooter incident
preparedness is effective.
Q2-5 Strongly My school provides drills for staff in order to practice active shooter
Agree
incident preparedness.
Q2-6 Strongly My school provides drills for students in order to practice active shooter
Agree
incident preparedness.
Q2-7
Agree
My school’s active shooter incident drills are effective.
Researcher Drill/Proc Mean = 3.14
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Q3-1

Researcher
Answer
Agree

I am confident in my ability to respond appropriately in the event of an
active shooter incident in my school.
Q3-2
Strongly
I have received adequate training and have the professional knowledge
Agree
to respond effectively in the event of an active shooter incident in my
school.
Q3-3
Agree
I am confident that I can control my classroom in the event of an active
shooter incident.
Q3-4
Disagree
I am confident that I can protect my students in the event of an active
shooter incident.
Researcher Response Mean = 3.00
Researcher Answers to Interview Questions
1. How many years teaching experience do you have? What grade and subject do you
teach? What is your gender?
a. 15 years total teaching experience, 12 years at my current school. I teach US
History to 5th graders in a departmentalized Private school. I am a male.
2. What is the grade-configuration of your school? How many students attend your school?
Does your school have security personnel on campus during the school day? Is (are) the
security personnel armed?
a. Pk-6th grade with 575 students, 2 security personnel on campus. Neither are
allowed to be armed as of this year, but I think they might be armed in some
fashion in a discreet way. One is a retired corrections officer from a prison, the
other is a retired police officer from Winter Park PD.
3. Describe how your school developed its planned response for active shooter scenarios?
Were teachers involved in developing the crisis management plan? What are/were their
roles?
a. The plan was devised by combined efforts and planning discussions from security
personnel, the head of school, the previous owners of the school, and new
protocol from our parent company, Spring Education Group. There is occasional
input from teachers especially during years where the school is under Florida
Council of Independent Schools review for accreditation. Usually teachers are
able to provide some input on the plan as it pertains to their own classroom or
situation if they feel the need. Leadership is responsive to teacher input.
4. What types of training have you received from your school or district to help you learn
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how to respond during an active shooter incident? Have there been changes in these plans
since you have worked at your current school? How are students trained in the protocol?
a. Each year we have our beginning of the year faculty meeting. During this meeting
there is a safety video shown that outlines the procedures for our lockdown drills.
In the past we have also had a security consultant come to our meeting and
conduct the training. Two years ago he had us role play scenarios where a
gunman was trying to enter the room and we as teachers were attempting to
disarm the assailant. I was chosen to be the assailant and nearly every other staff
member was able to practice throwing me to the ground and taking my weapon.
The trainer instructed us in the Run, Hide, Fight method of protection. The video
briefly covered some characteristics of previous school shooters. We also, were
all instructed that WE were an important part of the safety team at our school. We
were told to question anyone on campus that we did not recognize or that did not
have a badge/identification. Our school has gone through three different badge
systems in my tenure. Initially it was just a sticker with a name written on it.
Then, it was a printed-out photo ID from the front office. Last year, each parent
was supplied a lanyard badge that could be used to enter the new gate that was
installed in the visitor parking area and on the exterior road entrance on the
opposite side of campus from the office. The teachers train the students in class
usually at the beginning of the year or just prior to a drill that is announced. We
tell the steps in the drill and talk about how and why taking it seriously is
important.
5. Describe the protocol for your school’s response to an active shooter incident. (Who
activates the plan? What are your individual roles? How do you know an incident is
over?)
a. If an actual shooter were on campus, the first person to see the attacker would call
the front office, head of school, or security personnel to alert everyone that an
attack was taking place. The security team or the head of school would then
announce a lockdown over the intercom. Teachers would instruct students to get
away from windows and hide under desks in as quiet a manner as possible. The
teacher would then lock the doors, cover windows, and turn off the lights. The
security teach would work to contact the local police and monitor security
cameras to locate the attacker. Once the incident was over, either the security
manager or the head of school would announce over the intercom that the attack
had ended. My role is to protect my students and any students who might be in the
hallways near my room when the announcement is made about the attack.
6. Are lockdown drills conducted at your school? If so, how often? Describe the drills and
how they are conducted?
a. We conduct lockdown drills twice a year. They follow the same protocol as I
explained before. The difference is that during a drill, the security manager walks
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around making sure doors are locked and that students are hidden. He then talks
to any teachers who might have questions or need help figuring out what to do
during a lockdown. The security manager then announces over the intercom that
the drill is over. When he makes the announcement to start the drill, he states that
it is a drill so the kids and teachers do not panic.
7. What other measures are in place at your school to prevent or limit the damage that may
be caused by an active shooter?
a. We have a newly installed security gate that requires a code for entry. We also
have a badge system for parents and guests. There are a few cameras on campus,
but they are not monitored regularly and there aren’t very many of them.
Everyone on campus is good about asking people who are walking around
campus to check in at the office if they do not have the proper badge or sticker.
The school is a close-knit school where the faculty knows many of the parents.
There are often parents on campus to help with events and the school has a very
family type of atmosphere.
8. What are your thoughts and feelings regarding your school’s current level of
preparedness to respond to an active shooter incident?
a. My school gets part of it right and parts of it wrong. The drills are mostly about
hiding kids and locking doors in the hopes that the attacker doesn’t enter your
classroom. Some classrooms are more easily accessed than others and some
rooms are set up in a way that is more protective in terms of just hiding and
waiting. Other rooms have several entry points that are not very well built and are
not easily concealed. The faculty and training provided is pretty good. We have
an expert come from another school and we are trained in ways that I think are
better than what I hear about from most other schools. There is the missing
component of personalized practice and training that specifies what to do in
different scenarios and in different areas of the school. For the most part, because
we are an elementary (k4-6th grade) our likely attack would come from an angry
parent, someone in the neighborhood who committed a crime, or maybe a
disgruntled employee. Rarely have any of the school attacks been carried out by a
student younger than 12 or 13. We have newly installed gates, badge systems, and
capable security guards with connections to our local police
9. How prepared do you feel personally to respond to an active shooter incident in your
school?
a. I feel prepared. I have thought through scenarios, found a safe spot in my room
and planned for/ trained to try to disarm an assailant trying to enter my classroom.
I do wish that more training was provided, and more work was put into the
prevention components like looking for signs of a possible threat, and developing
mitigation teams if threats are detected. I also have read about “table exercises”
where administrators and teachers spend some time talking through different
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scenarios and coming up with ideas to limit damage in more specified situations
other than having an unspecified drill where someone comes on the loudspeaker
and says we are in lockdown.
10. Are there areas of additional training that you feel would be beneficial in helping you feel
safer and better prepared?
a. More specific training and walk through exercises with security personnel would
be helpful. Possibly having a safety team with specific roles that everyone on
campus knows all the roles of the individuals on the team. Better training for
students, maybe a video of some type or a discussion that would help them to be
prepared in a way that wouldn’t necessarily frighten them.
11. What about your school makes you feel safe? What about your school makes you feel
unsafe?
a. My school is very family oriented and everyone knows everyone pretty well.
Students, faculty, and parents I feel have someone to turn to if there is an issue
and the school works well with parents to find solutions to problems. The school
leadership has put in place new security features such as a big gate and a new
parent badge system. We also have very qualified security personnel who are
visible throughout the day. I don’t feel unsafe at school. Our campus is open and
there are some elements about my specific classroom that worry me, but I try not
to worry about things that (a) I don’t have much control over, like crazy people
going on a rampage and (b) are extremely rare, like school shootings.
12. What would help you feel more confident in your ability to prevent and respond more
effectively to an active shooter?
a. More specified training, stronger doors leading to my classroom that can be
covered, and … that’s about it. The media coverage of these events also seems to
make people, me included, more fearful especially right after an event takes place.

231

REFERENCES
Adame, T. (2015). A school shooting in Goddard, 30 years later. The Wichita Eagle.
http://www.kansas.com/news/local/crime/a rticle8073096.html.
Addington, L. A. (2009). Cops and cameras: Public school security as a policy response to
Columbine. American Behavioral Scientist, 52, 1426-1446.
doi:10.1177/0002764209332556
American Institute of Research, (2019). National Center on Safe Supportive Learning
Environments. Tools and resources, climate survey. Retrieved from:
https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/sites/default/files/EDSCLS_Questionnaires_112017
.pdf
Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychological
review, 84(2), 191.
Bandura, A. (1993). Perceived self-efficacy in cognitive development and functioning.
Educational Psychologist, 28(2), 117-148. doi:10.1207/s15326985ep2802_3
Bandura, A. (2006). Guide for constructing self-efficacy scales. Self-efficacy beliefs of
adolescents, 5(1), 307-337.
Benbenishty, R., Astor, R., & Estrada, J. (2008). School violence assessment: A conceptual
framework, instruments, and methods. Children & Schools, 30(2), 7181.
Blanchfield, K. E., & Ladd, P. (2013). Leadership, violence, and school climate: Case studies in
creating non-violent schools. R&L Education.
Bloomberg, L. D., & Volpe, M., (2012). Completing your qualitative dissertation: a road map
from beginning to end. Second Edition. Sage Publications.
232

Blum, R.W. (2005, April). A case for school connectedness. Educational Leadership, 62(7). 1620.
Blum, R.W. & Libbey, H.P. (2004) School connectedness: Strengthening health and education
outcomes for teenagers. Journal of School Health, 74(7). 229-299.
Böckler, N., Seeger, T., Sitzer, P., & Heitmeyer, W. (2013). School shootings: International
research, case studies, and concepts for prevention. New York, NY: Springer. Retrieved
from: https://link-springer-com.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-1-46145526-4.pdf
Bogdan, R., & Biklen, S. K. (2007). Qualitative research for education: an introduction to
theories and methods. Pearson A & B. Retrieved from:
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=cat00846a&AN=ucfl.02037317
2&site=eds-live&scope=site
Boin, A., Stern, E., & Sundelius, B. (2016). The politics of crisis management: Public leadership
under pressure. Cambridge University Press.
Borum, R., Cornell, D. G., Modzeleski, W., & Jimerson, S. R. (2009). What can be done about
school shootings? A review of the evidence. Educational Researcher, 39(1), 27-37.
Brice, A., (2019). After Parkland shooting, student fights for mental health resources in schools.
Berkeley News. University of California Berkeley. Retrieved from:
https://news.berkeley.edu/2019/12/17/podcast-student-kai-koerber-on-gun-violence-andmental-health/
Brock, S. E., Sandoval, J., & Lewis, S. (2001). Preparing for crises in the schools: A manual for
building school crisis response teams. John Wiley & Sons Inc.
233

Brock, S. E., Lazarus Jr, P. J., & Jimerson, S. R. (2002). Best Practices in School Crisis
Prevention and Intervention. National Association of School Psychologists, 4340 East
West Highway, Suite 402, Bethesda, MD 20814.
Brown, L. L. (2008). The role of teachers in school safety (Order No. 3329730). Available from
ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. (304465841). Retrieved from
https://login.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/docview/304465841?accountid=10003
Bushman, B. J., Newman, K., Calvert, S., Downey, G., Dredze, M., Gottfredson, M., Webster,
D. (2013, 1–2 February). Youth violence: What we need to know. Report of the
Subcommittee on Youth Violence of the Advisory Committee to the Social, Behavioral
and Economics Sciences directorate. Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation
Bushman, B. b., Calvert, S. L., Dredze, M., Jablonski, N. G., Morrill, C., Romer, D., & ...
Webster, D. W. (2016). Youth Violence: What We Know and What We Need to
Know. American Psychologist, 71(1), 17-39. doi:10.1037/a0039687
Caplan G (1964) Principles of preventive psychiatry. New York: Basic Books.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). (2014). School associated violent death
study. Retrieved from
http://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/youthviolence/schoolviolence/SAVD.html
Chapman, S. H. (2018). A retrospective study on rampage school shootings: Considerations for
school-based threat assessment teams. (2017-36662-217). Retrieved
from https://login.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login?auth=shibb&url=https://search.ebscohost.co
m/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2017-36662234

217&cpidlogin.asp?custid=current&site=ehost-live&scope=site
CNN-Library. (May 23, 2018). Deadliest mass shootings in modern day history. Retrieved from
https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/us/20-deadliest-mass-shootings-in-u-s-history-fastfacts/index.html
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum.
Comfort, L. K. (1988). Managing disaster: Strategies and policy perspectives. Durham: Duke
University Press.
Cornell, D. G., & Sheras, P. L. (2006). Guidelines for responding to student threats of violence.
Boston, MA: Sopris West Educational Services.
Cowan, K. C., Vaillancourt, K., Rossen, E., & Pollitt, K. (2013). A framework for safe and
successful schools [Brief]. Bethesda, MD: National Association of School Psychologists.
Cowell, J. M., & McDonald, C. C. (2018). School safety. The Journal of School Nursing, 34(4),
254. https://doi-org.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/10.1177/1059840518782215
Crabtree, B. F., & Miller, W. L. (1992). Doing qualitative research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Creswell, J. W. (2007). Five qualitative approaches to inquiry. Qualitative inquiry and research
design: Choosing among five approaches, 2, 53-80.
Creswell, J. W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods
approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA. Sage.
Creswell, J. W. (2013). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five
approaches. Third Edition. Sage publications.
Daly, M. (2014). The ﬁrst modern school shooter feels responsible for the rest. The Daily Beast.
235

https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-first-modern-school-shooter-feels-responsible-for-therest.
Daniels, J. A., & Bradley, M. C. (2011). Preventing lethal school violence. Springer Science +
Business Media. https://doi-org.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/10.1007/978-1-4419-8107-3
David-Ferdon, C., & Simon, T. R. (2014). Preventing youth violence: Opportunities for action.
Atlanta, GA: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention.
Department of Education, Washington, DC. (2004). Practical information on crisis planning: A
guide for schools and communities. ERIC Clearinghouse.
DeVos, B., Azar, A.M., Nielsen, K.M., & Whitaker, M.; (December 18, 2018). Final report of
the Federal Commission on School Safety. Retrieved from
https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/school-safety-report.pdf
Dumitriu, C. (2013). Crisis management in school shooting situations: The school—A forgotten
factor in the equation. In School Shootings (pp. 441-476). Springer, New York, NY.
Duplechain, R., & Morris, R. (2014). School violence: Reported school shootings and making
schools safer. Education, 135(2).
Dwyer, K. and Jimerson, S. (2002). Enabling prevention through planning. In S.E. Brock,
P.J.Lazarus, and S.R. Jimerson (Eds.)., Best Practices in School Crisis Prevention and
Intervention (//. 23-46). Bethesda, MD: National Association of School Psychologists.
Embry-Martin, T. D. (2017). Perceptions in preparing for and responding to an active shooter
incident: A qualitative study of K-12 teachers' self-efficacy (D.B.A.). Available from
ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. (1971899174). Retrieved
236

from https://login.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login?url=https://search-proquestcom.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/docview/1971899174?accountid=10003
Erlandson, D. A., Harris, E. L., Skipper, B. L., & Allen, S. D. (1993). Doing naturalistic inquiry:
A guide to methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Eklund, K., Meyer, L., Way, S., & Mclean, D. (2017). School psychologists as mental health
providers: The impact of staffing ratios and Medicaid on service provisions. Psychology
in the Schools, 54(3), 279-293.
Eklund, K., Meyer, L., & Bosworth, K. (2018). Examining the Role of School Resource Officers
on School Safety and Crisis Response Teams. Journal of School Violence, 17(2), 139–
151.
Fink, A. (2009). How to conduct surveys (4th Edition), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Fraenkel, J. R., Wallen, N. E., & Hyun, H. H. (2011). How to design and evaluate research in
education. New York: McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages.
Frazzano, T. L., & Snyder, G. M. (2014). Hybrid targeted violence: Challenging conventional"
Active Shooter" response strategies. Homeland Security Affairs, 10.
Geranios, N.K. (2017a). Victim told suspect in Washington school shooting: I knew you would
‘shoot up the school.’ Chicago Tribune. Retrieved from:
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-wa shington-school-shooting20170914-story.html.
Geranios, N.K. (2017b). Barry Loukaitis. Moses Lake school shooter, breaks silence with
apology. The Seattle Times. https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/barry-loukaitismoses-lake-school-shooter-apologizes-in-1st-remarks/.
237

Glaser, B. G., & Strauss. AL (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative
research.
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (2017). Discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative
research. Routledge.
Graveline, M. M. (2003). Teacher self-efficacy at managing a school crisis (Doctoral
dissertation, University of Hartford).
Gregory, A., & Cornell, D. (2009). “Tolerating” adolescent needs: Moving beyond zero
tolerance policies in high school. Theory into Practice, 48, 106–113.
doi:10.1080/00405840902776327
Gregory, A., Cornell, D., & Fan, X. (2012). Teacher safety and authoritative school climate in
high schools. American Journal of Education, 118(4), 401-425. Retrieved
from https://login.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login?auth=shibb&url=https://search.ebscohost.co
m/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eric&AN=EJ986705&site=ehostlive&scope=site; http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/666362
Goddard, R. D., Hoy, W. K., & Hoy, A. W. (2000). Collective teacher efficacy: Its meaning,
measure, and impact on student achievement. American Educational Research
Journal, 37(2), 479–507. https://doi-org.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/10.2307/1163531
Harding, D. J., Fox, C., & Mehta, J. (2002). Studying rare events through qualitative case
studies: Lessons from a study of rampage school shootings. Sociological Methods &
Research, 31 (2), 174–217
Haravuori, H., Suomalainen, L., & Marttunen, M. (2016). Quality of life in adolescents and
young adults after traumatic experience. Psychiatria Fennica.
238

Hirschfield, P. J. (2008). Preparing for prison? The criminalization of school discipline in the
USA. Theoretical Criminology, 12(1), 79–101. doi:10.1177/1362480607085795
Hirschfield, P. J., & Celinska, K. (2011). Beyond Fear: Sociological Perspectives on the
Criminalization of School Discipline. Sociology Compass, 5(1), 1.
Hoover-Dempsey, K. V., & Walker, J. M. (2002). Family-school communication. Elementary
School Journal, 106(2), 105-130.
Irvine, R. B. (1997). What’s a crisis, anyway? Communication World, 14(7), 36. Retrieved from
https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ufh&AN=9707091242&site=ed
s-live&scope=site
Jagodzinski, C. L. (2019). School safety upgrades and perceptions of safety protocols in
prevention of school shootings. In School Violence in International Contexts (pp. 185197). Springer, Cham.
Jennings, W. G., Khey, D. N., Maskaly, J., & Donner, C. M. (2011). Evaluating the relationship
between law enforcement and school security measures and violent crime in schools.
Journal of Police Crisis Negotiations, 11(2), 109–124.
doi:10.1080/15332586.2011.581511
Jones, J. (2015). Principals' perceptions and self-efficacy in relation to school security
University of Central Florida. Retrieved from
http://digitalcollections.net.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/6540
Jonson, C. L. (2017). Preventing school shootings: The effectiveness of safety measures. Victims
& Offenders, 12(6), 956-973. doi:10.1080/15564886.2017.1307293
Jonson, C. L., Moon, M. M., & Hendry, J. A. (2018). One size does not fit all: Traditional
239

lockdown versus multioption responses to school shootings. Journal of School Violence,
1-13.
Joshi, A., Kale, S., Chandel, S., & Pal, D. K. (2015). Likert scale: Explored and explained.
British Journal of Applied Science & Technology, 7(4), 396.
Katsiyannis, A., Whitford, D. K., & Ennis, R. P. (2018). Historical examination of united states
intentional mass school shootings in the 20th and 21st centuries: Implications for
students, schools, and society. Journal of Child and Family Studies, doi:10.1007/s10826018-1096-2
Keller, J., (2019). The psychological aftermath of surviving a school shooting. Pacific Standard.
A Maven Channel. Retrieved from: https://psmag.com/education/the-psychologicalaftermath-of-surviving-school-shootings
Krejcie, R. V., & Morgan, D. W. (1970). Determining sample size for research
activities. Educational and psychological measurement, 30(3), 607-610.
Kubena, J., & Watts, J. H. (2019). The evolution of securing the American K-12 educational
environment with armed police officers. In Police Science: Breakthroughs in Research
and Practice (pp. 493-508). IGI Global.
Langman, P. (2009). Why kids kill: Inside the minds of school shooters. Macmillan.
Langman, P. (2018). Different types of role model influence and fame seeking among mass
killers and copycat offenders. American behavioral scientist, 62(2), 210-228.
Lankford, A. (2016). Public mass shooters and firearms: a cross-national study of 171
countries. Violence and Victims, (2), 187. https://doiorg.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/10.1891/0886-6708.VV-D-15-00093
240

Lankford, A., Adkins, K. G., Madfis, E., Addington, L. A., & Muschert, G. W. (2019). Are the
Deadliest Mass Shootings Preventable? An assessment of leakage, information reported
to law enforcement, and firearms acquisition prior to attacks in the United States. Journal
of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 35(3), 315.
Lawrence, R. (2007). School crime and juvenile justice (2nd ed.). New York: Oxford University
Press.
Layden, D. R. (2010). Campus violence: lessons from the cases. National Social Science Journal
Volume 33# 2, 106.
Levin, J., & Madfis, E. (2009). Mass murder at school and cumulative strain: A sequential
model. American Behavioral Scientist, 52, 1227-1245. Doi: 10.1177/0002764209332543
Lightfoot, S. L. (2004). Building bridges from school to home. Instructor, 114(1), 24-73.
Lincoln, Y.S. and Guba, E.G. 1985. Naturalistic inquiry, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Lott, J. R. (April 25, 2019). Schools that Allow Teachers to Carry Guns are Extremely Safe:
Data on the Rate of Shootings and Accidents in Schools that allow Teachers to Carry
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3377801
Lunenburg, F. C., & Irby, B. J. (2008). Writing a successful thesis or dissertation: Tips and
strategies for students in the social and behavioral sciences. Corwin press
MacNeil, W., & Topping, K. (2007). Crisis management in schools: Evidence based prevention.
Journal of Educational Inquiry, 7(1), 64-94
Madfis, E. (2016). It’s better to overreact: School officials’ fear and perceived risk of rampage
attacks and the criminalization of American public schools. Critical Criminology, 24(1),
39-55. Retrieved from: https://doi-org.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/10.1007/s10612-015-9297-0
241

Mehdinezhad, V., & Mansouri, M. (2016). School principals’ leadership behaviors and its
relation with teachers’ sense of self-efficacy. International Journal of Instruction, (2), 51.
doi:10.12973/iji.2016.924
Merriam, S. B. (1988). Case study research in education: A qualitative approach. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
Merriam, S. B. (1998). Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in Education. Revised
and Expanded from" Case Study Research in Education.” Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Merriam, S. B. & Tisdell, E. J. (2016). Qualitative research: A guide to design and
implementation. Fourth Edition. Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: A sourcebook of new
methods (2nd edition). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Mitchell, R.A. (1996). 10 years later, Cokeville just says: Let us be. Deseret News.
https://www.deseretnews.com/article/489528/10YEARS-LATER-COKEVILLE-JUSTSAYS-LET-US-BE.html.
Mitroff, I. I., Alpaslan, M. C., & Green, S. E. (2004). Crises as Ill-Structured
Messes. International Studies Review, 6(1), 165–182. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15219488.2004.393_3.x
Modzeleski, W., & Randazzo, M. R. (2018). School threat assessment in the USA: Lessons
learned from 15 years of teaching and using the federal model to prevent school
shootings. Contemporary School Psychology, doi:10.1007/s40688-018-0188-8
Mohandie, K. (2014). Threat assessment in schools. International handbook of threat
assessment, 126-147.
242

Morabia, A. (2018). Teachers in arms? A special section of American Journal of Public Health.
Retrieved from: https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304502
Morrison, B. E. (2003). Regulating safe school communities: Being responsive and
restorative. Journal of Educational Administration.
Morton, R. (2013). Returning decision to school discipline decisions: An analysis of recent, antizero tolerance legislation. Wash. UL Rev., 91, 757.
National Center for Education Statistics, NCES, (2017). Back to School: Fast facts for the 2017
school year. Retrieved from: https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372
National Center for Education Statistics, NCES, (2019). Mental health in public schools , by
school ethnic and racial composition. Data Point, US Department of Education.
Retrieved from: https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2019/2019020.pdf
Newgass S & Schonfeld D J (2000) School crisis intervention, crisis prevention, and crisis
response. In A R Roberts (ed) Crisis intervention handbook: assessment, treatment, and
research, 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 209–28.
Newman, K. S., Fox, C., Harding, D. J., Mehta, J., & Roth, W. (2004). Rampage. The social
roots of school shootings. New York: Perseus.
Page, J. (2017). A qualitative investigation of completed and averted school shootings:
Deciphering the characteristics that prevent school shootings. (2017-01060-230).
Retrieved from
https://login.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login?auth=shibb&url=https://search.ebscohost.com/log
in.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2017-01060230&cpidlogin.asp?custid=current&site=ehost-live&scope=site
243

PDK Poll International. (2018). Teaching: Respect but dwindling appeal. The 50th annual PDK
poll of the publics attitudes toward the public schools. ©Copyright 1969 - 2019 PDK Int.
Retrieved from: http://pdkpoll.org/assets/downloads/pdkpoll50_2018.pdf
Pearson, C. M., & Clair, J. A. (1998). Reframing crisis management. Academy of management
review, 23(1), 59-76.
Pearson, C.M. (2002). A blueprint for crisis management. Ivey Business Journal, 66(3), 69-73.
Pearson Education. (2019). Timeline of worldwide school and mass shootings. Retrieved from
https://www.infoplease.com/history/world/timeline-of-worldwide-school-and-massshootings
Perkins, J. C. (2018). Preparing Teachers for School Tragedy: Reading, Writing, and
Lockdown. Journal of Higher Education Theory & Practice, 18(1).
Petrovich, N. (2016). Teacher's perceptions of warning signs to prevent mass school
shootings. (Doctoral dissertation, Adler School of Professional Psychology).
Rajan, S., & Branas, C. C. (2018). Arming schoolteachers: what do we know? Where do we go
from here?. American Journal of Public Health. Retrieved from:
https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/full/10.2105/AJPH.2018.304464
Redlener, E. (2006). How to make school safer. Time. Retrieved from:
https://time.com/time/nation/arti-cle/0,8599,1543803,00.html
Rider, C. F. (2016). Teachers’ perceptions of their ability to respond to an active shooter
incident. Dissertation: Humanities and Social Sciences. ProQuest Information &
Learning. Retrieved from https://search-ebscohostcom.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2016-17334244

234&cpidlogin.asp%3fcustid%3dcurrent&site=ehost-live&scope=site
Riedman, D., & O’Neill, D. (2019). CHDS–K-12 school shooting database. Center for
Homeland Defense and Security, US Naval Postgraduate School, accessed January, 30.
Ruger, T., (March 25, 2019). Congress Set Aside $1 Billion After Parkland, Schools are Starting
to Use it. CQ Roll Call, retrieved from: https://www.rollcall.com/news/congress/schoolsafety-parkland-congress-federal-grants
Saldaña, J. (2013). The coding manual for qualitative researchers (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Sampson, H. (2004). Navigating the waves: The usefulness of a pilot in qualitative research.
Qualitative Inquiry, 9, 643-668
Sandelowski, M. (2011). “Casing” the research case study. Research in Nursing and Health, 24,
153-159.
Schensul, J. J. (2008). Methodology. In Lisa M. Given (Ed.). The SAGE Encyclopedia of
Qualitative Research Methods. (pp. 517-522). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications,
Inc. doi:10.4135/9781412963909.n267
Scherz, J. (2006). The truth about school violence: keeping healthy schools safe. Rowman &
Littlefield Pub Inc.
Schneider, B., Ehrhart, M. G., & Macey, W. H. (2011). Perspectives on organizational climate
and culture. In S. Zedeck (Ed.), APA handbooks in psychology®. APA handbook of
industrial and organizational psychology, Vol. 1. Building and developing the
organization (p. 373–414). American Psychological
Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/12169-012
245

Schram, T. H., (2003). Conceptualizing qualitative inquiry. Columbus, OH: Merrill Prentice
Hall.
Secure Our Schools Act of 2001, 34 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2707 (2011).
Shrivastava, P. (1993). Crisis theory/practice: Towards a sustainable future. Industrial &
Environmental Crisis Quarterly, 7(1), 23-42.
Shrivastava, P., Mitroff, I., & Alpaslan, C. M. (2013). Imagining an Education in Crisis
Management. Journal of Management Education, 37(1), 6–20. https://doiorg.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/10.1177/1052562912455418
Siemaszko, C., (2019). Charging ex security guard at Parkland could backfire. NBCNews.
Retrieved from: https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/charging-ex-parkland-securityofficer-scot-peterson-child-neglect-could-n1014231
Silver, J., Simons, A., & Craun, S. (2018). A study of the pre-attack behaviors of active shooters
in the United States between 2000 and 2013. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Retrieved
from: https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-of-active-shooters-in-us2000-2013.pdf/view
Simon, M. (2011). Assumptions, limitations, and delimitations. Retrieved from.
http://www.dissertationrecipes.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/AssumptionsLimitations-Delimitations-and-Scope-of-the-Study.pdf.
Simons, H. (2009). Case study research in practice. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
Skiba, R., & Sprague, J. (2008, September). Safety without suspensions. Educational Leadership,
38-43.
Somerville, S., (1989). Teen gets life in prison in shooting. Daily Press News. Retrieved from:
246

https://www.dailypress.com/news/dp-xpm-19891213-1989-12-13-8912130120story.html
Sprague, J., Colvin, G., Irvin, L. (1995). The Oregon school safety survey. Eugene, OR: The
Institute on Violence and Destructive Behavior. Retrieved from
http://pages.uoregon.edu/eval/pdf/OSSS1X.pdf
Sprague, J., Smith, S., & Stieber, S. (2002). Principal perceptions of school safety. Journal of
School Violence, 1(4), 51-64. doi:10.1300/J202v01n04_04.
STOP School Violence Act of 2018: Student, Teachers, and Officers Preventing School Violence
Act 2018. U.S.C. 115, 2017-1018. Pub. L. 115-141, II Sec, D.(s), T. (V), enacted March
23, 2018.
Sussman, T. J., Jin, J., & Mohanty, A. (2016). Top-down and bottom-up factors in threat-related
perception and attention in anxiety. Biological Psychology, 121(Part B), 160–172.
https://doi-org.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2016.08.006
Swanson, E., Thompson, C., Fingerhut, H., (April 16, 2019). AP-NORC Poll: Most believe
schools have become less safe. ApNews.com: retrieved from:
https://www.apnews.com/39a6676a68ca4e81bc22253bb1e84eeb
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Pub. L. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197, enacted
June 19, 1968, codified at 34 U.S.C. § 10101-10554.
Theriot, M. T. (2009). School resource officers and the criminalization of student behavior.
Journal of Criminal Justice, 37(3), 280–287. doi:10.1016/j. jcrimjus.2009.04.008
Timmons, V., & Cairns, E. (2010). Case Study Research in Education. In Albert J. Mills, G.
Durepos, & E. Wiebe (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Case Study Research. (pp. 100-103).
247

Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. doi:
http://dx.doi.org.proxy1.ncu.edu/10.4135/9781412957397.n36
Trump, K. S. (2019). In Support of Lockdown. Best’s Review, 120(4), 57–59. Retrieved from
https://searchebscohostcom.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bft&AN=13
5551289&site=eds-live&scope=site
Tschannen-Moran, M., Hoy, A., & Hoy, W. (1998). Teacher efficacy: Its meaning and
measure. Review of Educational Research, 68(2), 202. Retrieved
from https://login.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login?auth=shibb&url=https://search-ebscohostcom.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=edsjsr&AN=edsjsr.1170754&site=e
ds-live&scope=site
Ujifusa, A. (2018). New Federal School Safety Grant Winners Include Board of Education for
Parkland. Education Week, accessed March 20, 2019. Retrieved from:
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2018/10/school-safety-grant-winnersjustice-department-stop-act-parkland.html
Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., Reddy, M., Borum, R., & Modzeleski, W. (2004). The ﬁnal report and
ﬁndings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the prevention of school attacks in
the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Education.
Wallenfeldt, J. (2016). Texas tower shooting of 1966. Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved from:
https://www.britannica.com/event/Texas-Tower-shooting-of-1966
Warnick, B. R., Johnson, B. A., & Rocha, S. (2010). TRAGEDY AND THE MEANING OF
SCHOOL SHOOTINGS. Educational Theory, 60(3), 371-390. Retrieved from
https://login.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest248

com.ezproxy.net.ucf.edu/docview/744663795?accountid=10003
Wildavsky, A. B. (1988). Searching for safety (Vol. 10). Transaction publishers.
Williams, S., Schneider, M., Wornell, C., Langhinrichsen-Rohling, J. (2018). Student’s
perceptions of school safety: It is not just about being bullied. The Journal of School
Nursing 2018, Vol. 34(4) 319-330.
Wilson, D.B., Gottfredson, G.D., & Najaka, S.S. (2001). School-based prevention of problem
behaviors: A meta-analysis. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 17, 247-272.
Winton, R., (November 21, 2019). Santa Clarita shooting: Weapon used in Saugus High attack a
'ghost gun,' sheriff says". Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from:
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-11-21/santa-clarita-shooting-45-calibergun-saugus-high-attack-a-ghost-gun-sheriff-says
Wright Jr, R. J. (2015). Rural teacher's perceptions of safety on Texas high school campuses.
Lamar University-Beaumont.
Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: Design and method (4th Edition). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Zullig, K. J., Ghani, N., Collins, R., & Matthews-Ewald, M. R. (2017). Preliminary Development
of the Student Perceptions of School Safety Officers Scale. Journal of School
Violence, 16(1), 104–118.

249

